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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
Casual observation conﬁrms that some people are unemployed against their will
while at the same time some ﬁrms have diﬃculties in ﬁnding suitable workers.
Both ﬁrms and workers spend time and energy on ﬁnding suitable matches; shops
compete to lure in customers and; not all similar goods sell for the same price
nor do all similar workers receive the same compensation. Everyone is familiar
with these phenomena. Yet, their analysis is a relatively recent endeavor within
economics. It is called search theory, and it is the framework that I employ to
analyze the role of ﬁrm size.
In the standard theory there is a centralized market. The equilibrium price
is determined at the intersection of the demand and supply curves. There is one
price and all market participants willing to trade at this price do so. The market
is in this sense frictionless. Clearly, this setting doesn’t easily lend itself to the
study of questions related to involuntarily unemployment or why similar goods
trade for diﬀerent prices. In order to analyze these questions it is useful to leave
the world of centralized frictionless Walrasian markets of textbook economics and
enter the world of search theory. This was realized already in the 1960’s when the
ﬁrst search models were developed.
Search theory is extensively used in labor economics, monetary economics as
well as in analyzing goods and housing markets. The recent economic crises and
1
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the ensuing high levels of unemployment have only heightened the interest in search
theory. The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred
Nobel was in 2010 awarded to Peter Diamond, Christopher Pissarides, and Dale
Mortensen for their analysis of markets with search frictions. One of the motiva-
tions mentioned in the press release is that the theory "helps us understand the
ways in which unemployment, job vacancies and wages are aﬀected by regulation
and economic policy".
There are several excellent surveys on diﬀerent strands of search theory1. Be-
low, I will brieﬂy describe some of the main developments. Note that some of the
models are described in a goods market context with buyers and sellers while other
models are set in a labour market with vacancies and unemployed. This does not
matter from a pure theory perspective as any of the search models below can be
interpreted in both contexts.
Stigler (1961) is among the ﬁrst search models. Stiegler starts by making
the empirical observation that even seemingly very similar goods sell for diﬀerent
prices. He asserts that buyers don’t know the prices of individual stores before
they have sampled them. After sampling some of the stores the buyers buy from
the cheapest store in their sample. In this setup Stiegler solves for the optimal
sample sizes of the buyers. That there is price dispersion for similar goods in the
ﬁrst place is not exactly modelled. It is however explained as resulting from the
market participants not knowing the exact levels of supply and demand.
In sequential search models, developed by McCall (1970) and Grounau (1971)
the searchers no longer have to decide in advance how many oﬀers to sample. It is
assumed that a job searcher knows the distribution of wage oﬀers in the economy
but doesn’t know the oﬀers of individual ﬁrms before sampling them. The oﬀers to
an unemployed worker then arrive one per period and unemployment (and search)
ends when the worker accepts an oﬀer. In this stopping problem it is optimal
for the worker to set a reservation wage and reject all oﬀers below this wage and
accept the ﬁrst oﬀer above the threshold.
One limitation of the sequential search models is that they only analyze the
behavior of one side of the market, e.g. the unemployed looking for work. Among
1The interested reader is referred to Diamond (2008), Shi (2008), Rogerson et al. (2005),
Mortensen (2008) and Mortensen and Pissarides (2011).
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the ﬁrst equilibrium search models are the so called random search models. In
these models buyers (unemployed) meet sellers (ﬁrms) randomly. The number of
matches (an employee getting a vacancy or a buyer managing to acquire a good) is
decided by an exogenous matching function that depends on the market tightness,
i.e.,the ratio of vacancies to unemployed in the economy. After a match is formed
the price (wage) is determined. If wages were decided by take it or leave it oﬀers
by the sellers and the sellers could commit to the oﬀers then all sellers would
enjoy a local monopoly due to switching costs and thus the ﬁrms would charge
the monopoly price and leave no surplus to the buyers. Thus, with positive search
costs buyers would anticipate the monopoly prices and would hence not engage in
search to begin with. In the extreme case this leads to the collapse of the market
and no trade (see Diamond 1971). In reality, however, trade takes place, thus the
result is often referred to as the Diamond paradox.
Later Diamond (1982), Mortensen (1982a, 1982b) and Pissarides (1984, 1985)
let the terms of the trades be determined e.g. by Nash bargaining. This usually
results in that the buyers receive some of the surplus. The idea is that both the
unemployed and the ﬁrms incur costs from continued search. Neither is willing to
accept terms that are worse than the expected value of continued search, which
establishes the threat points of the two sides. The actual wage settled on is then
a function of the negotiating strength of the two sides. To ﬁnd equilibrium it is
assumed that there is a ﬁxed number of workers and the number of vacancies is
decided by free entry, ﬁrms enter the market as long as it oﬀers them at least the
same utility as their outside option. There is usually a ﬁxed cost associated with
the creation of one vacancy.
In analyzing decentralized markets, such as labour markets, it is of interest to
know whether they are eﬃcient. The criterion that is used is called constrained
eﬃciency. A market is eﬃcient if a planner maximizing social welfare, and facing
the same frictions as the agents, is unable to improve upon the market outcome. In
random search models the outcome is eﬃcient only if the ﬁrms’ expected revenue
is equal to the social value created by a marginal ﬁrm. For this requirement to
be met the wage share of the workers must equal the elasticity of the matching
function with respect to unemployment (see Hosios 1990). To understand the
Hosios condition note that a ﬁrm entering the market creates two externalities.
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Firstly, it increases the probability by which workers ﬁnd a match. This is a
positive externality. The negative externality is that it decreases the probability
by which other ﬁrms ﬁnd a match. When the Hosios condition holds these eﬀects
are equal and cancel out. In random search models both the workers’ wage share
and the elasticity of the matching function are exogenous, and thus the Hosios
condition holds only when designed to do so, i.e. when the exogenous parameters
are chosen to satisfy it.
The drawback of the random search models is that the ﬁrms cannot use wages
to aﬀect the probabilities by which buyers visit them. The focus of my thesis is on
how the market structure or the size of ﬁrms in an economy aﬀects prices, wages,
welfare, eﬃciency, unemployment or the average length of unemployment spells.
In order to address these questions in an equilibrium setting I therefore turn to
the next generation of search models, i.e. directed search.
First, however I brieﬂy discuss market structure. I deﬁne market structure as
the size and number of trading locations in an economy. A trading location might
consist of a single, possibly capacity constrained seller or of several competing sell-
ers. Important is that trade within the same location is frictionless, if a seller runs
out of a good then the buyers visiting the location can buy the good from another
seller within the same location. The single location setting could correspond to
similar neighboring shops in a shopping mall or stalls at a farmers market. Then,
if there is uncertainty about the size of demand,i.e., on how many buyers will show
up, then the sellers use mixed pricing strategies in a symmetric equilibrium. Some
sellers would ask a low price and sell almost certainly while other sellers would ask
a higher price and sell only when demand is high. Thus, there is price dispersion
also in a single centralized market with capacity constrained sellers. This setting
goes back to Prescott (1975) in his example of hotel competition. Later the eﬀect
of demand uncertainty on pricing has been modelled by Dana (1999). Price com-
petition between capacity constrained sellers in a decentralized market is analyzed
in the directed search literature discussed next.
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1.1.1 Directed search
I model search frictions by letting the market structure be decentralized in the
sense that capacity constrained ﬁrms are at diﬀerent locations and the buyers
decide which ﬁrm to visit. The buyers have unit demand. The ﬁrms post prices
(wages) and buyers (workers) decide on which ﬁrm to contact based on the posted
price. I follow the directed search literature2 and capture the search frictions by
assuming that the agents cannot coordinate their actions and, hence, I focus on
symmetric strategies where the buyers visit all ﬁrms posting the same price with
the same probability. Then a single capacity constrained ﬁrm can be visited by too
few buyers in which case some of the goods are left unsold or by too many buyers
in which case some of the buyers are left without the good. If the buyers could
perfectly coordinate their actions e.g., by jointly deciding for each buyer which
ﬁrm he visits, then perfect eﬃciency could again be achieved; the largest possible
number of trades would take place. It is illustrative to consider an economy with
two sellers with one good each and two buyers. Then, both goods would clearly
be traded if the buyers could coordinate on which seller to visit. However, if the
buyers cannot coordinate, but contact each ﬁrm with probability 1/2, then the
probability that not all goods are traded is 1/2.
In directed search models both the sellers and buyers face a non-trivial trade-
oﬀ between the posted price and the probability of trade. By lowering his price a
seller can expect to be visited by a larger number of buyers. In equilibrium the
buyers have to be indiﬀerent between the sellers they visit.
The trade-oﬀ between prices and probability of trade is actually a key char-
acteristic of directed search. Moen (1997) formulates directed search by letting
each wage level constitute a submarket with its own market tightness or expected
queue length. In equilibrium the workers distribute themselves between the sub-
markets so that they are indiﬀerent between any oﬀered wage (if possible) and
expect the same market utility from them all. The property of market utility to-
gether with free entry leads identical ﬁrms to post identical wages. Interestingly,
the equilibrium wage fully internalizes the search externalities and satisﬁes the
2The directed search formulation goes back to Peters (1991), Moen (1997), Shimer (1996) and
Burdett et al (2001).
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Hosios condition.
Although highly useful, directed search models are rather restrictive in some
respects. A ﬁrm is assumed to possess a single good or a single vacancy and a
worker sends a single application (per period). Recent contributions to directed
search theory aim to expand the applicability of directed search models by tackling
these restrictions. Albrecht et al. (2008) and Galenianos and Kircher (2008) allow
workers to apply to more then one ﬁrm. I allow ﬁrms to hold multiple units of a
good or to post multiple vacancies.
In a decentralized market it matters whether there are relatively few ﬁrms, each
with several goods or many locations with fewer goods. Stated diﬀerently: The size
of ﬁrms aﬀects the frictions and number of matches, i.e., trades in the economy.
An economy with, say 200 goods and 200 buyers is very diﬀerent depending on
whether the goods are divided between 2 ﬁrms or between 50 ﬁrms. If there
were only one large ﬁrm the market would be frictionless; all mutually beneﬁcial
trades would again take place. A question that to my knowledge hasn’t been
satisfactorily analyzed in the literature is how the average size of ﬁrms aﬀects the
number of trades or equivalently, in a labor market setting, how the average number
of vacancies aﬀects the employment rates. In this thesis I explicitly investigate this
relationship.
I am not the ﬁrst to recognize the importance of ﬁrm size; Burdett et all.
(2001) show that the size of ﬁrms matter. They study capacity choice in a labor
market when the ﬁrms’ capacity is either one or two. Their result is indicative
but it is not based on equilibrium analysis. The paper ﬁnds that ﬁrm size aﬀects
matching frictions and thus both the equilibrium wages and unemployment levels.
This ﬁnding is used to partly explain observed shifts in the Beveridge curve. (The
Beveridge curve depicts the relationship between the number of vacancies and
unemployment.) Figure 1, below, depicts the Beveridge curve in the US for recent
years.
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Figure 1: Example of a Beveridge curve (Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics,
Current Population Survey and Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey, June
19, 2012.)
Lester (2010) endogenizes capacity in a directed search model of the labor
market. He restricts capacity to at most two and ﬁnds a unique equilibrium. In
this thesis I allow for any capacity and can thus better analyze the eﬀects of ﬁrm
size on the economy. Tan (2011) explains why large ﬁrms pay higher wages than
small ﬁrms by assuming that ﬁrms have diﬀerent optimal sizes and that they incur
a cost for operating below their capacity.
Watanabe (2010) describes a model where sellers can choose to be farmers that
produce one good or to be merchants/middlemen who can store several goods but
need to buy them from the farmers. The middlemen are able to restock their goods
between periods and buy the leftover goods from farmers at price zero between the
periods. The reason for the zero price and lack of competition between merchants
at the restocking market is that the discount factor of all agents is zero and thus
they don’t value future payoﬀs. Given the measure of sellers the model endogenizes
the steady state measure of merchants.
Geromichalos (2008) studies more general mechanisms in the product market.
The main diﬀerence to our approach is that production takes place after the loca-
tional demand is realized while in our model the production costs are sunk at the
time of trading, which in general is a diﬃcult problem in some settings leading to
hold-up problems.
Hawkins (2012) considers a rich set of wage contracts. In his model ﬁrms can
create any number of vacancies, possibly with diﬀerent wages. Workers are homo-
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geneous and a single ﬁrm can substitute workers between vacancies. A competitive
search equilibrium is shown to exist and is characterized when ﬁrms announce at
most two vacancies. The main focus of the paper is on the eﬃciency properties of
the equilibrium; if ﬁrms cannot commit to the number of workers they hire then
the equilibrium need not be constrained eﬃcient. In our setting the ﬁrms bear
the costs of production at the time they announce their capacity and price/wage.
This assumption is natural in product markets, where ﬁrms have to acquire their
goods before selling them. Also in labor markets at least some of the costs related
to the creation of vacancies has to be born by the ﬁrms before the hiring of new
workers.
1.2 Contribution of the thesis/ Chapter summary
The general theme of my thesis is to analyze the role of ﬁrm size in an economy
with search frictions. In Chapters 2 and 3 I let the ﬁrms to choose their capacity in
addition to the price they post. The sellers then face a non-trivial trade-oﬀ between
increasing per unit costs and increasing the expected number of customers. I solve
for the equilibrium price-capacity pairs and analyze the eﬃciency properties of
equilibrium.
In the last two chapters I analyze market structures where several capacity
constrained sellers share a single location. In chapter 4 I show that the equilibrium
strategies of the sellers and the beliefs of the buyers in a limit economy can be
derived from ﬁnite economies thus making the assumption of an inﬁnite number
well founded. In chapter 5 I then compare three often observed market structures
in terms of price and expected utilities when there is a large ﬁrm and a fringe of
small capacity constrained ﬁrms.
All chapters of my thesis are self contained.
1.2.1 Chapter 2: "Directed Search with Endogenous Ca-
pacity"
In this chapter I derive the equilibrium capacities and prices in a large market
with search frictions. This allows me to answer questions such as: What is the
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equilibrium size of ﬁrms in a market with frictions? and How many matches are
formed and what are the welfare costs of the frictions when ﬁrm size is endoge-
nously determined? In the directed search literature these questions are still largely
unanswered. The main contributions of the chapter are as follows.
Firstly, I endogenize capacity choice and the number of active sellers in a
directed search model with free entry. I show that there is no equilibrium with a
linear cost function, but strictly increasing per unit costs are needed for equilibrium
to exist. Then equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient, a planner constrained by the
same search frictions would choose the same capacities and the same number of
active sellers. In addition, I show the equivalence of posted prices and auctions for
the multi-unit case. This result can be used to simplify calculations.
Secondly, I demonstrate that the welfare costs due to frictions become much less
pronounced when ﬁrms choose their capacity compared to the standard case. This
eﬀect can be found whenever the cost function is such that the equilibrium capacity
of ﬁrms is above one. Already quite modest capacities substantially alleviate the
welfare costs of frictions.
Thirdly, while my model describes an economy with buyers and sellers it can
easily be rewritten to describe job market search. I do so in a steady state ex-
tension of the model where I show how the equilibrium size of the ﬁrms aﬀects
unemployment, the distribution of wages and the expected length of unemploy-
ment. The ﬁndings are in line with the ﬁndings in the static case. The results
from my model can be used to evaluate the expected eﬀectiveness of job creation
policies.
Fourthly, I show that equilibrium exists and analyze it also when there is a
ﬁxed amount of sellers, or no free entry.
1.2.2 Chapter 3: "Directed Search and Divisible Goods"
In this chapter I derive the equilibrium capacity of sellers in a market with fric-
tions when capacity is divisible. I let the buyers utility function be linear. One
unexpected result is that when buyers demand at most one unit of a good or one
vacancy the equivalence between posted prices and auctions established in Kultti
(1999) no longer holds. While the equilibrium capacities under both trading rules
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are constrained eﬃcient and identical the expected utilities of the buyers and sell-
ers diﬀer. The average price of goods is lower when ﬁrms post prices than when
trades are decided by auction at the sellers locations. Thus the expected utility
of the ﬁrms is lower under price posting than when trades are decided by auction.
Similarly the expected utility of the buyers is higher under price posting. This
ﬁnding might be relevant for markets with part time labour. It would be interest-
ing to analyze data on how wages in occupations with a large proportion of part
time vacancies are determined.
Capacity choice with perfectly divisible goods has been surprisingly little ana-
lyzed in the directed search literature. Kultti and Riipinen (2003), Julien, Kennes
and King (2008) and Dutu, Julien and King (2009) have done so in a monetary
search setting but these papers assume that production takes place after the loca-
tional demands have been realized while I assume that production costs are sunk
at the time of trading.
1.2.3 Chapter 4: “Convergence of Finite Clustered Mar-
kets”
The ﬁnite economy foundations of search models of decentralized economies with
frictions are well established. In this chapter I show that the pricing strategies of
capacity constrained sellers in a ﬁnite model of a centralized economy with uncer-
tainty about demand converge to those of the limit economy. This is important
as it demonstrates that the simplifying assumption of a continuum of agents is
well motivated. In the model that I analyze the sellers are clustered together in a
single location. There are no search frictions and the buyers are served in order
of appearance. The only friction is that the total number of buyers is stochastic.
Thus, if there are fewer buyers than sellers then only the lowest price items are
sold whereas if there are more buyers than sellers then all items are sold.
I start by analyzing a ﬁnite economy where the strategy of the sellers is well
deﬁned. In this ﬁnite setting I show that the sellers have a unique strategy in
mixed prices. Then I let the number of agents in the economy grows without limit
while keeping the ratio of sellers to buyers constant. I show that the equilibrium
strategies of the sellers converge to those I get by directly assuming a continuum
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of agents. In addition I show that the buyers’ beliefs about the level of demand
converge.
These results, together with the well known results establishing the ﬁnite econ-
omy foundations of directed search, allow me to simplify the setup by starting
directly with a limit economy in Chapter 5, where I analyze pricing under three
diﬀerent market structures.
1.2.4 Chapter 5: "Pricing and Market Structure"
In the last paper of my thesis “Pricing and Market Structure”, I derive the equi-
librium pricing strategies under three often observed market structures in a model
with one large ﬁrm and a competitive fringe of small capacity constrained ﬁrms un-
der uncertain demand. The pricing strategies reﬂect the varying levels of frictions
and within-location competition induced by the market structures.
It is often observed that sellers of similar goods, say outdoor equipment or
children’s clothes, locate close to each other and that several smaller retailers are
found near a larger one. Another frequently observed market structure is one
with several small sellers in the city centre and large retailers in the outskirts
of the city. I deﬁne market structure as the locational distribution of ﬁrms and
analyze the eﬀect that diﬀerent market structures have on expected prices and
expected utilities and proﬁts. This can be seen as investigating the eﬀects of price
competition between locations versus price competition within a location. The
settings that I consider are:
(A) All ﬁrms are in the same location. This setting can be interpreted as
describing a city centre.
(B) The large ﬁrm is in one location and all the small ﬁrms are in a second
location. This setting can be seen as corresponding to a city center with small
ﬁrms and a large retailer at the outskirts of the city.
(C) All ﬁrms are at separate locations. This is self explanatory.
The relative ordering of the diﬀerent market structures by average price and
by expected utilities and revenues vary both between the market structures and
within a single market structure depending on the expected demand. There are
several reasons for this. Firstly, when the small sellers are together in a location
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 12
(as in market structures (A) and (B)) they use mixed pricing strategies. The
cheapest goods are then bought ﬁrst, leading to diﬀerences in the average and
realized prices when demand is less than the small ﬁrms’ capacity. The large ﬁrm’s
expected price is higher than that of the small ﬁrms in both market structures (A)
and (B). Thus, the average prices and the average realized prices diﬀer also for
high demand realizations. Secondly, when there are several locations as in market
structures (B) and (C) the locations compete for customers aﬀecting the prices.
These market structures induce extra frictions as now some buyers visiting the
small sellers are left without the good and not all small sellers are able to sell
even when demand is relatively high. The small ﬁrms’ prices reﬂect the need to
compensate the buyers for the possibility of being left without the good. It is clear
that these frictions aﬀect market structures (B) and (C) diﬀerently as the number
of locations and goods per location are diﬀerent. For the reasons above the eﬀect
of market structure on prices is highly nontrivial.
The diﬀerent market structures lead to diﬀerent pricing strategies for both the
large and the small ﬁrms. An implication is that a sample of posted prices and a
simple index based on these are not enough for comparing the market structures
in terms of expected utilities or expected revenues. Knowledge of the market
structure and potential demand, or alternatively expected demand, is needed as
well.
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Chapter 2
Directed Search with Endogenous
Capacity
2.1 Introduction1
Recently the role that ﬁrm size has on prices (wages) and on the predicted number
of matches has received attention in the search literature. In this spirit I aim to
answer questions such as: What is the equilibrium size of ﬁrms in a market with
frictions? and How many matches are formed and what are the welfare costs of
the frictions given the size distribution of the ﬁrms?.
In search models the number of goods or vacancies that a ﬁrm has to oﬀer
is typically set to one. When larger capacity is allowed for, it is usually either
exogenously given or the ﬁrms are given a choice between holding one unit and
holding two units. Casual observation conﬁrms that ﬁrms often stock more than
a single good or announce more than a single vacancy. It is known that the size
of ﬁrms aﬀects the frictions and number of matches in the economy. An economy
with, say 1000 goods and 1000 buyers is very diﬀerent depending on whether the
goods are divided between 2 sellers or between 1000 sellers. If there were only one
large seller the market would be frictionless. One aim of this paper is to analyze
the welfare costs or ineﬃciencies of frictions given the equilibrium capacities of the
ﬁrms. Natural benchmarks to contrast my results with are Walrasian (frictionless)
1This chapter is based on a mimeo by the same name that is joint work with Klaus Kultti.
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markets and standard directed search models where ﬁrms hold unit capacities
(maximal search frictions).
Following the directed search literature2 I let capacity constrained ﬁrms com-
pete by posting prices (wages) and the buyers (workers) decide on which ﬁrm to
contact based on the prices and the matching probabilities at the ﬁrms. The search
frictions are captured by focusing on symmetric equilibria where the buyers mix
upon which seller to visit. This leads to uncertainty of the demand that each seller
faces. If the number of buyers visiting a seller exceeds the seller’s capacity the good
gets rationed so that some of the buyers will be left without the good, while if the
number of buyers visiting a seller is less than the capacity of the seller then some of
the goods will be left unsold. Novel to my approach is that I allow ﬁrms to choose
their capacity. From a single ﬁrm’s perspective an increase in capacity leads to
higher revenue per unit due to more eﬃcient matching at its location. To oﬀset
this eﬀect I assume that marginal costs of holding capacity are strictly increasing.
My main results are as follows. Firstly, I endogenize capacity choice and the
number of active sellers in a directed search model with free entry. I show that there
is no equilibrium with a linear cost function, but strictly increasing marginal costs
are needed for equilibrium to exist. To characterize equilibrium I ﬁrst show that
there is a one-to-one relationship between equilibrium and the planner’s solution,
then I demonstrate that the planner’s solution is straightforward to ﬁnd. Given
the equilibrium size of ﬁrms it is easy to ﬁnd the expected number of matches in
the economy and to analyze the welfare loss due to frictions. In addition, I show
the equivalence of posted prices and auctions for the multi-unit case. This result
can be used to simplify calculations.
Secondly, I demonstrate that the welfare loss due to frictions becomes much less
pronounced when I allow ﬁrms to choose their capacity whenever the cost function
is such that the equilibrium capacity of ﬁrms is above one. Interestingly, already
quite modest capacities substantially alleviate the welfare costs of frictions.
Thirdly, while our model describes an economy with buyers and sellers it can
easily be rewritten to describe job market search. I do so in a dynamic steady
state extension of the model where I show how the equilibrium size of the ﬁrms
2The directed search formulation goes back to Montgomery (1991), Peters (1991), Moen
(1997), Shimer (1996) and Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001).
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aﬀects unemployment, the distribution of wages and the expected length of un-
employment. As not all ﬁrms are able to hire all the workers they need within
one period a size distribution of ﬁrms arises quite naturally. The diﬀerently sized
ﬁrms have diﬀerent labour demands and pay diﬀerent wages in equilibrium. My
ﬁndings on the welfare costs due to frictions are in line with the ﬁndings in the
static case. The results can be used to evaluate the expected eﬀectiveness of job
creation policies.
Fourthly, I show that equilibrium exists and analyze it also when there is a
ﬁxed amount of sellers, or no free entry.
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 I introduce the model and the
timeline of the game. The price setting behavior of ﬁrms is analyzed both when
ﬁrms have the same capacity and when the capacities are diﬀerent. In section 3
I deﬁne free entry equilibrium, solve the planner’s problem and show that there
is a one-to-one mapping between the solution to the planner’s problem and any
free entry equilibrium. In section 4 equilibrium is analyzed when the measure of
sellers is ﬁxed. In section 5 I demonstrate exactly how the welfare implied by our
model diﬀers from the standard model where it is assumed that all sellers have
capacity set to unity under diﬀerent parameter values of a cost function. In section
6 the equilibrium wage dispersion in the economy as well as the expected time of
unemployment in a steady state are analyzed. I again contrast our results to those
obtained in the standard model. The conclusions are presented in Section 7.
Related literature There is an extensive literature on directed search. I brieﬂy
discuss the most relevant contributions. Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001) show that
the size of ﬁrms matter. They study capacity choice in a labor market when the
ﬁrms’ capacity is either one or two. Their result is indicative but it is not based on
equilibrium analysis. The paper ﬁnds that ﬁrm size aﬀects matching frictions and
thus both the equilibrium wages and unemployment levels. This ﬁnding is used to
explain observed shifts in the Beveridge curve. Lester (2010) endogenizes capacity
in a directed search model of the labor market. The setup in his model is quite
similar to ours in that ﬁrms bear the costs of creating capacity before production
takes place. Lester lets the ﬁrms choose between posting one and posting two
vacancies and characterizes equilibrium of the game. Our model allows ﬁrms to
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choose any capacity and is therefore better suited for studying questions such as
equilibrium employment levels and the average duration of unemployment as a
function of the costs of the ﬁrms.
Tan (2011) explains why large ﬁrms pay higher wages than small ﬁrms by
assuming that ﬁrms have diﬀerent optimal sizes and that they incur a cost for
operating below their capacity. In a model where ﬁrms can hire at most two
workers the paper ﬁnds the fraction of ﬁrms that choose to operate with either
capacity.
Watanabe (2010) describes a model where sellers can choose to be farmers that
produce one good or to be merchants/middlemen who can store several goods but
need to buy them from the farmers. The middlemen are able to restock their goods
between periods and buy the leftover goods from farmers at price zero between the
periods. The reason for the zero price and lack of competition between merchants
at the restocking market is that the discount factor of all agents is zero and thus
they don’t value future payoﬀs. Given the measure of sellers the model endogenizes
the steady state measure of merchants. In Watanabe (2011) the assumption of a
zero discount factor is relaxed. The cost of this relaxation is that the sellers
are no longer allowed the choice between remaining as sellers (with capacity at
unity) or middlemen; it is assumed that there are always enough sellers for the
restocking price to be the sellers continuation value. The measure of middlemen
is then determined for any capacity by imposing a zero proﬁt condition on the
middlemen. The middlemen are found to have a positive eﬀect on overall utility.
The diﬀerence to the current paper is that I allow for a richer strategy set of the
ﬁrms; in particular, capacity in our model is a choice variable of the sellers.
Geromichalos (2008) studies more general mechanisms in the product market.
The main diﬀerence to our paper is that production takes place after the locational
demand is realized while in our model the production costs are sunk at the time
of trading. This assumption is natural in product markets, where ﬁrms have to
acquire their goods before selling them. Also in labor markets at least some of the
costs related to the creation of vacancies has to be borne by the ﬁrms before the
hiring of new workers.
Hawkins (2012) considers a rich set of wage contracts. In his model ﬁrms can
create any number of vacancies, possibly with diﬀerent wages. In the main part of
CHAPTER 2. DIRECTED SEARCH WITH ENDOGENOUS CAPACITY 21
the analysis production takes place after the number of ﬁrm speciﬁc matches are
realized. Workers are homogeneous and a ﬁrm can substitute workers between va-
cancies. A competitive search equilibrium is shown to exist and it is characterized
when ﬁrms announce at most two vacancies. The main focus of the paper is on
the eﬃciency properties of the equilibrium; if ﬁrms cannot commit to the number
of workers they hire then the equilibrium need not be constrained eﬃcient. This
result is interesting as the welfare loss due to frictions would then be higher than
in our model where the ﬁrms can commit to both the wages and the number of
workers they hire.
2.2 The model
The environment consists of a continuum of size 1 of buyers and a large continuum
of potential sellers of which θ−1 are active in the market. The ratio of buyers to
active sellers is thus θ. The sellers choose their capacity in units of the indivisible
good and post binding prices. Both the capacity and the price of each seller are
observable. Each buyer has unit demand and can visit only one seller. Buyers
value the good at one, sellers at zero. The sellers choose their capacity and price
so as to maximize their expected revenue minus cost. The revenue to the sellers is
the price times the number of trades. The buyers maximize their expected utility
deﬁned as their utility from the good minus its price times the probability by which
they end up with a good.
The order of events is as follows: In stage 1 the active sellers choose capacities
k ∈ N. In stage 2 the sellers choose prices. In stage 3 the buyers choose which
seller to visit. This is a game of perfect information, as the actions of the previous
stages are perfectly observed by the players.
I capture the frictions by focusing on symmetric equilibrium strategies for the
buyers. I further assume that the strategies of both the sellers and the buyers
are anonymous. Loosely stated anonymity here means that sellers with the same
capacity and the same price are treated identically by the buyers and all buyers
are treated identically by the sellers.
A strategy of a seller i consists of his choice of capacity ki and his posted price
qi, given his capacity and the distribution H of capacities chosen by sellers. The
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pricing strategy qi is a map qi: {H ∪ {ki}} → [0, 1].
The buyers maximize their expected utility. They choose which type of seller
to visit. When there are diﬀerent capacity-price pairs the buyers adjust their
behavior so that they are indiﬀerent between visiting the diﬀerent types of sellers
and expect the market utilityM from them all. This adjustment of behavior leads
to diﬀerent ratios of buyers to sellers, i.e., expected queue lengths3, that the sellers
face. A seller with k goods and price q thus faces queue length βk,q(θ,M) that
depends on the overall market tightness θ and and the market utility M . When
the queue length is β the number of buyers that visit a seller is a discrete random
variable that has the Poisson distribution4 with parameter β, the probability
that a seller is visited by exactly j buyers then has the probability mass function
P [x = j] = e−β β
j
j!
.
2.2.1 Identical capacities
I begin by analyzing a situation where all sellers have identical capacities and
identical price. After this I solve for price given the distribution of capacities and
ﬁnally for the equilibrium capacities.
Sellers’ proﬁt When all sellers have capacity k and price q all sellers face queue
length θ. The probability that exactly j buyers visit a seller is then P [x = j] =
e−θ θ
j
j!
. The probability that at most k buyers visit a seller is thus given by the
Poisson cumulative distribution function Fθ(k) ≡
∑k
i=0 e
−θ θi
i!
. In this case he sells
as many units as he has customers giving him proﬁt q
∑k
i=0 e
−θ θi
i!
i = q (θFθ(k − 1)).
If more than k buyers visit the seller he still sells only k units. Thus the seller’s
expected proﬁt is captured by
πs = q [θFθ(k − 1) + k (1− Fθ (k))] . (2.1)
3In the remainder of the paper I will refer to expected queue length as queue length when the
meaning is otherwise clear.
4The motivation for the Poisson distribution is as follows. The buyers randomize over the
identical sellers. When the number of buyers and sellers is ﬁnite the number of buyers that a
seller meets follows the binomial distribution. Holding the ratio of buyers to sellers constant
and letting their numbers tend to inﬁnity the binominal distribution converges to the Poisson
distribution.
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Buyers’ utility A buyer visiting a seller expects the following utility:
ub = (1− q)
[
k−1∑
i=0
e−θ
θi
i!
+
∞∑
i=k
e−θ
θi
i!
k
i+ 1
]
= (1− q)
[
Fθ(k − 1) + k
θ
(1− Fθ(k))
]
, (2.2)
where (1− q) is the utility of the buyer if he gets the good. Given total demand,
the probability that there are fewer than k other buyers at the same location is
Fθ(k−1), in which case the buyer acquires the good for sure. If there are k or more
other buyers at the same location the good gets rationed, the k buyers’ probability
of acquiring the good is then k
θ
(1− Fθ(k)).
Price I analyze price formation when all sellers have the same capacity k. To
ﬁnd a symmetric equilibrium in price I ﬁrst assume that all sellers post price q and
examine the problem of a single seller considering a deviation to some price q˜. The
expected queue length β that the deviator faces is then decided by the indiﬀerence
condition of the buyers. In equilibrium the buyers distribute themselves so that
they are indiﬀerent between contacting the deviator and the non-deviator. Thus
β is given by
(1− q)
[
Fθ(k − 1) + k
θ
(1− Fθ(k))
]
= (1− q˜)
[
Fβ(k − 1) + k
β
(1− Fβ(k))
]
.
The deviating seller maximizes his expected proﬁt
max
q˜
q˜ [βFβ(k − 1) + k (1− Fβ (k))] .
The symmetric equilibrium price q is such that the optimal deviation is to q. This
holds whenever q is as in Proposition 1.
Proposition 2.1 When all sellers have capacity k the equilibrium price q is given
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by5
q =
k (1− Fθ (k))
k (1− Fθ(k)) + θFθ (k − 1) . (2.3)
Proof. The proof is found in the appendix
The only non-standard part of the proof is the derivation of the oﬀ-equilibrium
queue length. To derive the queue length faced by a single (measure zero) seller
I begin by analyzing the queue lengths in an alternative economy where multiple
sellers, or more precisely proportion  of the sellers, deviate. I denote the equilib-
rium price in this economy by q() and analyze deviations to q˜ (). I then derive
the ﬁrst order condition of the deviators and impose the equilibrium condition that
q˜ () = q(). Then I let  tend to zero to get the equilibrium price q 6.
2.2.2 Diﬀerent capacities
I need to understand the price setting behavior when there are sellers of diﬀerent
capacities in order to analyze their ﬁrst stage capacity choice. To this end I analyze
price setting when there are sellers of two diﬀerent capacities. The result can be
generalized to any ﬁnite number of diﬀerent capacities.
Prices
The equilibrium prices are solved in a similar way as in the last section. First I
postulate that price q is the price for ﬁrms with capacity k and r is the price for
ﬁrms with capacity l. The buyers distribute themselves so that they are indiﬀerent
between the sellers. To ﬁnd the expected queue length and hence payoﬀ of a seller
5Note that when all sellers have unit capacity, i.e., k = 1, then the equilibrium price is
q = 1−e
−θ−θe−θ
1−e−θ , just as in the standard directed search model.
6There are at least three other approaches in the directed search literature that can be used for
ﬁnding the oﬀ-equilibrium expected queue lengths. Galenianos and Kircher (2009) introduce a
fraction of  of noise sellers that post every price in [0, 1] and lets  tend to zero and can therefore
deﬁne the meeting rates and thus expected proﬁts for any price in the support. Burdet, Shi
and Wright (2001) solve for subgame perfect equilibria in a ﬁnite model and let the number of
buyers and sellers tend to inﬁnity keeping their ratio constant. In the market utility approach
that is used e.g. by Moen (1997) and Shimer (1996) buyers respond to sellers’ deviations so
that they receive the same utility by going to the deviators as going to the non-deviators, i.e.
the market utility. All these approaches yield the same result as our approach. The main gain
in our approach is that it makes the strategic interactions of the players explicit.
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with capacity k who deviates from price q I let a proportion  of sellers deviate
and quote price q˜ ().7 One diﬀerence to the proof in the last section is that there
are two indiﬀerence conditions that have to be satisﬁed as the buyers have to be
indiﬀerent between the three kinds of sellers. I thus have three groups of buyers;
those who contact sellers with quantity-price pair (l, r), those who contact sellers
with quantity-price pair (k, q ()), and those who contact the sellers with quantity-
price pair (k, q˜ ()).
Proposition 2.2 When proportion s of the sellers have capacity l and proportion
1− s of the sellers have capacity k the equilibrium prices q and r are given by
q =
k (1− Fα (k))
k (1− Fα (k)) + αFα(k − 1)
and
r =
l (1− Fβ (l))
l (1− Fβ (l)) + βFβ(l − 1) (2.4)
where the subscripts α = 1−ω
1−s θ and β =
ω
s
θ refer to the expected queue lengths and
where ω is the proportion of buyers going to capacity l sellers.
Proof. The proof of the proposition is similar to the proof of Proposition 1 and
is found in the appendix.
It immediately follows from Proposition 2 that there is price dispersion when
there are sellers with diﬀerent capacities. Translated to a model with job applicants
and ﬁrms Proposition 2 means that in equilibrium similar workers are paid diﬀerent
wages when there are ﬁrms of diﬀerent size.
Sellers’ proﬁt and buyers’ utility
If there are sellers of two diﬀerent capacities, k and l, then their expected proﬁts
π(k) and π(l) are determined by the following expressions.
π(k) = q [αFα(k − 1) + k(1− Fα(k))]− c(k) = k (1− Fα(k))− c(k), (2.5)
7The process for ﬁnding the queue length, and hence the expected payoﬀ, that a seller with
capacity l faces when deviating from the equilibrium price r is identical.
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where [αFα(k − 1) + k(1− Fα(k))] is the expected number of trades and c is the
cost function. The proﬁt of sellers with capacity l is
π(l) = r [βFβ(l − 1) + l(1− Fβ(l))]− c(l) = l (1− Fβ(l))− c(l). (2.6)
To derive the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition, that determines the queue lengths α
and β, ﬁrst note that the buyers’ utility if they acquire a good for price q is
1− q = k(1− Fα(k)) + αFα(k − 1)− k(1− Fα(k))
k(1− Fα(k)) + αFα(k − 1)
=
αFα(k − 1)
k(1− Fα(k)) + αFα(k − 1) . (2.7)
Thus the expected utility of a buyer visiting a seller with capacity-price pair (k, q)
is
αFα(k − 1)
k(1− Fα(k)) + αFα(k − 1) ·
[
Fα(k − 1) + k
α
(1− Fα(k))
]
= Fα(k − 1). (2.8)
Similarly, the expected utility from visiting a ﬁrm with capacity-price pair (l, r) is
βFβ(l − 1)
l(1− Fβ(l)) + βFβ(l − 1) ·
[
Fβ(l − 1) + l
β
(1− Fβ(l))
]
= Fβ(l − 1). (2.9)
The buyers’ indiﬀerence condition is simply
Fα (k − 1) = Fβ (l − 1) . (2.10)
Interestingly, the equilibrium prices make the expected utilities of the sellers
and buyers exactly what they would be were trades determined by auction at the
sellers’ locations. To see this note that the expected utility of a buyer visiting an
auction with k goods (and no reserve price) is equal to Fθ(k − 1), the probability
that at most k − 1 other buyers visit the auction. This is because the buyer’s
optimal strategy is to bid zero as long as there are at most as many buyers as
goods at the auction, and to bid up the price to unity whenever there are at least
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k other buyers at the auction. When there are auctions with k goods and auctions
with l goods the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition is again given by Eq. (2.10) and
the queue lengths α and β are exactly as when sellers compete by posting prices.
The buyers’ expected utility is thus the same under both trading mechanisms.
The bidding behavior of the buyers and hence the indiﬀerence condition, Eq.
(2.10), imply that the expected proﬁt of auctions with k and l goods are k (1− Fα(k))−
c(k) and l (1− Fβ(l))−c(l). Thus, also the sellers are indiﬀerent between the trad-
ing mechanisms. The equivalence between posted prices and auctions (see Kultti
1999) hence generalizes to the multi-unit case.
Observation Auctions and posted prices are payoﬀ equivalent.
2.3 Free Entry Equilibrium
I deﬁne equilibrium in a standard way (see e.g. Lester 2010). Then I show existence
and describe an algorithm that ﬁnds equilibrium. After this I discuss eﬃciency
properties of equilibrium. The free entry equilibrium consists of the following
parts.
a) Buyers’ optimal choice.
The buyers maximize their expected utility. Given the distribution of diﬀerent
capacity-price pairs F (kj, qj) the buyers adjust their behavior in equilibrium so
that they are indiﬀerent between visiting the diﬀerent capacity-price pairs and re-
ceive the market utilityM from from each type of seller. This adjustment of behav-
ior leads to diﬀerent expected queue lengths βk,q(θ,M) to the diﬀerent types of sell-
ers so that the expected utility of all buyers is M and
∫
βk,q(θ,M)dF (k
j, qj) = θ.
b) A seller’s optimal price q∗(k) given his capacity is, following section 2.2,
equal to
argmax
q
[
βk,q(θ,M)Fβk,q(θ,M)(k − 1) + (1− Fβk,q(θ)(k))k
]
.
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c) A seller’s optimal choice of capacity k∗ is, following section 2.4, equal to
argmax
k
πk(M) = argmax
k
{
q∗(k)
[
βk,q(θ,M) · Fβk,q(θ,M)(k − 1) + k(1− Fβk,q(θ,M)(k))
]
− c(k)
}
= argmax
k
{
k
(
1− F
βk,q(θ,M)
(k)
)
− c(k)
}
.
d) Free entry of sellers
The free entry condition implies that the measure of active sellers θ−1 is such
that the expected proﬁt of sellers πk(θ,M) is zero.
Deﬁnition 2.3 Let π∗(M) = max {πk(M)}. An free entry equilibrium is a distri-
bution F ∗(k, q) of capacities and prices across ﬁrms, a market utility M , queue
lengths βk,q(θ,M) such that (i) π
j
k(q
j,M) = π∗k(M) for all (k
j, qj) such that
dF ∗(kj, qj) > 0; (ii) πjk(q
j,M) ≤ π∗k(M) for all (kj, qj) such that dF ∗(kj, qj) = 0;
(iii) M and βk,q(θ,M) constitute a symmetric equilibrium of the third stage sub-
game where the buyers maximize their utility. The queue length βk,q(θ,M) is given
by the market utility condition whenever q < 1 −M and is set at zero whenever
q ≥ 1−M ; and (iv) the expected proﬁt of all sellers is zero πk(θ,M) = 0.
In order for equilibrium to exist I need to restrict the cost function. I begin by
showing that there is no equilibrium with a linear cost function.
Proposition 2.4 There is no equilibrium with constant marginal cost for c < 1.8
9
Proof. I show that when marginal costs are constant there always exists a prof-
itable deviation to a higher capacity l from any candidate equilibrium k or
π(k) = k (1− Fθ(k))− ck < l (1− Fβ(l))− cl = π(l), (2.11)
where, as usual, the queue length β that the deviator faces is decided by the
buyers’ indiﬀerence condition Fθ (k − 1) = Fβ (l − 1). As 0 < k < l and π(k) ≥ 0
8For the trivial case of a per unit cost of c ≥ 1 it is obvious that producing k = 0 is an
equilibrium.
9Note that the nonexistence result holds for any candidate equilibrium with linear costs
including the free entry equilibrium.
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it is immediate that if a deviation leads to higher per unit proﬁts then it certainly
leads to higher overall proﬁts as well. A deviation leads to higher per unit proﬁts
whenever (1− Fθ(k))− c < (1− Fβ(l))− c, which simpliﬁes to
Fθ (k) > Fβ (l) . (2.12)
The buyers’ indiﬀerence condition
Fθ (k − 1) = Fβ (l − 1) (2.13)
can be written with the help of upper incomplete gamma functions as
Q(k, θ) = Q(l, β),
where
Q(k, θ) =
Γ (k, θ)
Γ (k)
=
1
(k − 1)!
∫ ∞
θ
yk−1e−ydy =
k−1∑
i=0
e−θ
θi
i!
= Fθ (k − 1) , (2.14)
and
Q(l, β) =
Γ (l, β)
Γ (l)
=
1
(l − 1)!
∫ ∞
β
yl−1e−ydy =
l−1∑
i=0
e−β
βi
i!
= Fβ (l − 1) .
As both k and θ are known I can treat the probability Q(k, θ) as a constant
t ∈ (0, 1).Thus
Q(k, θ) = t = Q(l, β). (2.15)
Now the inverted-regularized incomplete gamma function Q−1(l, t) is the solution
in β to Q(l, β) = t. Next let’s deﬁne
C1(l, t) ≡ Q
(
l + 1, Q−1(l, t)
)
, (2.16)
where the inverse Q−1(l, t) is just the value of β satisfying Eq. (2.15). Furman
and Zitikis (2008) show that the function C1(l, t) is decreasing in l. To see that
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this implies that Eq. (2.12) holds ﬁrst note that for l = k I get Q−1(l, t) = θ. Thus
C1(k, t) = Q (k + 1, θ) = Fθ (k) . (2.17)
Similarly l = k + 1 gives us Q−1(k + 1, t) = β and I have
C1(k + 1, t) = Q (k + 2, β) = Fβ (k + 1) . (2.18)
Then by C1(l, t) being decreasing in l it follows that Fθ (k) > Fβ (k + 1) implying
that inequality (2.12) and thus also Eq. (2.11) always hold. This means that given
any candidate equilibrium10 in capacities there always exists a proﬁtable deviation.
Thus, there cannot exist an equilibrium with constant marginal cost.
The intuition for the nonexistence result is as follows. First note that an
economy with ﬁxed numbers of buyers and goods is more eﬃcient the fewer sellers
there are. If there were only one large seller the market would be frictionless.
A deviation to a larger capacity by a seller increases the amount of goods in the
economy without aﬀecting the number of active sellers. Thus there are less frictions
in the market than before. This is true especially at the deviator’s location. The
buyers respond by increasing the probability by which they contact the deviator
until they again are indiﬀerent between the sellers. But at this point the per unit
revenue of the deviator is higher than that of other sellers. By deviating upwards
a seller thus increases his unit revenue while leaving unit costs unchanged. As the
expected proﬁt of a seller is non-negative in any candidate equilibrium a deviation
to a higher capacity is always proﬁtable and hence, no equilibrium exists.
A few words of caution regarding the interpretation of the result are appropriate
here. Note that the nonexistence result regarding the symmetric equilibrium is due
to there being an inﬁnite number of buyers in the market. It is immediate that
in ﬁnite markets there exists an equilibrium capacity with linear costs as there is
no incentive for a seller to deviate and oﬀer a capacity larger than the number of
buyers in the market. When the number of buyers in the market is inﬁnite this
threshold is never reached. Thus, in order for us to have a symmetric equilibrium
with an inﬁnite number of buyers and sellers I need to assume the following.
10It is easy to see that the result also holds for deviations from mixed equilibria in capacities
as long as the supports are ﬁnite.
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Assumption A The cost function c(k) satisﬁes a) c(0) = 0, b) c(∞) = ∞ , c)
c(x)′ > 0, d) c′′(x) > 0, and e) there exists some k̂ such that c(x)
x
> 1 for
x ≥ k̂.
It is immediate that the set of proﬁtable capacities is ﬁnite as the buyers’
valuation of a good is unity and average per unit costs are above unity for some
capacity above k̂. As no buyer is willing to pay a price higher than unity it is clear
that a seller would then make negative proﬁts even if he sold all his goods. Thus
the set of relevant capacities is ﬁnite. It is clear that e.g. strongly convex cost
functions satisfy assumption A.
With the deﬁnition of equilibrium at hand I next derive the planner’s solution.
Then I show that the planner’s solution is the equilibrium as no agent has an
incentive to deviate from it.
2.3.1 Planner’s problem
The measure of welfare is the number of matches in the economy multiplied by
the value of a match minus the capacity costs. The measure of matches in the
economy m(θ, k) when all sellers have k goods is stated as the probability that a
buyer makes a trade times the measure of buyers in the economy. This is
m(θ, k) = Fθ(k − 1) + k
θ
(1− Fθ (k)) = [θFθ(k − 1) + k (1− Fθ (k))] θ−1 (2.19)
The costs of capacity c(k) are born by the θ−1 sellers. Thus welfare is given by
S(θ, k) = m(θ, k)− θ−1c(k) = [θFθ(k − 1) + k (1− Fθ (k))] θ−1 − c(k)θ−1. (2.20)
The planner maximizes S(θ, k). She chooses the capacities as well as the overall
measure of sellers. The terms of trade are decided e.g. by auction at the sellers’
location. The planner does not decide on the buyers’ actions. The buyers dis-
tribute themselves in equilibrium so that they are indiﬀerent between visiting all
sellers regardless of capacity. I show in the appendix that all the sellers make zero
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expected proﬁts in any solution. If there are two solutions that both include sellers
of capacity l then the queue lengths at l must be such that the sellers make zero
proﬁts in both. Thus the queue lengths must be the same at l.11 This result lets us
signiﬁcantly simplify the planner’s problem. I can now without loss of generality
focus on solutions where all sellers have identical capacity. The planner’s problem
is thus
maxk,θS(θ, k). (2.21)
The FOC with respect to θ is simply
[c(k)− k (1− Fθ (k))] θ−2 = 0,
as ∂ Fθ(k−1)
∂θ
= − e−θθk−1
(k−1)! and −kθ ∂Fθ(k)∂θ = e
−θθk−1
(k−1)! sum to zero. I rewrite the FOC as
c(k)− k (1− Fθ (k)) = 0. (2.22)
Note that for diﬀerent values of k the θs making the condition true are diﬀerent.
Thus, to avoid confusion, I henceforth let θk denote the value of θ satisfying Eq.
(2.22) when the sellers have k goods.
The planner’s problem can now be expressed as
maxkS(θk, k) = maxk [θkFθk(k − 1) + k (1− Fθk (k))] θ−1k − c(k)θ−1k . (2.23)
This is equivalent to
maxk [Fθk(k − 1)] , (2.24)
where θk is given by Eq. (2.22). With a cost function that satisﬁes assumption
A it is clear that Eq. (2.24) is relevant only up to some capacity k̂. Thus, the
planner’s problem is to pick a capacity coupled with a measure of sellers from a
ﬁnite set of such pairs and hence the planner’s solution exists.
Proposition 2.5 A solution to the planner’s problem exists.
Proof. The proof is above.
11This holds as the sellers proﬁts are strictly increasing in the queue length.
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A solution to the planner’s problem is easy to ﬁnd. It only requires to pick a
(k, θk) pair that maximizes welfare. It is in principle possible that there are many
such pairs implying that there would be sellers of diﬀerent capacities. Clearly the
solutions are then payoﬀ equivalent to all agents as Eq. (2.22) indicates that the
sellers make zero proﬁts and all the solutions give the same welfare or expected
utility to the buyers. I proceed by showing that there is a one-to-one mapping
between any planner’s solution and free entry equilibria.
Proposition 2.6 Any solution to the planner’s problem constitutes a free entry
equilibrium.
I only need to show that no seller has a proﬁtable deviation from any solution
by the planner. The proof is by contradiction and can be found in the appendix.
Proposition 2.7 Any free entry equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient.
Proof. I argue by contradiction that a planner facing the same frictions as the
sellers cannot improve upon any free entry equilibrium. This makes the equilibrium
constrained eﬃcient. If a capacity k with corresponding queue length θk is in
the support of the free entry equilibrium then by deﬁnition there cannot exist a
proﬁtable deviation from it and by free entry the expected proﬁt of the sellers is
zero. Now assume that (k, θk) is the equilibrium but that it is not the planner’s
solution. Then there exists a welfare level Fθk+d(k + d− 1), associated with some
capacity k + d, that is higher than Fθk(k − 1), the welfare level associated with
capacity k. The queue length θk+d is decided by Eq. (2.22). and is equivalent
to the zero proﬁt condition for sellers stocking k + d goods. Now as ∂ Fγ(l)
∂γ
=
−γle−γ
l!
< 0, it is possible for the planner to increase the queue length from θk+d
to θ′k+d and thus decrease the buyers’ utility to Fθ′k+d(k + d − 1) = Fθk(k − 1).
The overall welfare is still higher than in the free entry equilibrium as the buyers
are indiﬀerent between (k, θk) and
(
k + d, θ′k+d
)
but Eq. (2.22) no longer holds as
(k + d)
(
1− Fθ′k+d (k + d)
)
− c(k + d) > 0. But this implies that (k, θk) cannot
be an equilibrium in the ﬁrst place as the sellers have a proﬁtable deviation from
capacity k to k + d.
I have shown that the that free entry equilibrium exists and is constrained
eﬃcient. As the planner’s problem is only to pick the welfare maximizing pair
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(k, θk) satisfying Eq. (2.24) from a ﬁnite set it is computationally easy to ﬁnd the
planner’s solution and hence equilibrium. I haven’t shown uniqueness, although
numerical analysis suggests that this is the case. It is, however, clear from Eq.
(2.24) and Propositions 6 and 7 that if there are several solutions, then they are
payoﬀ equivalent for both the sellers, who earn zero expected proﬁts, and the
buyers.
In ﬁgure 1 and ﬁgure 2 I illustrate the connection between equilibrium and the
planner’s solution. The expected proﬁt of a single seller is given on the y-axis, the
capacity of the seller on the x-axis. The cost function is c(k) = 0.2k1.15. In ﬁgure
1 I study three possible equilibria. In the ﬁrst, all sellers have capacity 10, in the
second 16, and in the third 23. Due to free entry the expected proﬁt of sellers
is zero in each. I analyze a single seller’s deviations from these equilibria. Note
that the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition means that the prices and queue lengths
of the deviator all give the buyers the same utility expected utility. I thus ﬁx the
buyers’ utility level and look at the expected proﬁts of a deviator. As seen in ﬁgure
1 there is a proﬁtable deviation (upwards along the red curve) from the possible
equilibrium with capacity 10 and from the possible equilibrium where each seller
has capacity 23 (downwards along the green curve). There is no proﬁtable devia-
tion from the equilibrium where all have capacity 16 (blue dotted curve) making
this the equilibrium. In ﬁgure 2 I have labeled the curves with the market utilities
associated with the possible equilibria described above. The equilibrium (where
all have capacity 16) gives the highest market utility of the possible equilibria I
have analyzed. As all equilibria give zero expected proﬁts for the sellers the welfare
associated with the equilibria consists only of the utility of the buyers.
CHAPTER 2. DIRECTED SEARCH WITH ENDOGENOUS CAPACITY 35
CHAPTER 2. DIRECTED SEARCH WITH ENDOGENOUS CAPACITY 36
2.4 Equilibrium with a ﬁxed measure of sellers
In this section I analyze equilibrium with a ﬁxed measure of sellers. The equilib-
rium deﬁnition from the last section carries over with the obvious change that the
measure of sellers θ−1 now is exogenous.
To ﬁnd equilibrium, ﬁrst note that the sellers can in the ﬁrst stage choose any
capacity k ∈ N.When θ−1 ≥ θ−1k ﬁnding equilibrium is easy. The only equilibrium
is such that exactly θ−1k (the free entry measure) of the sellers have capacity k and
the rest have capacity zero. The sellers are indiﬀerent between these capacities as
their expected proﬁt in both cases is zero. There exists no proﬁtable deviations
for any seller to any capacity as the pair (θ−1k , k) is the free entry equilibrium.
When θ−1 < θ−1k ﬁnding equilibrium is harder. In the next section I derive
equilibrium.
Planner’s problem
In order to solve the game for an arbitrary θ−1 I ﬁrst show that a solution
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to the planner’s problem exists when the cost function is given by assumption A.
Then I show that the planner’s solution is also the equilibrium of the game. I then
conclude with examples demonstrating typical equilibria.
Proposition 2.8 A solution to the planner’s problem exists.
Again assumption A implies that there is a capacity x̂ after which even the
average costs per unit are above unity, the value of a match. The planner clearly
has a proﬁtable deviation from such a capacity for a seller to zero. The planner
maximizes welfare by distributing proportions of the measure of sellers θ−1 over a
ﬁnite set of capacities. This problem is well deﬁned and has a solution.
Proposition 2.9 Any solution to the planner’s problem constitutes an equilibrium
Proof. The proof is in the appendix
The idea of the proof is the following. Assume that the planner’s solution
involves positive mass onm out of n possible capacities. This implies that a planner
maximizing over n capacities chooses a corner solution where he distributes zero
mass on all other but the m capacities chosen. Note that the planner faces the
restriction that the buyers must be indiﬀerent between visiting the sellers with
m diﬀerent capacities. I show that the ﬁrst order conditions of the planner and
the sellers’ indiﬀerence conditions coincide. Thus all sellers make the same proﬁts
in the planner’s solution. A deviation by a seller to any other capacity would
not increase his proﬁts as long as the planner’s solution gives the sellers a non-
negative expected proﬁt. In the appendix I show that whenever the planner can
choose the measure of sellers all sellers have expected proﬁts of zero. If the sellers’
proﬁt is negative the planner can increase welfare by decreasing the measure of
sellers. When the measure of sellers is ﬁxed she can achieve this by assigning
zero capacity to some sellers. Thus there cannot exist a solution where the sellers
make negative proﬁts. Hence, the planner’s solution constitutes an equilibrium.
Numerical analysis indicates that a typical equilibrium consists of at most two
consecutive capacities. Below I give an illustrative example.
Example 2.10 Find the equilibrium capacities and the measure of sellers per ca-
pacity when the cost function is c(k) = 0.3k1.3 and the measure of sellers is θ−1 =
4. 798 5× 10−2
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In the free entry equilibrium there is a measure of θ−12 = 2. 76 sellers each with
capacity 2. Clearly I are in the region where θ−1 < θ−12 . With the help of Maple
I ﬁnd the equilibrium to be such that proportion s of the sellers have capacity 15
and proportion (1− s) have capacity 16, where s ≈ 0.59. Thus, there is price and
capacity dispersion in equilibrium. The expected proﬁt of a seller is 2.78. The
expected utility of a buyer is 0.09. No seller has a proﬁtable deviation from this
prospective equilibrium. The welfare in the economy is 0.225.
2.5 Capacity and the cost of frictions
Directed search is often motivated as a way to model an economy with frictions
that arise because buyers cannot coordinate their actions. An interesting question
is how much the ineﬃciencies are alleviated when I let the sellers choose their
capacity compared to the standard directed search model where all sellers are
assumed to have exactly one good. To make the comparison I report the resulting
welfare levels and howmany trades actually take place. In order for the comparison
to be fair I assume that the measure of sellers is decided by free entry in both cases.
I use examples to shed some light on the issue.
Example 2.11 I ﬁnd the equilibrium capacity when the cost function is a) c(k) =
0.2k1.25, b) c(k) = 0.2k1.15, and c) c(k) = 0.2k1.05.
a) A free entry equilibrium is given by
argmax
k
[Fθk(k − 1)]
where θk satisﬁes the free entry condition
k (1− Fθ (k))− c(k) = 0.
I ﬁnd (with the help of Maple) that the free entry equilibrium capacity in a) is
k = 6 and the measure of active sellers is θ−16 = 0.182 The expected utility of the
buyers, i.e., welfare is 0.53 and the expected measure of trades is 0.868. As the
measure of buyers is unity 86.8% of all possible trades take place. In a standard
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model with capacities set k = 1 and the same cost function the level of welfare is
0.44 and 64% of all possible trades take place. The welfare is thus 20.8% higher
and 35.6% more trades take place in the model with endogenous capacity choice.
Figure 3 shows welfare levels given the capacities of the sellers.. The cost
function is c(k) = 0.2k1.25 and the free entry condition is assumed to be satisﬁed
for each capacity. The welfare of the sellers is on the vertical axis and the capacity
of the sellers is on the horizontal axis. The free entry equilibrium capacity k = 6
is shown as a blue circle.
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0.42
0.44
0.46
0.48
0.50
0.52
0.54
capacity of sellers
Welfare
Figure 3: Planner’s choice
b) With cost function c(k) = 0.2k1.15 the free entry equilibrium capacity is
k = 16 and the measure of sellers θ−116 = 6. 823 7× 10−2 . Welfare is 0.60 and 93%
of all possible trades take place. The welfare with endogenous capacity choice is
now 37.6% higher than in the standard model and 45.3% more trades take place
in the model with endogenous capacity compared to the standard model.
c) With cost function 0.2k1.05 the free entry equilibrium capacity is k = 162
and the measure of active sellers is 0.00647. Welfare is 0.716 which is almost 73%
higher then in the standard model and 99.16% of all possible trades take place,
which is an increase of more than 54.9% compared to the standard model.
I collect the results in table 4, where I compare the equilibrium welfare of the
examples to both the standard model where the sellers capacity is set at one and to
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a model without frictions. With the above cost function there would be an equal
number of buyers and sellers in the model without frictions. All sellers would have
one good and the welfare would be 0.8.12
cost function 0.2k1.25 0.2k1.15 0.2k1.05
FE capacity 6 16 162
FE measure of sellers 0.18 6. 8 · 10−2 6.5 · 10−3
Total measure of goods 1. 08 1. 09 1.05
FE welfare 0.53 0.60 0.72
FE measure of trades 0.87 0.93 0.99
FE price 0.39 0.35 0.28
standard model (k=1): welfare 0.44 0.44 0.44
standard model: measure of sellers 1.21 1.21 1.21
standard model: price 0.36 0.36 0.36
standard model measure of trades 0.64 0.64 0.64
Walras price 0.20 0.20 0.20
Walras welfare 0.80 0.80 0.80
Table 4: Convexity of cost functions and welfare
Table 4 demonstrates that the less convex the cost function is the higher is the
equilibrium capacity and the lower is the equilibrium measure of sellers. Welfare
and the expected measure of trades increase with the (equilibrium) capacity of the
ﬁrms. The increase in welfare is most pronounced in the last column where the
cost function is the least convex and each ﬁrm stocks 162 units. Here the welfare is
already remarkably high compared to the prediction of a standard directed search
model, and is actually closer to the welfare in a frictionless (Walrasian) market.
Figure 3 and table 4 demonstrate exactly how much the ineﬃciencies due to
frictions are alleviated when I allow ﬁrms to choose their capacity. The model
allows for the prediction of the number of matches and thus the welfare given the
cost function and the size distribution of the ﬁrms in the economy. In addition
it allows us to quantify the eﬀect that shocks or policies that aﬀect the cost of
holding capacity has on prices, welfare and the expected measure of matches.
12In a Walrasian equilibrium the price would be 0.2.
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The example above shows how endogenizing capacity aﬀects welfare and the
measure of trades in an economy. It doesn’t, however, isolate the eﬀect of ﬁrm size
on frictions. To see why ﬁrst note that the standard case with capacity k = 1 can
be achieved with a cost function that is convex enough, for example c(k) = 0.2kζ
with ζ →∞. Now changing ζ, e.g. to the values in table 4, changes not only the
frictions but also has a direct eﬀect on welfare and the measure of active ﬁrms. (It
can be thought of as changing the production technology in addition to changing
the frictions).
To isolate the eﬀect of ﬁrm capacity on frictions I do the following. I ex-
ogenously change the capacity of the ﬁrms as well as the measure of ﬁrms while
keeping the total number of goods ﬁxed at unity. Then I compare the outcomes
in terms of expected measure of trades. I get the following results.
When all ﬁrms have capacity k = 1, and the total measure of goods is unity,
63.2% of all possible trades take place. For k = 2, 72.9% and for k = 6, as in case
a) of the previous example, 83.9% of the possible trades take place.. For k = 16
and k = 162 the corresponding percentages are 90% and 96.8%. The results show
that the capacity of the ﬁrms has a drastic eﬀect on frictions. Interestingly, search
frictions still play a role even for quite large capacities. This can be seen by noting
that capacities k = 1000 and k = 10000 correspond to only 97.5% and 99.2% of
the potential trades taking place.
2.6 A steady state example of a labor market
In this section I use the model to study a labor market with frictions. I demon-
strate how allowing for endogenous ﬁrm capacity aﬀects the employment rate, the
size distribution of ﬁrms, the wage distribution and the expected time to ﬁnd em-
ployment. I derive the steady state employment rate when the cost function is
such that all ﬁrms want to hire two workers and contrast this to the standard
directed search models where all ﬁrms have one vacancy. I focus on the simple
case where the optimal ﬁrm size is two in order to keep the example as tractable
as possible.
As the optimal ﬁrm size in this example is two, as in Lester (2010) one might
ask what diﬀerences there are between the two setups. The main diﬀerence is that
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Lester (2010) imposes that active ﬁrms can open either one or two one vacancies
whereas here ﬁrms are free to open any number of vacancies, albeit the optimal
number of vacancies happens to be two. Secondly the model in my example is
a dynamic steady state model whereas Lester describes a static model. There is
free entry in both models which in a one shot model normally leads to all ﬁrms
having equally many vacancies. In order to have equilibria with diﬀerent sized
ﬁrms Lester thus introduces an economy wide shock to the production costs, this
shock is realized after the entry decision has been made. The result is that there
might now be too many or too few sellers compared to the baseline free entry
equilibrium. As ﬁrms then can produce one good without cost there can be mixed
equilibria where some sellers produce one and some sellers produce two goods. The
eﬀect is thus similar to section 2.4 in this dissertation with the diﬀerence that my
model allows for mixed equilibria between any k (here one) and k + 1 (here two)
vacancies. In my current example I don’t need a production shock: the diﬀerence
in ﬁrm size is due only to the stochasticity of the matching process, i.e., the ex
post number of matches of the ﬁrms diﬀer. The current example is also in line
with the empirical ﬁnding that larger ﬁrms pay higher wages.
The setup in my example is as follows. There is a unit interval of workers,
measure U of them are unemployed measure E are employed. The measure of
ﬁrms is S. Of these measure Si has i ∈ {0, 1, 2} workers. An unemployed worker
searches for employment and directs his search to the ﬁrms with two vacancies
with probability x and to the ﬁrms with one vacancy with probability 1− x. The
expected queue lengths associated with the two submarkets are thus β0 =
xU
S0
and
β1 =
(1−x)U
S1
. At rate s a ﬁrm goes bankrupt and is replaced with a new two-
vacancy ﬁrm. To simplify calculations I assume at this stage that the discount
rate δ is equal to zero; workers and ﬁrms care only about the current period.
The timing is such that in a period t, ﬁrst matching takes place, then there is
production and only at the end of the period does separation take place.
In equilibrium the unemployed workers have to be indiﬀerent between visiting
a ﬁrm with two vacancies and a ﬁrm with only one vacancy. Thus the indiﬀerence
condition of the buyers’ is
Fβ0 (1) = Fβ1 (0) .
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Writing out the Poisson cumulative distributions Fβ0 (1) and Fβ1 (0) the indif-
ference condition can be expressed as
e−β0 + β0e
−β0 = e−β1 (2.25)
It determines x, the proportion of unemployed workers visiting the ﬁrms with
two vacancies (zero workers).
The outﬂow associated with unemployed workers directing their search to two-
vacany ﬁrms is given by
2− 2e−β0 − β0e−β0
β0
xU ·[s · (1− x) + (1− s)]+β0 − 2 + 2e
−β0 + β0e
−β0
β0
xU ·(1− x) .
The term before the ﬁrst parenthesis is the probability by which an unemployed
worker ﬁnds a job.13 multiplied by xU , the measure of unemployed directing their
search to two-vacancy ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst parenthesis s is the probability that the
ﬁrm goes bankrupt at the end of the period, and 1− x is the probability that the
again unemployed worker directs his search to ﬁrms with one vacancy in the next
period, 1− s is the probability that the ﬁrm stays in business, (in which case the
worker is no longer unemployed in the next period). The second term is just xU
multiplied by the probability by which the worker doesn’t get employed multiplied
by 1 − x, the probability that he directs his search to ﬁrms with one vacancy in
the next period.
The inﬂow to xU is given by
1− e−β1
β1
s · x · (1− x)U + β1 − 1 + e
−β1
β1
x · (1− x)U + E · s · x,
where the ﬁrst term is given by the mass of workers directing their search to ﬁrms
with one vacancy multiplied by the probability that they get employed and are
hit by the separation shock s and direct their search to ﬁrms with two vacancies
in the next period. The second term reﬂects the mass of workers directing their
search to ﬁrms with one vacancy who don’t get hired and direct their search to
13A more familliar form is the more compact Fβ0(1) +
2
β0
(
1− F
β0
(2)
)
. This is the form used
e.g. in equation 2.2.
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ﬁrms with two vacancies in the next period. The last term is the workers currently
employed who are hit by the separation shock and direct their search to the ﬁrms
with two vacancies in the next period. In a steady state the inﬂows and outﬂows
have to equal. Thus
2− 2e−β0 − β0e−β0
β0
U(1− sx) + β0 − 2 + 2e
−β0 + β0e
−β0
β0
U (1− x)
=
1− e−β1
β1
s (1− x)U + β1 − 1 + e
−β1
β1
(1− x)U + E · s. (2.26)
Similarly the steady state condition associated with the unemployed workers going
to ﬁrms with one vacancy is given by
sE =
2− 2e−β0 − β0e−β0
β0
Ux (1− s) + 1− e
−β1
β1
(1− s) (1− x)U. (2.27)
Note that Eq. (2.26) and Eq. (2.27) give rise to the same condition.
I derive the steady state conditions related to the ﬁrms in a similar way. The
outﬂow of ﬁrms with two workers has to equal the inﬂow.
S2 · s = S0
(
1− e−β0 − β0e−β0
)
(1− s) + S1(1− e−β1) (1− s) (2.28)
The outﬂow of ﬁrms with two workers consists of the ﬁrms that are hit by the
separation shock s. The inﬂow, i.e. the RHS of Eq. (2.28), consists of ﬁrms to
which at least two workers apply and that and are not hit by the separation shock
s and by ﬁrms with one worker that manage to hire an additional worker and are
not hit by the separation shock.
The steady state conditions related to ﬁrms with zero workers and to ﬁrms
with one worker are derived similarly. Thus the steady state condition for new
ﬁrms is
S0
(
1− e−β0) (1− s) = ( S1 + S2) s. (2.29)
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The steady state condition related to ﬁrms with one worker is
S1 s+ S1
(
1− e−β1) = S0 (β0e−β0) (1− s) . (2.30)
It is clear that one of the steady state conditions concerning the ﬁrms is superﬂuous.
The free entry condition for ﬁrms with two vacancies is
2
(
1− e−β0 − β0e−β0 −
β20
2
e−β0
)
− c(2) = 0. (2.31)
To ﬁnd free entry equilibrium I thus need to ﬁnd ﬁve unknowns, i.e., x, U, S0, S1
and S2. As I have ﬁve equations, i.e., the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition, three
steady state conditions and the free entry condition, it is in principle straightfor-
ward to proceed. Note, however, that as capacity choice is endogenous one has to
make sure that no new ﬁrm would like to deviate to any other capacity. Thus one
should show that the free entry capacity of ﬁrms is indeed two in this example.
To this end I let the cost function be c(k) = 0.2k1.4 and the separation rate be
s = 0.05. Then capacity two is indeed the equilibrium capacity. I numerically solve
for the unknowns and collect the results in table 2 where I compare the results
including the wages and the expected length of an unemployment spell to those
obtained in a standard model where capacity is set at unity. First, however, I give
the steady state equilibrium conditions of the standard model where capacity is
restricted to unity. The steady state ﬂow related to the unemployed is just that the
measure of unemployed workers ﬁnding work has to equal the measure of workers
laid oﬀ, i.e.
U · (1− e−β) (1− s) = (1− U) · s. (2.32)
The steady state ﬂow related to ﬁrms is
S0
(
1− e−β) (1− s) = S1 · s, (2.33)
and the free entry condition is
1
(
1− e−β − β0e−β
)− c(1) = 0. (2.34)
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I have three unknowns S0, U and S1 and three equations. I solve for these and
collect the results in table 5 where the model with capacity choice is compared to
the standard model.
Capacity of new ﬁrms 2 1
Unemployment rate 6.5% 8.6%
Measure of ﬁrms with two vacancies S0 3. 03 · 10−2 -
Wage of the ﬁrms with two vacancies w0 0.61 -
Measure of ﬁrms with one vacancy S1 1. 49 · 10−2 0.10
Wage of ﬁrms with one vacancy w1 0.67 0.57
Average wage 0.63 0.57
Prob. of ﬁnding employment in one period 0.76 0.68
Average duration of unemployment 1.33 1. 47
Table 5: capacity and unemployment in steady state
In table 5 I compare the eﬀects of frictions of our model to those of the standard
model where capacity is ﬁxed at unity. The cost function leads to an equilibrium
capacity of two workers per ﬁrm. Some of the ﬁrms with two vacancies are con-
tacted by fewer than two workers. They then try to ﬁll these vacancies in the
upcoming periods. The ﬁrms with one vacancy need to oﬀer a higher wage than
ﬁrms with two vacancies in order to compensate the applicants for the lower hir-
ing probability they oﬀer. Hence, there are two diﬀerent wages in the steady state
equilibrium, as can be seen in the second column of table 5. When ﬁrm size is
ﬁxed at unity, as in the standard model depicted in the third column there is, of
course, only a single wage is oﬀered in equilibrium.
Comparing the two settings I ﬁnd that the unemployment rate in our model is
76% of the rate in the standard model and the expected duration of unemployment
in our model is 90% of that in the standard model. The average wages are 11.1
% higher in our model. These results are in line with the results in example 11
and demonstrate the importance of ﬁrm size in determining expected levels of
unemployment and the average duration of unemployment spells. The example
shows that even a small increase in the size of ﬁrms (from one to two) has a large
eﬀect in reducing the welfare costs due to frictions.
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2.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I derive the equilibrium capacities and prices under directed search.
First, I show that there is a one-to-one relationship between any equilibrium and
the planner’s solution. I then demonstrate an algorithm for ﬁnding the planner’s
solution and use it to characterize the equilibrium capacities and prices given
strictly increasing marginal costs of holding capacity.
I ﬁnd that the welfare loss due to frictions is much less severe than in standard
models where capacity is set to unity. Already quite modest equilibrium capacities
lead to large welfare improvements, which I demonstrate by examples. In a steady
state extension our model automatically generates a wage distribution as not all
ﬁrms manage to ﬁll their vacancies and hence enter the subsequent periods with
diﬀerent labor demands. In this setting I solve for the unemployment levels as well
as the average wages and the average duration of unemployment and demonstrate
how these are aﬀected by the equilibrium size of the ﬁrms.
There are several ways to develop our model. The ﬁrst is to a setting of costly
unobservable quality and heterogenous buyers of whom only some are willing to
pay a premium for quality. Of interest is then whether sellers can signal quality
by a choice of capacity and price. To make the model more realistic I assume that
the buyers can inspect the good, i.e., receive a signal about quality, by visiting a
seller. Purchasing decisions then depend on this signal as well as on the price.
Another extension is to analyze a fully dynamic setting and focus on how the
perishability of goods aﬀects the equilibrium capacity and price distributions. The
eﬃciency properties of equilibrium would then be a focus of interest.
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Appendix 2.A Proofs
Proposition 1 When all sellers have capacity k the equilibrium price q is given
by
q =
k (1− Fθ (k))
k (1− Fθ(k)) + θFθ (k − 1) .
Proof. To derive the queue length faced by a single (measure zero) seller I begin
by analyzing the queue lengths in an alternative economy where multiple sellers,
or more precisely proportion  of the sellers, deviate. I denote the equilibrium
price in this economy by q() and let proportion  of the sellers deviate to q˜ (). In
equilibrium the buyers must be indiﬀerent between contacting a deviating seller
and a non-deviating seller. Assume that portion ω of the buyers contact a deviating
seller and 1−ω contact a non-deviator. The deviators’ queue length is then β = ω
	
θ,
and the non-deviators’ queue length is α = 1−ω
1−	 θ. The indiﬀerence condition of
the buyers is thus
(1− q ())
[
Fα(k − 1) + k
α
(1− Fα(k))
]
= (1− q˜ ())
[
Fβ(k − 1) + k
β
(1− Fβ(k))
]
.
(2.35)
The ﬁrms deviating to price q˜() maximize
max
q˜(	)
q˜ ()
[
k∑
1
e−β
βi
i!
i+
∞∑
k+1
e−β
βi
i!
k
]
. (2.36)
The ﬁrst order condition is
k∑
1
e−β
βi
i!
i+
∞∑
k+1
e−β
βi
i!
k+
q˜ ()
[
−e−β
k∑
1
βi
i!
i− e−β
∞∑
k+1
βi
i!
k + e−β
k∑
1
i
βi−1
i!
i+ e−β
∞∑
k+1
i
βi−1
i!
k
]
θ

dω
dq˜ ()
= 0
(2.37)
and simpliﬁes to
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βFβ(k − 1) + (1− Fβ(k))k + q˜ ()Fβ(k − 1)θ

dω
dq˜ ()
= 0. (2.38)
To solve the ﬁrst order condition, Eq. (2.38), I ﬁrst need to solve for 1
	
dω
dq˜(	)
. I do so
by totally diﬀerentiating the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition, Eq.(2.35), noting that
dα
dω
= − θ
1−	 and
dβ
dω
= θ
	
. I get
dq˜ ()
[
Fβ(k − 1) + k
β
(1− Fβ(k))
]
+
dω
[
(1− q ()) [ d
dα
Fα(k − 1)− kα2 (1− Fα(k))− kα ddαFα(k)
] (− θ
1−	
)
− (1− q˜ ())
[
d
dβ
Fβ(k − 1)− kβ2 (1− Fβ(k))− kβ ddβFβ(k)
]
θ
	
]
= 0.
(2.39)
Now I impose q˜() = q() which leads to β = α = θ. Thus
1

dω
dq˜()
= − θFθ(k − 1) + k(1− Fθ(k))
(1− q) [k (1− Fθ(k)) 	1−	 + k (1− Fθ (k))] . (2.40)
Inserting Eq. (2.40) in the ﬁrst order condition and simplifying and letting  tend
towards zero the ﬁrst order condition becomes
θFθ (k − 1) + (1− Fθ (k)) k − θFθ (k − 1) [θFθ(k − 1) + k (1− Fθ (k))]
(1− q) k (1− Fθ (k)) q = 0,
which simpliﬁes to
(1− q) k (1− Fθ (k))− θFθ (k − 1) = 0. (2.41)
From this I derive a candidate for the equilibrium price q.
q =
k (1− Fθ(k))
k (1− Fθ(k)) + θFθ (k − 1) . (2.42)
Next I show that there are no deviations from q, making it the equilibrium
price.
Proof. Price q gives expected revenue
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q [θFθ(k − 1) + k(1− Fθ(k))] = k (1− Fθ(k)) , (2.43)
deviating to some q gives
q [γFγ(k − 1) + k(1− Fγ(k))]
where γ is derived from the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition
(1− q)
[
Fθ(k − 1) + k
θ
(1− Fθ(k))
]
= (1− q)
[
Fγ(k − 1) + k
γ
(1− Fγ(k))
]
.
Rewriting I get
θFθ (k − 1)
k (1− Fθ(k)) + θFθ (k − 1)
[
Fθ(k − 1) + k
θ
(1− Fθ(k))
]
= (1− q)
[
Fγ(k − 1) + k
γ
(1− Fγ(k))
]
⇔
Fθ (k − 1) = (1− q)
[
Fγ(k − 1) + k
γ
(1− Fγ(k))
]
Thus,
q =
Fγ(k − 1) + kγ (1− Fγ(k))− Fθ (k − 1)
Fγ(k − 1) + kγ (1− Fγ(k))
A deviator expects to get
Fγ(k − 1) + kγ (1− Fγ(k))− Fθ (k − 1)
Fγ(k − 1) + kγ (1− Fγ(k))
[γFγ(k − 1) + k(1− Fγ(k))]
= γFγ(k − 1) + k (1− Fγ(k))− γFθ (k − 1) . (2.44)
For q to be an equilibrium I need
k (1− Fθ(k)) ≥ γFγ(k − 1) + k (1− Fγ(k))− γFθ (k − 1) . (2.45)
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Diﬀerentiating the RHS with respect to γ
d
dγ
(γFγ(k − 1) + k (1− Fγ(k))− γFθ (k − 1))
=
d
dγ
(
k∑
1
e−γ
γi
i!
i+
∞∑
k+1
e−γ
γi
i!
k −
k∑
1
e−θ
θi−1
i!
iγ
)
= −e−γ
k∑
1
γi
i!
i− e−γ
∞∑
k+1
γi
i!
k + e−γ
k∑
1
i
γi−1
i!
i+ e−γ
∞∑
k+1
i
γi−1
i!
k − e−θ
k∑
1
θi−1
i!
i
= Fγ(k − 1)− Fθ (k − 1) . (2.46)
This is zero when γ = θ. The second order condition
d
dγ
(Fγ(k − 1)− Fθ (k − 1)) = −e−γ
k−1∑
0
γi
i!
+ e−γ
k−1∑
0
γi−1
(i− 1)!
= −e−γ γ
k−1
(k − 1)! < 0 (2.47)
is negative meaning that γ = θ is a global maximum. Thus there is no proﬁtable
deviation from
q =
k (1− Fθ(k))
k (1− Fθ(k)) + θFθ (k − 1)
and q is the equilibrium price.
Proposition 2 When proportion s of the sellers have capacity l and proportion
1− s have capacity k the equilibrium prices q and r are given by
q =
k (1− Fα (k))
k (1− Fα (k)) + αFα(k − 1)
and
r =
l (1− Fβ (l))
l (1− Fβ (l)) + βFβ(l − 1)
where the subscripts α = 1−ω
1−s θ and β =
ω
s
θ refer to the expected queue
lengths and where ω is the proportion of buyers going to capacity l sellers.
Proof. In a prospective equilibrium the buyers are indiﬀerent as to which type
of seller they contact. Sellers with quantity-price pair (l, r) face expected queue
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length β = ω
s
θ, and sellers with quantity-price pair (k, q) face expected queue
length α = 1−ω
1−s θ. The indiﬀerence condition of the buyers is thus as follows:
(1− q)
[
Fα(k − 1) + k
α
(1− Fα(k))
]
= (1− r)
[
Fβ(l − 1) + l
β
(1− Fβ(l))
]
. (2.48)
From this expression I can solve for s, the proportion of buyers going to sellers
with quantity-price pair (l, r).Next I show that there are no proﬁtable deviations
in price from this prospective equilibrium.
I assume that proportion  of sellers with capacity k deviate to price q˜.14 The
buyers have to be indiﬀerent between the three kinds of sellers. I thus have three
groups of buyers; those who go to sellers with quantity-price pair (l, r), those
with quantity-price pair (k, q) and those who go to sellers with quantity-price pair
(k, q˜). I call these groups of buyers ω1, ω2, and ω3,with ω1+ω2+ω3 = 1. I get the
following expected queue lengths determining the meetings of buyers and sellers
in the diﬀerent submarkets:.α1 = ω1s θ, β1 =
ω2
(1−s)(1−	)θ, and γ1 =
ω3
(1−s)	θ. Buyer’s
utility when he goes to (q, k) is
e−β1
k−1∑
i=0
βi1
i!
(1− q)+e−β1
∞∑
i=k
βi1
i!
k
i+ 1
(1− q) = (1− q)
[
Fβ1(k − 1) + k
1
β1
(
1− Fβ1(k)
)]
.
(2.49)
In equilibrium
N(ω2, ω3, q˜) =
(1− q)
[
Fβ1(k − 1) +
k
β1
(
1− Fβ1(k
)
)
]
−(1− q˜)
[
Fγ1(k − 1) +
k
γ1
(
1− Fγ1(k
)
)
]
= 0,
(2.50)
and
M(ω2, ω3, q˜) =
14To simplify the rather cumbersome notation we henceforth denote q˜ () by q˜.and q() by q.
As the technique for the proof is familiar from the proof of Proposition 1 this should not lead to
confusion.
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(1− r)
[
Fα1(l − 1) +
l
α1
(1− Fα1(l))
]
−(1− q˜)
[
Fγ1(k − 1) +
k
γ1
(
1− Fγ1(k
)
)
]
= 0.
(2.51)
The ﬁrms deviating from (k, q) to (k, q˜) maximize
max
q˜
q˜
[
k∑
1
e−γ1
γi1
i!
i+
∞∑
k+1
e−γ1
γi1
i!
k
]
. (2.52)
The ﬁrst order condition
[
k∑
1
e−γ1
γi1
i!
i+
∞∑
k+1
e−γ1
γi1
i!
k
]
+ q˜
[
−e−γ1
k∑
1
γi1
i!
i− e−γ1
∞∑
k+1
γi1
i!
k + e−γ1
k∑
1
i
γi−11
i!
i+ e−γ1
∞∑
k+1
i
γi−11
i!
k
]
θ
(1− s) 
dω3
dq˜
= 0 (2.53)
simpliﬁes to
γ1Fγ1(k − 1) + (1− Fγ1(k))k + q˜Fγ1(k − 1)
θ
(1− s) 
dω3
dq˜
= 0. (2.54)
In order to solve this I ﬁrst need to derive the expression for 1
	
dω3
dq˜
. I get it by to-
tally diﬀerentiating the indiﬀerence conditions M(ω2, ω3, q˜) and N(ω2, ω3, q˜) with
respect to q˜, ω2 and ω3. I then show that there are no deviations from quantity-
price pair (k, q) by a small number of sellers and derive q(k). Note that dα1
dω3
= − θ
s
and dβ1
dω3
= − θ
(1−s)(1−	) .and
dγ1
dω3
= θ
(1−s)	 and ω1 = 1− ω2 − ω3. Also note that
dFβ1
dω2
(k) =
d
dβ1
k∑
i=0
βi1
i!
= −Fβ1(k)+e−β1
k∑
i=1
βi−11
(i− 1)! = −Fβ1(k)+e
−β1
k−1∑
i=0
βi1
i!
= −e−β1 β
k
1
k!
.
Totally diﬀerentiating M(ω2,ω3,q˜) and N(ω2,ω3,q˜) I get
CHAPTER 2. DIRECTED SEARCH WITH ENDOGENOUS CAPACITY 54
Mω2dω2 +Mω3dω3 +Mq˜dq˜ = 0 (2.55)
and
Nω2dω2 +Nω3dω3 +Nq˜dq˜ = 0 (2.56)
By Cramer’s rule
dω3
dq˜
= −
∣∣∣∣∣Mω2 Mq˜Nω2 Nq˜
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣Mω2 Mω3Nω2 Nω3
∣∣∣∣∣
, (2.57)
where
Mω2=(1− r)
[
−e−α1 α
l−1
1
(l − 1)! −
l
α21
(1− Fα1 (l)) +
l
α1
e−α1
αl1
l!
](
−θ
s
)
=
= (1− r)
{
− l
α21
(1− Fα1 (l))
}(
−θ
s
)
, (2.58)
Mω3=Mω2 − (1− q˜)
{
− k
γ21
(
1− Fγ1 (k)
)}( θ
(1− s) 
)
, (2.59)
Mq˜=
[
Fγ1(k − 1) +
k
γ1
(
1− Fγ1(k)
)]
, (2.60)
Nω2 = (1− q)
{
− k
β21
(
1− Fβ1 (k)
)}( θ
(1− s) (1− )
)
, (2.61)
Nω3=(1− q˜)
{
− k
γ21
(
1− Fγ1 (k)
)}( θ
(1− s) 
)
, (2.62)
Nq˜=M q˜, (2.63)
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∣∣∣∣∣Mω2 Mω3Nω2 Nω3
∣∣∣∣∣ =Mω2Nω3 −Mω3Nω2 ,
and ∣∣∣∣∣Mω2 Mq˜Nω2 Nq˜
∣∣∣∣∣ =Mq˜ (Mω2 −Nω2) .
Thus
1

dω3
dq˜
= −1

⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
(1− r) l
α21
(1− Fα1 (l))
(
θ
s
) [
Fγ1(k − 1) + kγ1
(
1− Fγ1(k)
)]
+(1− q) k
β21
(
1− Fβ1 (k)
) (
θ
(1−s)(1−	)
) [
Fγ1(k − 1) + kγ1
(
1− Fγ1(k)
)]
(1− q˜)
{
k
γ21
(
1− Fγ1 (k)
)}(
θ
(1−s)	
)
· (1− r) l
α21
(1− Fα1 (l))
(
θ
s
)
+(1− q) k
β21
(
1− Fβ1 (k)
) (
θ
(1−s)(1−	)
)
· (1− r) l
α21
(1− Fα1 (l))
(
θ
s
)
+(1− q˜)
{
k
γ21
(
1− Fγ1 (k)
)}(
θ
(1−s)	
)
⎫⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎭
⇔
1

dω3
dq˜
=
(1− r) l
α21
(1− Fα1 (l))
(
θ
s
) [
Fγ1(k − 1) + kγ1
(
1− Fγ1(k)
)]
+(1− q) k
β21
(
1− Fβ1 (k)
) (
θ
(1−s)(1−	)
) [
Fγ1(k − 1) + kγ1
(
1− Fγ1(k)
)]
(1− q˜)
{
k
γ21
(
1− Fγ1 (k)
)}(
θ
(1−s)
)
· (1− r) l
α21
(1− Fα1 (l))
(
θ
s
)
+(1− q) k
β21
(
1− Fβ1 (k)
) (
θ
(1−s)(1−	)
)
· (1− r) l
α21
(1− Fα1 (l))
(
θ∗	
s
)
+(1− q˜)
{
k
γ21
(
1− Fγ1 (k)
)}(
θ
(1−s)
)
(2.64)
Inserting this expression in the ﬁrst order condition and simplifying and letting 
CHAPTER 2. DIRECTED SEARCH WITH ENDOGENOUS CAPACITY 56
tend towards zero the ﬁrst order condition becomes
αFα(k − 1) + k(1− Fα(k))
+ qFα(k − 1) θ
(1− s)
·
[
(1− r) l
β2
(1− Fβ (l))
(
θ
s
)
+ (1− q) k
α2
(1− Fα (k))
(
θ
(1−s)
)] [
Fα(k − 1) + kα (1− Fα(k))
]
(1− q){ k
α2
(1− Fα (k))
}(
θ
(1−s)
)
·
[
(1− r) l
β2
(1− Fβ (l))
(
θ
s
)
+ (1− q) k
α2
(1− Fα (k))
(
θ
(1−s)
)]
(2.65)
= 0.
This can be simpliﬁed to
[αFα(k − 1) + k(1− Fα(k))] (1− q) k
α2
(1− Fα (k)) θ
(1− s)
− qFα(k − 1) θ
(1− s)
[
Fα(k − 1) + k
α
(1− Fα(k))
]
(2.66)
= 0
and further to
α (1− q) k
α2
(1− Fα (k)) θ
(1− s) − qFα(k − 1)
θ
(1− s) = 0. (2.67)
Using the fact that α 1−s
1−ω = θ I get
k
α
(1− Fα (k)) α
(1− ω) − q
k
α
(1− Fα (k)) α
(1− ω) − qFα(k− 1)
α
(1− ω) = 0 (2.68)
which can be rewritten as
k (1− Fα (k)) = q {k (1− Fα (k)) + αFα(k − 1)} . (2.69)
I get the equilibrium price
qE =
k (1− Fα (k))
{k (1− Fα (k)) + αFα(k − 1)} (2.70)
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I derive the equilibrium price of the sellers with capacity l in the same way. Thus
the equilibrium price that a ﬁrm with capacity l posts is
rE =
l (1− Fβ (l))
{l (1− Fβ (l)) + βFβ(l − 1)} .
The second order conditions and equilibrium conditions are derived similarly as in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 6 Any solution to the planner’s problem constitutes a free entry
equilibrium.
Proof. Assume that the planner chooses capacity k∗ and queue length, θk∗ i.e.
they are the solutions to
argmax
k
[Fθk(k − 1)]
where θk satisﬁes the free entry condition
k (1− Fθk (k))− c(k) = 0.
I show by contradiction that there cannot exist a proﬁtable deviation from k∗ for
a seller.
Let there exist a proﬁtable deviation from k∗ to quantity k∗ + d . Then
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(k∗) (1− Fθk∗ (k∗))− c(k∗) < (k∗ + d)
(
1− Fβk∗,d(k∗ + d)
)
− c(k∗ + d). (2.71)
The RHS of Eq. (2.71) is then also higher than the proﬁt under the free entry
condition for capacity k∗ + d i.e.
=0︷ ︸︸ ︷
(k∗ + d)
(
1− Fθk∗+d(k∗ + d)
)− c(k∗ + d) < (k∗ + d)(1− Fβk∗,d(k∗ + d))−c(k∗+d).
But as
∂
Fγ (k)
∂γ
= −γ
ke−γ
k!
< 0,
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this means that
βk,d > θk+d.
Next I deﬁne tk = Fθk∗ (k
∗ − 1) and tk∗+d = Fθk∗+d(k∗ + d − 1) and note that
βk∗,d = Q
−1(k∗ + d, tk∗) and θk∗+d = Q−1(k∗ + d, tk∗+d). As
∂Q−1(k + d, t)
∂t
< 0
βk,d > θk+d implies that
Fθ∗k(k
∗ − 1) < Fθk∗+d(k∗ + d− 1)
contradicting the claim that k∗ is the solution to
argmax
k
[Fθk(k − 1)] .
Proof that sellers have identical capacities in planner’s
choice when the planner can choose θ and k
The planner chooses θ−1 as well as the distribution of capacities over the sellers.
I show that there always exists a planner’s solution such that all sellers have the
same capacity.
Assume that a planner’s solution is such that there are two capacities, k and
l. The planner maximizes the value of the matches minus the cost of capacity.
Maxs
[ [
Fα(k − 1) + kα (1− Fα (k))
]
(1− ω)− (1−s)
θ
c(k)
+
[
Fβ(l − 1) + lβ (1− Fβ (l))
]
ω − s
θ
c(l)
]
(2.72)
s.t.
Fα (k − 1) = Fβ (l − 1)
where α = 1−ω
1−s θ and β =
ω
s
θ. I get the following ﬁrst order condition with respect
to s
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k
α2
(1− Fα (k))
[ −θ
1− s
dω
ds
+
(1− ω)θ
(1− s)2
]
(1− ω)−
[
Fα(k − 1) + k
α
(1− Fα (k))
]
dω
ds
+ θ−1c(k)− l
β2
(1− Fβ (l))
[
θ
s
dω
ds
− ωθ
s2
]
ω − θ−1c(l)
+
[
Fβ(l − 1) + l
β
(1− Fβ (l))
]
dω
ds
=
k
α
(1− Fα (k)) dω
ds
− k
θ
(1− Fα (k))− Fα(k − 1)dω
ds
− k
α
(1− Fα (k)) dω
ds
+ θ−1c(k)
− l
β
(1− Fβ (l)) dω
ds
+
l
θ
(1− Fβ (l)) + Fβ(l − 1)dω
ds
+
l
β
(1− Fβ (l)) dω
ds
− θ−1c(l).
Utilizing Fα (k − 1) = Fβ (l − 1) the dωds terms cancel each other out the FOC
simpliﬁes to
= −k
θ
(1− Fα (k)) + θ−1c(k) + l
θ
(1− Fβ (l))− θ−1c(l) = 0. (2.73)
Thus
−k (1− Fα (k)) + c(k) + l (1− Fβ (l))− c(l) = 0. (2.74)
Now let the planner maximize
Maxθ
[ [
Fα(k − 1) + kα (1− Fα (k))
]
(1− ω)− (1−s)
θ
c(k)
+
[
Fβ(l − 1) + lβ (1− Fβ (l))
]
ω − s
θ
c(l)
]
(2.75)
s.t.
Fα (k − 1) = Fβ (l − 1)
where α = 1−ω
1−s θ and β =
ω
s
θ.
I get the following ﬁrst order condition
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(1− s)
θ2
[−k (1− Fα (k)) + c(k)] + s
θ2
[−l (1− Fβ (l)) + c(l)] = 0.
Utilizing Eq. (2.74) I get
1
θ2
[−k (1− Fα (k)) + c(k)] = 0 (2.76)
or
1
θ2
[−l (1− Fβ (l)) + c(l)] = 0.
One can see that this implies that α = θk and β = θl. But this means that a
social planner can replicate any expected utility from having two capacities by a
choice of θ and k. This result generalizes to include any planner’s solution over n
capacities. I demonstrate the case of a planner’s solution over 3 capacities in the
proof of Proposition 9.
Proposition 9 Any solution by the planner that gives sellers non-negative ex-
pected proﬁts constitutes an equilibrium.
Proof. I ﬁrst show that if the planner’s solution is such that only capacities k
and l are oﬀered and sellers make a positive expected proﬁt then no single seller
would like to switch his capacity from k to l or vice versa.
If the planner’s solution is such that only two capacities k and l are oﬀered
the planner’s choice is the solution to the following maximization problem. The
buyers move after the planner. Thus if the planner oﬀers capacities k and l then
the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition Fα (k − 1) = Fβ (l − 1) determines α and β. The
planner maximizes the value of the matches minus the cost of capacity.
Maxs
[ [
Fα(k − 1) + kα (1− Fα (k))
]
(1− ω)− (1−s)
θ
c(k)
+
[
Fβ(l − 1) + lβ (1− Fβ (l))
]
ω − s
θ
c(l)
]
(2.77)
s.t.
Fα (k − 1) = Fβ (l − 1)
where α = 1−ω
1−s θ and β =
ω
s
θ.
I get the following ﬁrst order condition with respect to s
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k
α2
(1− Fα (k))
[ −θ
1− s
dω
ds
+
(1− ω)θ
(1− s)2
]
(1− ω)−
[
Fα(k − 1) + k
α
(1− Fα (k))
]
dω
ds
+ θ−1c(k)− l
β2
(1− Fβ (l))
[
θ
s
dω
ds
− ωθ
s2
]
ω − θ−1c(l)
+
[
Fβ(l − 1) + l
β
(1− Fβ (l))
]
dω
ds
=
k
α
(1− Fα (k)) dω
ds
− k
θ
(1− Fα (k))− Fα(k − 1)dω
ds
− k
α
(1− Fα (k)) dω
ds
+ θ−1c(k)
− l
β
(1− Fβ (l)) dω
ds
+
l
θ
(1− Fβ (l)) + Fβ(l − 1)dω
ds
+
l
β
(1− Fβ (l)) dω
ds
− θ−1c(l)
Utilizing Fα (k − 1) = Fβ (l − 1) the dωds terms cancel each other out and the FOC
simpliﬁes to
= −k
θ
(1− Fα (k)) + θ−1c(k) + l
θ
(1− Fβ (l))− θ−1c(l) = 0. (2.78)
Thus
−k (1− Fα (k)) + c(k) + l (1− Fβ (l))− c(l) = 0. (2.79)
Note that π(k) = k (1− Fα (k))−c(k) is the expected proﬁt of a seller with capacity
k and π(l) = l (1− Fβ (l))− c(l) is the expected proﬁt of a seller with capacity l.
In an interior solution sellers are thus indiﬀerent between oﬀering capacity l and
k.
I assume that the planner’s solution is such that there are sellers with only
two capacities k and l. This implies that a planner maximizing his utility by
choosing in which proportion sellers oﬀer capacities k, l and (any) m chooses a
corner solution where only capacities k and l are oﬀered. I next show that at
this corner solution no single seller would like to deviate to capacity m. But this
implies that there is a competitive equilibrium where only capacities k and l are
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oﬀered.
A planner choosing the proportion of sellers with capacities k, l and m maxi-
mizes the number of matches in the economy minus the costs of producing these
matches
Maxs,r
⎡⎢⎢⎣
[
Fα(k − 1) + kα (1− Fα (k))
]
ψ − r
θ
c(k)
+
[
Fβ(l − 1) + lβ (1− Fβ (l))
]
ω − s
θ
c(l)
+
[
Fγ(m− 1) + mγ (1− Fγ (m))
]
(1− ψ − ω)− 1−r−s
θ
c(m)
⎤⎥⎥⎦ (2.80)
s.t. Fα(k− 1) = Fγ(m− 1) and Fβ(l− 1) = Fγ(m− 1), where α = ψr θ and β = ωs θ
and γ = 1−ψ−ω
1−s−r . The FOC with respect to r is
− k
α2
(1− Fα (k))
[
θ
r
dψ
dr
− ψθ
r2
]
ψ −
[
Fα(k − 1) + k
α
(1− Fα (k))
]
dψ
dr
− θ−1c(k) + l
β2
(1− Fβ (l))
[
θ
s
dω
dr
]
ω +
[
Fβ(l − 1) + l
β
(1− Fβ (l))
]
dω
dr
− m
ψ2
(1− Fψ (m))
[
− θ
(1− s− r)
dψ
dr
+
1− ψ − ω
(1− s− r)2
]
(1− ψ − ω)
+
[
Fγ(m− 1) + m
γ
(1− Fγ (m))
]
dψ
dr
+ θ−1c(m) = 0.
The FOC with respect to r simpliﬁes to
k (1− Fα (k))− c(k)−m (1− Fγ (m)) + c(m) = 0 (2.81)
and the FOC with respect to s simpliﬁes to
l (1− Fβ (l))− θ−1c(l)−m (1− Fγ (m)) + c(m) = 0. (2.82)
It was assumed that there are only sellers with capacities k and l in the planner’s
solution. Thus, as zero mass oﬀ sellers have capacity m it is clear that
k (1− Fα (k))− c(k)−m (1− Fγ (m)) + c(m) > 0 (2.83)
and
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l (1− Fβ (l))− c(l)−m (1− Fγ (m)) + c(m) > 0. (2.84)
But then no seller has a proﬁtable deviation to a capacity m as Eq. (2.83) and Eq.
(2.84) imply that π(k) > π(m) and π(l) > π(m) both hold. The claim follows.
Note that if the planner has a solution with mass on all three capacities k, l,
and m then, by subtracting Eq. (2.81) from Eq. (2.82), I notice that all proﬁts
must be equal, i.e., π(k) = π(l) = π(m). The result generalizes to any ﬁnite
capacity.
Proof that the planner’s choice of θ−1 gives zero expected
proﬁts for the sellers.
Proof. Assume that the planner’s choice is such that there are sellers of 3 diﬀerent
capacities. I derive the total measure of sellers θ−1 that maximizes social welfare.
The planner’s problem is thus
Maxθ
⎡⎢⎢⎣
[
Fα(k − 1) + kα (1− Fα (k))
]
ψ − r
θ
c(k)
+
[
Fβ(l − 1) + lβ (1− Fβ (l))
]
ω − s
θ
c(l)
+
[
Fγ(m− 1) + mγ (1− Fγ (m))
]
(1− ψ − ω)− 1−r−s
θ
c(m)
⎤⎥⎥⎦ (2.85)
s.t. Fα(k − 1) = Fγ(m − 1) and Fβ(l − 1) = Fγ(m − 1) and where α = ψr θ and
β = ω
s
θ and γ = 1−ψ−ω
1−s−r . The ﬁrst order condition simplify to
r
θ2
[−k (1− Fα (k)) + c(k)] + dr
dθ
1
θ
[(k (1− Fα (k))− c(k))]
+
s
θ2
[−l (1− Fβ (l)) + c(l)] + ds
dθ
1
θ
[(l (1− Fβ (l))− c(l))]
+
1− s− r
θ2
[−m (1− Fγ (l)) + c(m)] + ds
dθ
1
θ
[− (m (1− Fγ (m)) + c(m))]
+
dr
dθ
1
θ
[− (m (1− Fγ (m)) + c(m))] (2.86)
= 0.
Now I learned from Eq. (2.81) and Eq. (2.82) that the expected proﬁts of the
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sellers have to be equal in the planner’s solution. Thus k (1− Fα (k)) − c(k) =
m (1− Fγ (m))+ c(m) = (l (1− Fβ (l))− c(l)). The drdθ and dsdθ then cancel out and
the ﬁrst order condition can be written as
− [k (1− Fα (k))− c(k)]
[
r
θ2
+
s
θ2
+
1− s− r
θ2
]
= −
[
k (1− Fα (k))− c(k)
θ2
]
= 0.
(2.87)
Checking the second order condition I ﬁnd that Eq. (2.87) gives a maximum. Thus
all sellers make zero proﬁts in the planner’s solution.
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Chapter 3
Directed Search and Divisible
Goods
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter I derive the equilibrium capacity of sellers in a market with frictions
when capacity is divisible. I let the utility function of the buyers be linear and
I derive the symmetric equilibrium prices and capacities both when there is a
ﬁxed number of sellers and when the number of sellers is decided by free entry.
Equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient in both cases. In addition, both the sellers and
buyers are indiﬀerent between whether the terms of trade are decided by price
posting by the sellers or by auction.
One quite unexpected result is that changing this basic setup by assuming that
the buyers demand at most one unit each the equivalence between posted prices
and auctions, established in Kultti (1999), no longer holds. While the equilibrium
capacity under both trading rules is constrained eﬃcient and identical the expected
utilities of the buyers and sellers diﬀer. The average price of goods is lower when
ﬁrms post prices than when trades are decided by auction at the sellers’ locations.
Thus the expected utility of the ﬁrms is lower under price posting than when
trades are decided by auction. Similarly the expected utility of the buyers is
higher under price posting.
As in the previous chapter, sellers compete by posting capacities and prices.
67
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Buyers observe the prices and capacities and decide on which (type of) seller to
visit. Capacity choice in directed search with integer capacities has been studied
by Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001), Hawkins (2010), Geromichalos (2009), Lester
(2010) and Godenhielm and Kultti (2011). Capacity choice is endogenous in the
last four papers. I discuss this literature in chapter 2 of this dissertation and will
not repeat the analysis here.
Capacity choice with perfectly divisible goods has been surprisingly little ana-
lyzed in the directed search literature. Kultti and Riipinen (2003), Julien, Kennes
and King (2008) and Dutu, Julien and King (2009) have done so in a monetary
search setting but these papers assume that production takes place after the loca-
tional demands have been realized while I assume that production costs are sunk
at the time of trading.
3.2 The model; linear utilities
The environment consists of a unit interval of buyers and a large continuum of
potential sellers of which θ−1 ∈  are active in the market. The ratio of buyers to
active sellers is θ. The sellers choose their capacity and post binding prices. The
good is assumed to be perfectly divisible. Both the capacity and the price of each
seller are observable. The cost of capacity1 κ is c(κ), where c(0) = 0 , c′(κ) > 0
and c′′(κ) > 0. This cost is born before the sellers post their capacities. I begin by
assuming that the utility function of the buyers is linear,
u(x) = Ax, (3.1)
where x is the quantity that the buyer consumes and A is a constant. The
sellers choose their capacity and price so as to maximize their expected revenue
minus cost. The revenue to the sellers is the price multiplied by the quantity sold.
In the setup of this section, where the buyers’ utility is linear and there is no
upper bound on how much of a good a single buyer wants, a seller trades his whole
quantity even if he gets just one buyer. Similarly, if two buyers contact a seller
with capacity κ then they are indiﬀerent between whether the good is divided
1In this chapter I denote capacity with κ to emphasise that it is perfectly divisible.
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equally between them or whether both get the whole quantity κ with probability
1/2. Thus the expected utility of a buyer visiting a seller with capacity κ and per
unit price q is simply (A − q)κ multiplied by the probability that the buyer ends
up with quantity κ of the good.
The order of events is as follows: In stage 1 the active sellers choose capacities
κ ∈ R. In stage 2 the sellers choose prices. In stage 3 the buyers choose which
seller to visit. The actions of the previous stages are perfectly observed by the
players.
I capture the frictions similarly as in chapter 2, i.e., by focusing on symmetric
equilibrium strategies for the buyers. A strategy of a seller i consists of his choice of
capacity κi and his posted per unit price2 qi, given his capacity and the distribution
H of capacities chosen by sellers. When there are diﬀerent capacity-price pairs
the buyers adjust their behavior in equilibrium so that they are indiﬀerent between
the diﬀerent types of sellers and expect the market utility M from them all. This
adjustment of behavior leads to diﬀerent ratios of buyers to sellers, i.e., queue
lengths, βκ,q(θ,M), for the diﬀerent types of sellers. When the queue length is β the
probability that exactly j buyers visit a seller is given by the Poisson distribution
and is P [x = j] = e−β β
j
j!
as in chapter 2 of this thesis.
3.2.1 Price
In this subsection I concentrate on the second stage where the quantities that the
sellers oﬀer are known. I later show that in a symmetric equilibrium all sellers
oﬀer the same quantity.
Assume that all sellers have the same capacity κ and compete in price only.
The equilibrium price, if it exists is then a per unit price q from which no seller
has a proﬁtable deviation. A possible deviator has the maximization problem
max
q˜
q˜κ
(
1− e−γ) ,
where q˜ is the deviator’s price. He sells his whole quantity κ if he is visited by
at least one buyer, the probability of this is (1− e−γ). The queue length γ that
2Note that a buyer can purchase any available quantity at the per unit price.
CHAPTER 3. DIRECTED SEARCH AND DIVISIBLE GOODS 70
the deviator faces is determined by the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition between
contacting the deviator and the non-deviators
(A− q˜)κ(1− e
−γ)
γ
− (A− q)κ
(
1− e−θ)
θ
= 0.
The ﬁrst term in the indiﬀerence condition is the expected utility of a buyer visiting
a deviating seller. As described in the setup, the linearity of the utility function
lets me write the expression for the expected utility as (A− q˜)κ multiplied by the
probability that the buyer ends up with the whole quantity κ of the good. I derive
this probability similarly as in Eq. (2.2) in chapter 2. With probability e−γ no
other buyers show up and our buyer acquires quantity κ. If i other buyers show
up our buyer acquires κ with probability 1
i+1
. The probability that at least one
other buyer shows up is
∞∑
i=1
e−γ γ
i
i!
. Thus the probability that our buyer manages
to acquire κ is e−γ+
∞∑
i=1
e−γ γ
i
i!
1
i+1
, which simpliﬁes to (
1−e−γ)
γ
. The second term
is the expected utility of a buyer visiting the non-deviating ﬁrms. It is derived
similarly as the ﬁrst term.
The ﬁrst order condition of the deviating seller’s problem is
(
1− e−γ)κ+ e−γκq˜ dγ
dq˜
= 0.
I need to know how the price eﬀects the expected queue length of a deviator , thus
I totally diﬀerentiate the indiﬀerence condition of the buyers with respect to γ and
q to get
dγ
dq˜
= − 1− e
−γ
(A− q˜) 1
γ
(1− e−γ − γe−γ) .
The ﬁrst order condition can now be stated as
(
1− e−γ)κ− e−γκq˜ 1− e−γ
(A− q˜) 1
γ
(1− e−γ − γe−γ) = 0.
In equilibrium q˜ = q and γ = θ, thus the ﬁrst order condition implies that
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q =
(
1− e−θ − θe−θ)A
1− e−θ (3.2)
I show in the appendix that there are no proﬁtable deviations from Eq. (3.2).
Thus it is the equilibrium price.
Proposition 3.1 When all sellers have capacity κ the symmetric equilibrium price
is given by q = (
1−e−θ−θe−θ)A
1−e−θ .
Proof. The ﬁrst order conditions of the proof can be found above. In he appendix
I show that there are no deviations from this proposed equilibrium.
Equivalence between auctions and posted prices
When all sellers have capacity κ and post price q as per proposition 1 their expected
proﬁt is
π(κ) = (1− e−θ − θe−θ)Aκ− c(κ). (3.3)
The buyers’ expected utility is then
u(x, q) = e−θAκ (3.4)
When the terms of trade are decided by auction at the sellers’ locations a single
buyer would bid zero and still get the good. If there were two or more buyers
they would compete for the good and thus bid up the per unit price to their
valuation.Ax. It is then easy to see that a buyer’s expected utility from visiting a
seller with quantity κ is e−θAκ where e−θ is the probability that no other buyers
show up. By similar reasoning a seller receives a positive proﬁt only if at least two
buyers visit his auction. The probability that this happens is (1 − e−θ − θe−θ).
Thus the expected proﬁt of an auction is given by π(κ) = (1−e−θ−θe−θ)Aκ−c(κ).
Proposition 3.2 The expected proﬁts of the sellers are the same under posted
prices and when trades are decided by auction at the sellers’ locations.
Proposition 3.3 The expected utilities of the buyers are the same under posted
prices and when trades are decided by auction at the sellers’ locations.
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Proof. The proof can be found above
3.2.2 Equilibrium capacity
To derive the symmetric equilibrium capacity of the sellers I again proceed as
follows. I assume that all sellers have capacity κ and analyze a potential deviator’s
problem. If I manage to ﬁnd a capacity κ such that the deviators best deviation is
to κ then I have found equilibrium. To show that there are no proﬁtable deviations
I need to be able to derive the queue length that a deviator. Assume that the
deviator has capacity κ˜. He must still oﬀer the buyers’ the same expected utility
that they would get from going to the sellers with capacity κ. Thus the queue
length of the deviators, i.e., γ is decided by the buyers indiﬀerence condition
e−θAκ = e−γAκ˜,
or
e−θκ = e−γκ˜. (3.5)
Simple algebra thus allows me to write the queue length γ, that a deviator faces
as
γ = θ − ln(κ
κ˜
).
A seller deviating to capacity κ˜ maximizes his expected proﬁt
max
κ˜
π(κ˜) = max
κ˜
[
(1− e−γ − γe−γ)Aκ˜− c(κ˜)] . (3.6)
The FOC is
(1− e−γ − γe−γ)A+ γe−γAκ˜dγ
dκ˜
− c′(κ˜) = 0.
In order to solve the ﬁrst order condition I must ﬁrst ﬁnd dγ
dκ˜
To do so I totally
diﬀerentiate the buyers indiﬀerence condition to get
dγ
(−e−γκ˜)+ dκ˜ (e−γ) = 0.
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Thus
dγ
dκ˜
=
1
κ˜
.
In a symmetric equilibrium κ˜ = κ and γ = θ allowing me to rewrite the FOC as
(1− e−θ − θe−θ)A+ θe−θAκ
(
1
κ
)
− c′(κ) = 0. (3.7)
Solving for c′(κ∗) I have
c′(κ∗) = (1− e−θ)A. (3.8)
When c(κ) = κ2 the equilibrium capacity is
κ∗ =
(1− e−θ)A
2
. (3.9)
Proposition 3.4 The symmetric pure strategy equilibrium capacity of the sellers
is given by κ∗ = (1−e
−θ)A
2
Proof. The ﬁrst order condition for equilibrium can be found above, in the ap-
pendix I show that there are no deviations from this proposed equilibrium.
The sellers’ proﬁt from capacity κ∗ is
π(κ∗) =
1
4
A2
(
e−θ − 1) (e−θ + 2θe−θ − 1) (3.10)
One notices that π(κ∗) < 0 whenever θ is smaller than or equal to the threshold
t where t ≈ 1.25643 (as dπ(κ∗)
dθ
> 0 for θ > ln(2) and π(κ∗) is continuous in θ
it follows that π(κ∗) > 0 when θ > t). For θ ≤ t capacity κ∗ clearly isn’t an
equilibrium as there exists a proﬁtable deviation to κ = 0. I can thus conclude
that there exists no symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies when 0 < θ ≤ t.
Whenever θ > t the equilibrium capacity of the sellers is given by proposition 4.
There exists an asymmetric equilibrium when the measure of sellers θ−1 ≥ t−1,
where measure t−1 of the sellers have capacity
κ∗ =
(1− e−t)A
2
(3.11)
3t = −1/2− LambertW (−1,−(1/2) ∗ exp(−1/2)) ≈ 1.2564
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and make zero proﬁts and the rest of the sellers have capacity zero (or become
inactive). For A = 1 the equilibrium capacity for the active sellers is then κ∗ =
(1−e−t)A
2
≈ 0.36
Planner’s problem
I deﬁne social welfare directly as the total expected utility of the buyers added to
the total expected proﬁt of the sellers or
SW = e−θAκ+ θ−1
[(
1− e−θ − θe−θ)Aκ− c(κ)] . (3.12)
A social planner maximizes the social welfare
max
κ
(SW, 0) (3.13)
The FOC is
dSW
dκ
= e−θA+ θ−1
[(
1− e−θ − θe−θ)A− c′(κ)] = 0.
Solving for c′(κ) I get
(
1− e−θ)A = c′(κSO)
The second order condition is negative. I have thus shown that a symmetric
equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient as
c′(κSO) = c′(κ∗). (3.14)
Proposition 3.5 The symmetric equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient
Proof. The proof can be found above.
Free entry
With free entry the measure of sellers, θ−1, adjusts so that their zero proﬁt condi-
tion is satisﬁed. Thus for any κ
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π(κ) = (1− e−θ − θe−θ)Aκ− c(κ) = 0. (3.15)
From Eq. (8) we know that in any equilibrium
c′(κ∗) = (1− e−θ)A.
With the two equations above I can solve for the free entry equilibrium. When
the cost function is c(κ) = κ2 the free entry equilibrium capacity is given by
κ∗ =
(1− e−θ∗)A
2
The free entry measure of sellers is the solution in θ to
π(κ∗) =
1
4
A2
(
e−θ − 1) (e−θ + 2θe−θ − 1) = 0.
Solving for θ I ﬁnd that θ∗ = t, where t ≈ 1.2564 as in section 2.1. Thus, in a free
entry equilibrium measure t−1 of the sellers have capacity κ∗ = (1−e
−t)A
2
and the
rest have capacity zero.
Planner chooses both θ and κ
When the social planner is free to chose both θ and κ the social optimum is given
by
max
κ,θ
SW (3.16)
The FOC’s are
dSW
dκ
= e−θA+ θ−1
[(
1− e−θ − θe−θ)A− c′(κ)] = 0 (3.17)
and
dSW
dθ
= −
(
1− e−θ − θe−θ)Aκ− c(κ)
θ2
= 0. (3.18)
Rearranging I get
c′(κ) =
(
1− e−θ)A (3.19)
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and
c(κ) =
(
1− e−θ − θe−θ)Aκ. (3.20)
When c(κ) = κ2 the planner thus chooses
κSO =
(
1− e−θ)A
2
. (3.21)
The ﬁrst order condition with respect to θ can be rewritten as
−
(
1− e−θ − θe−θ)A(1−e−θ)A
2
− ((1−e
−θ)A
2
)2
θ2
= 0.
It holds whenever
(
e−θ + 2θe−θ − 1) = 0. The second order condition is negative.
Thus θ is4 θSO ≈ 1.2564. I have thus shown that θSO = θ∗ and κSO = κ∗. Thus
the free entry equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient.
3.3 Restricted demand
With indivisible goods and unit demand (see chapter 2 of this thesis) I found that
equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient and that both the sellers and buyers are indif-
ferent between whether trades are decided by sellers posting prices or by auctions.
In the previous section I demonstrate that the result holds also for perfectly di-
visible goods when the utility functions of the buyers are linear. In the current
chapter I make the additional assumption that a buyer demands at most one unit
of the good. The utility function of the buyers is thus
u(x) =
{
x, for 0 ≤ x < 1
1, for x ≥ 1 . (3.22)
where x is the amount of the good that the buyer receives. In this section I focus
on cases where the sellers hold capacities κ > 1 as the role of the restricted demand
by the buyers is meaningless otherwise. When sellers hold capacities below unity
the analysis of the previous section pertains.
4θ = −1/2− LambertW (−1,−(1/2)exp(−1/2)) ≈ 1.2564
CHAPTER 3. DIRECTED SEARCH AND DIVISIBLE GOODS 77
Sellers’ proﬁt When all the sellers hold capacity κ and per unit price at q the
sellers face queue length θ. The probability that exactly j buyers visit a seller is
then P [x = j] = e−θ θ
j
j!
. Now let k ≤ κ < k+1, where k is an integer. As in chapter
two a seller sells as many goods as he has customers whenever he is visited by at
most k buyers, giving him an expected revenue of q
∑k
i=0 e
−θ θi
i!
i = q (θFθ(k − 1)).
If more than k buyers visit the seller he sells his whole stock κ, this happens with
probability (1− Fθ (k)) .Thus a seller’s expected revenue is captured by
πs = q [θFθ(k − 1) + κ (1− Fθ (k))] . (3.23)
Note that whenever κ = k, i.e. whenever κ is an integer, the expression coincides
with Eq. (2.1) of chapter two.
Buyers’ utility A buyer visiting a seller with capacity κ expects the following
utility:
ub = (1− q)
[
k−1∑
i=0
e−θ
θi
i!
+
∞∑
i=k
e−θ
θi
i!
κ
i+ 1
]
= (1− q)
[
Fθ(k − 1) + κ
θ
(1− Fθ(k))
]
, (3.24)
where the ﬁrst term in the parenthesis is the probability by which there are fewer
than k other buyers at the same location, in which case the buyer acquires one
unit of the good for sure. The expected amount of a good that a buyer gets if there
are more than k other buyers at the same location is
∞∑
i=k
e−θ θ
i
i!
κ
i+1
, the expected
utility of a buyer is then (1− q) κ
θ
(1− Fθ(k)). Again, whenever κ is an integer
Eq. (3.24) is equal to Eq. (2.2), and the analysis from chapter two holds.
3.3.1 Price
When all sellers have capacity κ and compete by posting binding prices I ﬁnd the
symmetric equilibrium price in the same way as in the previous section. First I
assume that all other sellers ask some price q. Then contemplating some other
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price q˜ a potential deviator maximizes his expected revenue
max
q˜
q˜ [γFγ(k − 1)) + (1− Fγ(k))κ] . (3.25)
As before, the queue length γ that the deviator faces is given by the indiﬀerence
condition of the buyers. The buyers must, in other words, be indiﬀerent between
contacting the deviating seller and the non-deviating sellers. Thus
(1− q˜)
[
Fγ(k − 1) + κ
γ
(1− Fγ(k))
]
= (1− q)
[
Fθ(k − 1) + κ
θ
(1− Fθ(k))
]
.
(3.26)
After some manipulations, that can be found in the appendix, I ﬁnd the symmetric
equilibrium price
q =
θ2e−θ θ
k−1
(k−1)! − θe−θ θ
k
k!
κ+ (1− Fθ(k))κ
(1− Fθ(k))κ+ θFθ(k − 1) (3.27)
from which no proﬁtable deviations exist.
Proposition 3.6 When all sellers have capacity κ the symmetric equilibrium price
is given by Eq. (3.27).
Proof. The proof is found in the appendix.
Next I derive the expected proﬁt of a seller and the expected utility of a buyer
under price posting.
A seller’s expected payoﬀ is the price multiplied with the expected number of
sales. The expected proﬁt is thus
q [(1− Fθ(k))κ+ θFθ(k − 1)]− c(κ)
= θ2e−θ
θk−1
(k − 1)! − θe
−θ θ
k
k!
κ+ (1− Fθ(k))κ− c(κ)
= −θe−θ θ
k
k!
(κ− k) + (1− Fθ(k))κ− c(κ), (3.28)
where I have substituted in the equilibrium price q and simpliﬁed.
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Similarly a buyer’s expected utility under price posting is just his utility from
acquiring one unit of a good times the probability of a trade. The expected utility
is therefore
(1− q)
[
Fθ(k − 1) + κ
θ
(1− Fθ(k))
]
= Fθ(k − 1)− θe−θ θ
k−1
(k − 1)! + e
−θ θ
k
k!
κ
= e−θ
θk
k!
(κ− k) + Fθ(k − 1), (3.29)
where I have again substituted in the equilibrium price and simpliﬁed.
Auction
When the trades are decided by auction at the sellers’ locations a buyer will bid
zero and acquire one unit of the good as long as there are at most k − 1 other
buyers at the location. When there are k or more other buyers at the location the
buyers compete for the good and bid up the per unit price until their expected
utility from acquiring their share of the good is zero. The expected utility for a
buyer is thus
Fθ(k − 1). (3.30)
Similarly, if k or fewer buyers show up they have no incentive to bid more than
zero whereas if k + 1 or more buyers shoe up they bid up the price of the goods
to one per unit. This behavior gives a seller the following expected revenue
(1− Fθ(k))κ− c(κ).
One immediately sees that the equivalence between posted prices and auctions no
longer holds except for the special case where κ = k.
Proposition 3.7 The expected proﬁts of the sellers is lower under price posting
than when trades are decided by auction at the sellers’ locations
Proposition 3.8 The expected utility of the buyers is higher under price posting
than when trades are decided by auction at the sellers’ locations
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Proof. The proof is by construction and can be found above.
To understand the result ﬁrst note that when the quantity κ is an integer
k then the trading mechanisms are equivalent to both the buyers and sellers in
terms of expected utility. When the terms of trade are decided by auction a buyer’s
expected utility remains unchanged when the capacity κ is between two integers
k and k + 1. This is not true under price posting where any change in capacity
leads to a change in the price as well as in the expected utility for the buyers.
The reason why price posting is worse for the sellers under a ﬁxed capacity κ is
that the mechanism allows the sellers to compete by pricing all of their capacity.
By slightly lowering his price a seller can increase the queue length he faces. This
drives down the equilibrium price and leads to the results in propositions 3.7 and
3.8.
An interesting question is whether the two mechanisms lead to the same equi-
librium capacities.
3.3.2 Equilibrium capacity
In this section I derive the necessary conditions for the equilibrium capacity both
under price posting and when trades are decided by auction. I show that they are
identical. This means that the sellers hold the same amount of the good under
both trading rules in a symmetric equilibrium, when it exists. I begin by deriving
the equilibrium capacity when sellers post prices, I then I show that the same
capacity would be reached were the trades decided by auction.
Price posting
As there is no equivalence between price posting and auctions I need to begin by
ﬁnding the optimal price that a deviating seller posts. Assume that all other sellers
have capacity κ and a deviator deviates to some κ˜. By the buyers indiﬀerence
condition a deviating seller’s price q˜ must satisfy
(1− q˜)
[
(1− Fγ(l)) κ˜
γ
+ Fγ(l − 1)
]
= (1− q)
[
Fθ(k − 1) + κ
θ
(1− Fθ(k))
]
, (3.31)
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where l ≤ κ˜ < l+1 and l is a positive integer. The deviator maximizes his expected
proﬁt
max
q˜
q˜ [(1− Fγ(k))κ˜+ γFγ(k − 1)]− c(κ˜).
The ﬁrst order condition is
(1−Fγ(l))κ˜+ γFγ(l− 1)+ q
[
e−γ
γl
l!
κ˜+ Fγ(l − 1)− γe−γ γ
l−1
(l − 1)!
]
dγ
dq˜
= 0. (3.32)
By totally diﬀerentiating the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition I ﬁnd that
dγ
dq˜
=
Fγ(l − 1) + κ˜γ (1− Fγ(l))
(1− q˜)
[
−e−γ γl−1
(l−1)! − κ˜γ2 (1− Fγ(l)) + κ˜γ e−γ γ
l
l!
]
Substituting dγ
dq˜
into the deviators ﬁrst order condition and simplifying I ﬁnd the
deviator’s price
q˜ =
[
γe−γ γ
l−1
(l−1)! − κ˜e−γ γ
l
l!
+ κ˜
γ
(1− Fγ(l))
]
γ
γFγ(l − 1) + κ˜(1− Fγ(l)) . (3.33)
With the deviators optimal price at hand I am ready to ﬁnd the deviator’s optimal
capacity. As before, by ﬁnding a capacity from which the deviator’s best deviation
is to that same capacity I ﬁnd the symmetric Nash equilibrium capacity. I assume
that k ≤ κ˜ < k+1, then the deviator’s optimal price is given by Eq. (3.33). Thus
a deviator maximizes his expected proﬁt
max
κ˜
q˜ [(1− Fγ(k))κ˜+ γFγ(k − 1)]− c(κ˜) (3.34)
= max
κ˜
[
γ2e−γ
γk−1
(k − 1)! − γe
−γ γ
k
k!
κ˜+ (1− Fγ(k))κ˜− c(κ˜)
]
= max
κ˜
[
γe−γ
γk
k!
k − γe−γ γ
k
k!
κ˜+ (1− Fγ(k))κ˜− c(κ˜)
]
,
where I have substituted in the deviator’s price and simpliﬁed. The ﬁrst order
condition is
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[
(1− Fγ(k))− γe−γ γ
k
k!
]
+
[
e−γ
γk
k!
(k − κ˜) (k − γ + 1) + e−γ γ
k
k!
κ˜
]
dγ
dκ˜
− c′(κ˜),
(3.35)
where γ is decided by the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition
Fγ(k − 1)− γe−γ γ
k−1
(k − 1)! + e
−γ γ
k
k!
κ˜ = Fθ(k − 1)− θe−θ θ
k−1
(k − 1)! + e
−θ θ
k
k!
κ.
By totally diﬀerentiating the indiﬀerence condition I solve for dγ
dκ˜
dγ
dκ˜
= − e
−γ γk
k!
−e−γ γk−1
(k−1)! (1 + k − γ) + κ˜e−γ γ
k−1
k!
(k − γ) =
γ/k
(1 + k − γ) + κ˜ (γ
k
− 1) .
Thus the ﬁrst order condition becomes[
(1− Fγ(k))− γe−γ γ
k
k!
]
[k (1 + k − γ) + κ˜ (γ − k)] +
[
e−γ
γk
k!
(k − κ˜) (k − γ + 1) + e−γ γ
k
k!
κ˜
]
γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
e−γ γ
k+1
k!
(k(k+1−γ)−κ˜(k+1−γ−1))
− c′(κ˜) (k (1 + k − γ) + κ˜ (γ − k)) = 0.
In a symmetric equilibrium (if it exists) γ = θ and κ˜ = κ. Thus the necessary
condition for a Nash equilibrium is
1− Fθ(k)− c´(κ) = 0. (3.36)
Auction
A deviator maximizes
max
κ˜
(1− Fγ(k))κ˜− c(κ˜).
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The ﬁrst order condition is
(1− Fγ(k)) + e−γ γ
k
k!
κ˜
dγ
dκ˜
− c′(κ˜) = 0.
Note that dγ
dκ˜
= 0 . Thus the FOC is
(1− Fγ(k))− c′(κ˜) = 0.
In a symmetric equilibrium γ = θ and κ˜ = κ and thus the equilibrium capacity is
given by
(1− Fθ(k))− c′(κ) = 0. (3.37)
Thus I have shown that the symmetric equilibrium capacities must be the same
under price posting and when trades are decided by auction. By propositions
(3.6) and (3.7) we, however, know that the payoﬀs both the buyers and sellers
diﬀer. Next I show that the symmetric equilibrium quantities under both trading
mechanisms is constrained eﬃcient.
Planners problem
I let the planner choose how much each seller produces but not the total number
of sellers. The planner maximizes the overall welfare
max
κ
Fθ(k − 1) + κ
θ
(1− Fθ(k))− θ−1c(κ). (3.38)
The ﬁrst order condition is
(1− Fθ(k))− c′(κ) = 0.
The second order condition is negative. Thus, the planners solution is characterized
by
c′(κ) = (1− Fθ(k)) . (3.39)
This means that a symmetric equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient both under price
posting and when the terms of trade are decided by auction.
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Proposition 3.9 A symmetric equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient
Proof. The proof can be found above
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter I analyze the endogenous capacity choices of sellers when the buyers
have linear demand. When the utility function of the buyers is linear the sellers’
equilibrium capacity is quite straightforward to ﬁnd. I show that a symmetric Nash
equilibrium is then constrained eﬃcient. In addition I show that price posting and
auctions are payoﬀ equivalent both to the sellers and to the buyers.
The equivalence result doesn’t hold when each buyer demands at most one
unit of the good. The buyers then fare better under price posting than under
auction while the sellers fare better under auction. This result holds when all
sellers have the same capacity. Somewhat surprisingly the symmetric equilibrium
capacities under both trading mechanisms seem to be the same. The capacities are
also constrained eﬃcient in that a planner facing the same frictional environment
would arrive at the same equilibrium capacities.
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Appendix 3.A Proofs
Suﬃcient conditions for Proposition 3.1
Proof. When the price is q = (
1−e−θ−θe−θ)A
1−e−θ the expected revenue of a seller with
capacity κ is given by
qκ
(
1− e−θ) = (1− e−θ − θe−θ)Aκ.
Deviating to some other capacity q˜ gives
q˜κ
(
1− e−γ) ,
where the queue length of a deviator γ is determined by the buyers indiﬀerence
condition
(A− q)κ
θ
(
1− e−θ) = (A− q˜)κ
γ
(
1− e−γ) .
Rewriting I get
e−θAκ = (A− q˜)κ
γ
(
1− e−γ) .
Thus
q˜ =
A
(
κ
γ
(1− e−γ)− κe−θ
)
κ
γ
(1− e−γ) .
A deviator’s expected revenue is
q˜κ
(
1− e−γ) = A
(
κ
γ
(1− e−γ)− κe−θ
)
κ
γ
(1− e−γ) κ
(
1− e−γ) = Aκ ((1− e−γ)− γe−θ) .
For q to be the equilibrium price it must give a potential deviator a higher proﬁt
than any other price would give him. Thus the following inequality must hold
(1− e−θ − θe−θ)κ ≥ κ((1− e−γ)− γe−θ).
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To ﬁnd the maximum of the RHS I ﬁrst diﬀerentiate it with respect to γ.
d
dγ
κ(
(
1− e−γ)− γe−θ) = κe−γ − κe−θ
This is zero when γ = θ. The second order condition with respect to γ is negative.
As the RHS is continuos in γ and the ﬁrst derivative is zero only when γ = θ it
follows that γ = θ gives the global maximum. Thus there is no proﬁtable deviation
from price q = (
1−e−θ−θe−θ)A
1−e−θ .
There are no proﬁtable deviations from κ∗ = (1−e
−θ)A
2
given by Proposi-
tion 3.4
Proof. The expected proﬁt for a ﬁrm producing κ∗ is 1
4
A2
(
1− eθ) (1− e−θ − 2θe−θ).
A deviation to some other capacity κ˜ gives
(1− e−γ − γe−γ)Aκ˜− c(κ˜),
where γ is derived from the buyer’s indiﬀerence condition
e−γκ˜A− e−θκA = 0.
Thus κ˜ = e
−θκ
e−γ . A deviator expects proﬁt
(1− e−γ − γe−γ)Ae
−θκ
e−γ
− (e
−θκ
e−γ
)2
For κ to be an equilibrium I need
1
4
A2
(
1− eθ) (1− e−θ − 2θe−θ) ≥ (1− e−γ − γe−γ)Ae−θκ
e−γ
− (e
−θκ
e−γ
)2.
The RHS can be rewritten as
(1− e−γ − γe−γ)Ae
−θ
e−γ
(1− e−θ)A
2
− (e
−θ
e−γ
(1− e−θ)A
2
)2
Diﬀerentiating the RHS with respect to γ I get
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1
2
γA2((1− e−θ)e−θ + 1
2
(1− e−γ − γe−γ)A2(1− e−θ)e−θ
e−γ
− (1− e
−θ)2
(
e−θ
)2
A2
2 (e−γ)2
=
1
2
A2
(
e−2θ − e−θ − e−2θ+γ + e−θ+γ − e−4θ+2γ + 2e−3θ+2γ − e−2θ+2γ)
When γ = θ the above expression is zero.
The second order condition
d
dγ
1
2
A2
(
e−2θ − e−θ − e−2θ+γ + e−θ+γ − e−4θ+2γ + 2e−3θ+2γ − e−2θ+2γ) =
1
2
A2
(−e−2θ+γ + e−θ+γ − 2e−4θ+2γ + 4−3θ+2γ − 2e−2θ+2γ)
Evaluated at γ = θ this is
1
2
A2
(
3e−θ − 1− 2e−2θ) ,
To see which values this is negative for note that −2x2 + 3x − 1 = 0 has the
roots 1 and 1
2
. Thus e−θ = 1 or e−θ = 1
2
. I discard the solution θ = 0 as this
would imply that there are no buyers in the economy. I solve e−θ = 1
2
, Solution
is: {[θ = 0.693 15]} numerically to ﬁnd that 1
2
A2
(
3e−θ − 1− 2e−2θ) is negative for
values of θ > ln 2, which is approximately .693 15.
The equilibrium price when demand is restricted is given by Eq. (3.27)
Proof. Assume all other sellers charge price q. A deviator maximizes
max
q˜
q˜ [γFγ(k − 1)) + (1− Fγ(k))κ] , (3.40)
where the queue length γ that the deviator faces is given by the indiﬀerence
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condition of the buyers.
(1− q˜)
[
k−1∑
h=0
e−γ
γh
h!
+
∞∑
h=k
e−γ
γh
h!
κ
h+ 1
]
= (1− q)
[
k−1∑
h=0
e−θ
θh
h!
+
∞∑
h=k
e−θ
θh
h!
κ
h+ 1
]
.
(3.41)
By totally diﬀerentiating the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition with respect to γ and
q˜
dγ
[
−e−γ γ
k−1
(k − 1)! (1− q˜) + ((1− q˜)κ)
γe−γ γ
k
k!
− (1− Fγ(k))
γ2
]
−dq˜
[
Fγ(k − 1)) + 1
γ
(1− Fγ(k))κ
]
= 0
I derive
dγ
dq
=
[
Fγ(k − 1)) + 1γ (1− Fγ(k))κ
]
[
−e−γ γk−1
(k−1)! (1− q˜) + 1γ e−γ γ
k
k!
(1− q˜)κ− 1
γ2
(1− Fγ(k)) (1− q˜)κ
] .
The ﬁrst order condition of the deviator’s maximization problem evaluated at q˜ = q
where γ = θ is
γFγ(k− 1)) + (1−Fγ(k))κ+ q˜
[
Fγ(k − 1))− γe−γ γ
k−1
(k − 1)! + e
−γ γ
k
k!
κ
]
dγ
dq˜
= 0
∣∣q˜=q
γ=θ
(3.42)
and simpliﬁes to
θFθ(k − 1) + (1− Fθ(k))κ
−q θ
2
[
Fθ(k − 1) + 1θ (1− Fθ(k))κ
]
(1− q)
[
θ2e−θ θ
k−1
(k−1)! − θe−θ θ
k
k!
κ+ (1− Fθ(k))κ
] [Fθ(k − 1))− θe−θ θk−1
(k − 1)! + e
−θ θ
k
k!
κ
]
= 0.
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Again simplifying I solve for the candidate symmetric equilibrium price q.
q =
(
θ2e−θ θ
k−1
(k−1)! − θe−θ θ
k
k!
κ+ (1− Fθ(k))κ
)
(
θ2e−θ θ
k−1
(k−1)! − θe−θ θ
k
k!
κ+ (1− Fθ(k))κ
)
+ θ
(
Fθ(k − 1))− θe−θ θk−1(k−1)! + e−θ θ
k
k!
κ
) ,
thus the necessary condition for the Nash equilibrium is given by
q =
θ2e−θ θ
k−1
(k−1)! − θe−θ θ
k
k!
κ+ (1− Fθ(k))κ
(1− Fθ(k))κ+ θFθ(k − 1) . (3.43)
Next I show that there are no proﬁtable deviations from this candidate equilibrium
price. With price q the expected revenue of a seller is
q [θFθ(k − 1)) + (1− Fθ(k))κ] = θ2e−θ θ
k−1
(k − 1)! − θe
−θ θ
k
k!
κ+ (1− Fθ(k))κ.
By deviating to some other price q̂ a seller would receive
q̂ [γFγ(k − 1)) + (1− Fγ(k))κ]
The queue length of the deviator is determined by the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition
(1− q̂)
[
Fγ(k − 1) + κ
γ
(1− Fγ(k))
]
= (1− q)
[
Fθ(k − 1) + κ
θ
(1− Fθ(k))
]
I simplify the expression and solve for q̂. The price of the deviator is thus
q̂ =
Fγ(k − 1) + κγ (1− Fγ(k))− e−θ θ
k
k!
(κ− k) + Fθ(k − 1)[
Fγ(k − 1) + κγ (1− Fγ(k))
] .
A deviation is not proﬁtable as long as
θ2e−θ
θk−1
(k − 1)! − θe
−θ θ
k
k!
κ+ (1− Fθ(k))κ ≥ q̂ [γFγ(k − 1)) + κ(1− Fγ(k))]
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which simpliﬁes to
θe−θ
θk
k!
(k−κ)+(1−Fθ(k))κ ≥ γ
[
Fγ(k − 1) + κ
γ
(1− Fγ(k))− e−θ θ
k
k!
(κ− k) + Fθ(k − 1)
]
Diﬀerentiating the RHS with respect to γ I get
Fγ(k − 1)− ke−γ γ
k
k!
+ κe−γ
γk
k!
− e−θ θ
k
k!
(κ− k) + Fθ(k − 1).
This is zero when γ = θ. The second derivative of the RHS with respect to γ is
negative. As the RHS is continuos in γ and the ﬁrst derivative is zero only when
γ = θ it follows that γ = θ gives the global maximum. Thus there is no proﬁtable
deviation from price
q =
θ2e−θ θ
k−1
(k−1)! − θe−θ θ
k
k!
κ+ (1− Fθ(k))κ
(1− Fθ(k))κ+ θFθ(k − 1) .
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Chapter 4
Convergence of Finite Clustered
Markets
4.1 Introduction1
The purpose of this note is to provide the ﬁnite economy foundations of a model
describing an exchange economy where sellers with unit supply face an uncertain
number of buyers with unit demand. The model by Kultti (2011) resembles di-
rected search as the sellers compete by posting binding prices and buyers observe
the prices. It, however, diﬀers from the standard directed search models (see e.g.
Burdet et al. 2001) in two respects. Firstly, the sellers have a choice between
locating geographically close to each other (clustered market) or to locate sepa-
rately. Secondly, to make the locational choice meaningful it is assumed that the
number of buyers is stochastic. The stochasticity of demand makes the sellers’
choice between the markets interesting. If demand were known to be lower than
the number of sellers then they would make zero proﬁts if they where all in the
same location, thus they would prefer to be located separately as they would then
make positive proﬁts. If demand were known to be higher than the number of
sellers they would prefer to be together as they would then all be able to sell their
good for the highest possible price. In order to endogenize the market structure
1This chapter is based on a mimeo by the same name which is joint work with Professor Klaus
Kultti.
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in this fashion Kultti makes the simplifying assumption that there is a continuum
of sellers and buyers. In this note I motivate this assumption.
In the competitive search literature it is quite standard to assume that there
are continua of buyers and sellers. To model deviations by single (measure zero)
seller it is assumed that a deviator has to oﬀer the same expected utility to the
buyers as they would receive in equilibrium, namely, themarket utility. The sellers’
optimal prices can then be characterized by a pair consisting of the price and the
probability of trade together with the assumption that in equilibrium every such
pair gives the buyers at least the market utility. (see e.g. Peters 2000 or Moen
1997). Since Judd (1985) and Feldman and Gilles (1985) it is known that the
assumption of a continuum of agents using i.i.d. mixed strategies is problematic
as there is no guarantee that the expected utilities are deﬁned or that the law of
large numbers holds. The straightforward way to solve this problem is to model a
ﬁnite economy where the strategies of the sellers and buyers are well deﬁned and
show that they converge to those derived assuming a continuum of agents, when
the number of agents tends to inﬁnity and the ratio of sellers to buyers is held
ﬁxed. This has been done by Burdett et al. (2001) for a model with homogenous
buyers and by Peters (2000) for a model with heterogenous buyers. Galenianos
and Kircher (2012) show that also more complicated search environments, e.g.
ones involving risk averse consumers or moral hazard, can be derived as limits of
well deﬁned ﬁnite models.
In the current paper I derive the ﬁnite economy foundations for the strategies
of capacity constrained sellers as well as for the buyers’ beliefs about the level of
demand in the clustered market. In this setting the uncertainty of demand leads
to mixed pricing strategies by the sellers in a symmetric equilibrium. I show that
as the economy grows without limit holding the ratio of buyers to sellers constant,
the mixed strategy and the demand uncertainty converge to those of an economy
with continua of buyers and sellers. Thus using the simplifying assumption of a
continuum of agents is well founded. This setting is not new to the literature. It
was ﬁrst analyzed by Prescott (1975) in his example of hotel competition. Later the
eﬀect of demand uncertainty on pricing has been modelled e.g. by Dana (1999).
For a dynamic model of price posting with random demand see Deneckere and
Peck (2010).
CHAPTER 4. CONVERGENCE OF FINITE CLUSTERED MARKETS 95
In the next section I deﬁne the model. In section 3 I show that when the econ-
omy grows the uncertainty about the demand approaches that of the continuum
case. In section 4 I derive the mixed pricing strategy Fn in the ﬁnite economy and
show that it is unique. In section 5 I show that it converges to mixed strategy of
the continuum economy.
4.2 The model
Consider a sequence of ﬁnite economies of buyers and sellers {En}n∈{1,2,...}. The
sellers each have one good for sale and the number of sellers in En is n. Each of
the buyers desires one good and there is uncertainty about the total number of
buyers. The sellers are all in the same location so there are no search frictions in
the market. The only "friction" in the model is that there is uncertainty about
the total number of buyers. Their number in an economy En is a random variable
bn determined as follows. The buyers are named by the points on [0,m], there are
nm + 12 potential buyers evenly spaced, consecutive buyers being distance 1/n
apart, the ﬁrst buyer at 0. To simplify matters I assume that the buyers don’t
know their names 3. Then a draw θ from [0,m] according to distribution H takes
place, and all buyers x ∈ {0, 1/n, ..., nm /n} such that x > θ are dismissed. The
remaining buyers participate as active buyers in the economy En. Let us denote
the distribution function of bn by Kn.
The order of events is as follows. The sellers simultaneously choose prices at
which they are willing to sell their good to the buyers, they advertise the prices, and
then the buyers approach the sellers. The sellers are committed to the prices. The
setup corresponds to a situation where all goods are sold in the same location and
the buyers are served in order of appearance. As the model is a single period model
a buyers position in the queue can be derived e.g. by using a lottery where each
buyer is given a diﬀerent number and the numbers determine the order in which
2x ≡ floor(x)
3If the buyers knew their names one would have to shuﬄe the buyers so that the name would
lose it’s information. One way to achieve this is to let one of the buyers x ∈ {0, 1/n, ..., nm /n}
be chosen randomly from a uniform distribution and let the buyers be renamed so that buyer
y becomes y − x. Then the buyers are in a symmetric position, in particular, they cannot infer
anything about the magnitude of the demand on the basis of their own names.
CHAPTER 4. CONVERGENCE OF FINITE CLUSTERED MARKETS 96
the buyers are allowed to make the transactions. There is Bertrand competition
in the market and if there are fewer buyers than sellers only the lowest price items
are sold whereas if there are more buyers than sellers then all items are sold. In
this setting where the magnitude of total demand is uncertain it is clear that the
sellers’ symmetric pricing strategy Fn is a mixed strategy on some closed interval
[a,A].
4.3 Derivation of an active buyer’s belief
We determine an active buyer’s belief about the magnitude of demand. The idea
is that a buyer conditions his beliefs concerning the total number of buyers on his
own existence, he is more likely to exist in a world where the total number of active
buyers is high.4 Consider an active buyer x ∈ {0, 1/n, ..., nm /n} and, abusing
notation, let this also denote the event that the particular buyer is active. We want
to establish the connection with the continuum economy where the magnitude of
demand is a random variable Θ that follows distribution H on [0,m], which is
assumed continuous and to possess density h. Then the magnitude of demand
θ happens with probability h(θ), and the interpretation is that the demand is θ
times the magnitude of sellers with is given by the unit interval. The corresponding
magnitude in the economy En is that demand is given by θn where θ ∈ [0,m]. Of
course, it could well happen that θn is not an integer, and consequently we focus
on θn.
The probability that an active buyer assigns to the event that the total number
of buyer is smaller than θn conditional on his own existence is given by
Pr (bn ≤ θn |x) = Pr (x |bn ≤ θn) Pr (bn ≤ θn)∑nm
l=1 Pr (x |bn = l ) Pr (bn = l)
. (4.1)
Let us ﬁrst note that by symmetry
Pr (x |bn = l ) = lnm+ 1 ,
4While it is true that the beliefs of the buyers are irrelevant in this setting they are, however,
very important in settings, such as market structure (B) in chapter 5 of this thesis where the
buyers chose between diﬀerent markets to visit.
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i.e., the probability that the buyer exists conditional on their being l active buyers
is just l divided by the maximum potential number of buyers. The probability
that there are l active buyers in the economy is by construction
Pr (bn = l) = H−
(
l
n
)
−H−
(
l − 1
n
)
,
where H−
(
l
n
) ≡ Pr (b < l
n
)
. Consequently, the denominator in Eq. (4.1) is given
by
1
nm+ 1
nm∑
l=1
l
[
H−
(
l
n
)
−H−
(
l − 1
n
)]
=
1
nm+ 1
{
−H−
(
1
n
)
−H−
(
2
n
)
− ...−H−
(nm − 1
n
)
+ nmH−
(nm
n
)}
.
The numerator in Eq. (4.1) is given by
1
nm+ 1
nθ∑
l=1
l
[
H−
(
l
n
)
−H−
(
l − 1
n
)]
=
1
nm+ 1
{
−H−
(
1
n
)
−H−
(
2
n
)
− ...−H−
(θn − 1
n
)
+ θnH
(θn
n
)}
.
Now I can express
Pr (bn ≤ θn |x)
=
1
nm+1
{
−H−
(
1
n
)− ...−H− ( θn−1n )+ θnH ( θnn )}
1
nm+1
{
−H−
(
1
n
)− ...−H− ( nm−1n )+ nmH− ( nmn )}
=
n
{
− 1
n
H−
(
1
n
)− ...− 1
n
H−
(
θn−1
n
)
+ 1
n
θnH−
(
θn
n
)}
n
{
1
n
(
H−
(
nm
n
)
−H−
(
1
n
))
+ 1
n
(
H−
(
nm
n
)
−H−
(
2
n
))
+ ...+ 1
n
(
H−
(
nm
n
)
−H−
(
nm−1
n
))}
=
− l
n
H−
(
1
n
)− ...− l
n
H−
(
θn−1
n
)
+ l
n
θnH−
(
θn
n
)
l
n
(
H−
(
nm
n
)
−H−
(
1
n
))
+ l
n
(
H−
(
nm
n
)
−H−
(
2
n
))
+ ...+ l
n
(
H−
(
nm
n
)
−H−
(
nm−1
n
)) .
Notice that H−
(
nm
n
)
approaches H (m) = 1 as n increases, and replacing
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H−
(
nm
n
)
with 1 in the denominator makes it the Riemann-sum of 1−H(x). As n
goes to inﬁnity the denominator approximates ever more closely
∫ m
0
(1−H(x)) dx =
E(Θ), i.e., the expected demand. Similarly, the negative terms in the numerator
form a Riemann-sum of H(x) up to θn
n
. As n increases the sum approximates
as closely as desired
∫ θ
0
H(x)dx, and the last term is as close as desired to θH(θ).
Consequently, in the limit I get
lim
n→∞
Pr (bn ≤ θn |x) =
− ∫ θ
0
H(x)dx+ θH(θ)
E(Θ)
.
The derivative of the RHS with respect to θ is given by
θh(θ)
E(Θ)
.
Proposition 4.1 Consider an economy with a unit interval of sellers and the
magnitude of buyers determined by H on interval [0,m] An active buyer’s updated
view of the magnitude of demand is given by
g(θ) =
θh(θ)
E(Θ)
.
The updated probability of the ﬁnite economy approaches g in distribution when n
grows without limit.
This shows that the beliefs about the magnitude of demand from both the
buyers’ and sellers’ point of view in the ﬁnite economy converge in distribution to
the beliefs of the economy with a continuum of agents.
4.4 Derivation and uniqueness of the mixed pric-
ing strategy Fn
4.4.1 Derivation
In this section I derive the sellers’ symmetric pricing strategy Fn, which is a mixed
strategy on some closed interval [a,A]. First, Fn is continuous and has no gaps
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or atoms (mass points). (For the proof see e.g. Kultti and Virrankoski 2003).
The idea of the proof is simple and by contradiction. Assume there is a gap in
the support, then the seller with the highest price below the gap could quote a
price immediately below the lowest price in the support above the gap without
this aﬀecting the probability that he makes a sale. To prove that there are no
atoms in the support, suppose ﬁrst that there is an atom. But then an agent with
a price in the atom could by inﬁnitesimally lowering his price noticeably increase
his probability of selling his good (the probability of selling the good would exhibit
a discrete jump).
Second, A = 1 since the seller that quotes the highest price in the support of
the mixed strategy makes a sale only if there are at least as many buyers as sellers;
but then it is optimal not to leave any surplus to the buyers. To establish the
symmetric mixed strategy Fn let us determine the expected utility of a seller who
quotes price 1. He makes a sale only if there are at least as many buyers as sellers.
The probability that there are at least n buyers is by construction
Pr (bn ≥ n) = 1−H−
(n
n
)
. (4.2)
This is also the expected proﬁt of a ﬁrm quoting price 1 when all ﬁrms use mixed
strategy Fn. Since any price in the support of the mixed strategies has to generate
the same expected proﬁt as A = 1, and the seller quoting a makes a sale with
certainty, it must be the case that a = 1 − H−
(
n
n
)
. Notice that the utility of a
seller quoting the highest price A = 1 converges to 1 −H(1) as n grows without
limit.
4.4.2 Uniqueness
Assume that a seller in En quotes price z ∈ [a, 1]. The probability that price z is
the kth lowest of the prices can be expressed by the probability mass function of
the binomial distribution. Thus the probability that k − 1 of the remaining n− 1
sellers have a lower price than z is(
n− 1
k − 1
)
F k−1n (z) (1− Fn(z))n−k . (4.3)
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Conditional on z being the kth lowest price the seller trades with probability
Pr (bn ≥ k) = 1−H−
(
k
n
)
. (4.4)
To get the probability that the seller quoting price z trades I have to sum over all
k
n∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k − 1
)
F k−1n (z) (1− Fn(z))n−k ·
(
1−H_
(
k
n
))
, (4.5)
which is equivalent to
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
F kn (z) (1− Fn(z))n−1−k ·
(
1−H_
(
k + 1
n
))
. (4.6)
Any price in the support of the sellers mixed strategy has to yield the same ex-
pected utility choosing price z has to yield the same expected utility. Thus prize z
must yield the same as price A = 1. Thus the following equation that determines
the mixed strategy
z
n−1∑
k=0
[(
n− 1
k
)
F kn (z) (1− Fn(z))n−1−k ·
(
1−H_
(
k + 1
n
))]
= 1−H_
(n
n
)
, (4.7)
where the LHS is simply the expected utility of a seller quoting price z and the
RHS is the expected utility of a seller quoting price A = 1. A more convenient
form is
z =
1−H_
(
n
n
)∑n−1
k=0
[(
n−1
k
)
yk (1− y)n−1−k · (1−H_ (k+1n ))] , (4.8)
where I have deﬁned y = Fn(z). Notice that in Eq. (4.8) the numerator is a
constant, and when z = 1 then value y = 1 yields
1 =
1−H_
(
n
n
)
1−H_
(
n
n
) . (4.9)
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Denote the denominator in Eq. (4.8) by
j(y) ≡
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
yk (1− y)n−1−k ·
(
1−H_
(
k + 1
n
))
. (4.10)
Next I show that j(y) is strictly decreasing which means that for each z there is a
unique y that makes relation (4.8) true. The derivative of j is
n−1∑
k=1
(
n− 1
k
)
kyk−1 (1− y)n−1−k ΓkdH(b)
−
n−2∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
(n− k − 1)yk (1− y)n−2−k ΓkdH(b), (4.11)
where Γk ≡ 1 − H_
(
k+1
n
)
is a decreasing function of k. Let us compare the
rth factors of the positive and negative parts of the sum in Eq. (4.11) ignoring
the Γ-terms. The positive magnitude
(
n−1
r
)
ryr−1 (1− y)n−1−r equals the negative
magnitude
(
n−1
r−1
)
(n− (r − 1)− 1)yr−1 (1− y)n−2−(r−1) since(
n− 1
r
)
r =
(n− 1)!
r!(n− 1− r)!r =
(n− 1)!
(r − 1)!(n− 1− r)!
=
(
n− 1
r − 1
)
(n−(r−1)−1) = (n− 1)!
(r − 1)!(n− r)!(n−r) =
(n− 1)!
(r − 1)!(n− 1− r)! . (4.12)
But the multiplier of the positive term is Γr while the multiplier of the negative
term it is Γr−1. Further, the assumptions about H guarantee that Γr−1 > Γr Thus,
j is strictly decreasing.
The lowest value z = a in the support of Fn is given by Eq. (4.7) noticing that
Fn (ln) = 0, and that observing that only the index k = 0 in the sum is non-zero.
One can then solve
a =
1−H_
(
n
n
)
1−H_
(
1
n
) . (4.13)
When n grows indeﬁnitely I get the same lower limit of the mixed strategy as in
Kultti (2011), i.e. 1−H(1).
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4.5 Convergence of Fn
In Kultti (2011) it is shown that with a continuum of buyers and sellers the equilib-
rium dispersion of prices F (z) is unique and F (z) = H−1
(
1− 1−H(1)
z
)
. Similarly
for all ﬁnite n I have in the previous section shown that the mixed strategy Fn(z)
is unique. My aim is to show that the latter converges to the former i.e. that
Fn(z) converges to F (z). Given the form of Eq. (4.7)
z
n−1∑
k=0
[(
n− 1
k
)
F kn (z) (1− Fn(z))n−1−k ·
(
1−H_
(
k + 1
n
))]
≡ z · g(Fn(z))
= 1−H_
(n
n
)
, (4.14)
where I have named the probability that a seller with price z trades by g(Fn(z)),
showing convergence directly is non-trivial. It is clear that
lim
n→∞
1−H_
(n
n
)
= 1−H(1). (4.15)
Consequently
lim
n→∞
g(Fn(z)) =
1−H(1)
z
. (4.16)
In order to show that Fn(z) converges to F (z) I have to show that in addition to
Eq. (4.16) the following holds
lim
n→∞
g(Fn(z)) = 1−H (F (z)) . (4.17)
Eq. (4.17) just states that in the limit g(Fn(z)), the probability that a seller with
price z trades has to equal 1−H (F (z)), the probability that there are more than
F (z) sellers.
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To show that g(Fn(z)) converges 1−H (F (z)) I note that
g(Fn(z)) =
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
F kn (z) (1− Fn(z))n−1−k
(
1−H_
(
k + 1
n
))
= 1−
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
yk (1− y)n−1−kH_
(
k + 1
n
)
, (4.18)
where y = Fn(z).
Let us deﬁne the binomial Z
Z ∼ Bin(n− 1, y), (4.19)
and remember that the number of buyers is distributed as
bn ∼ Kn.
In addition I deﬁne the expectation R as
R = Ez [Pr (bn ≤ Z)] . (4.20)
Chebyshev’s inequality implies that
Pr
(
|Z − (n− 1)y| ≥ (n− 1) 34
)
≤ (n− 1)y(1− y)
(n− 1) 32 =
y(1− y)
(n− 1) 12 .
Thus,
limn→∞Pr
(
|Z − (n− 1)y| ≥ (n− 1) 34
)
= 0. (4.21)
Clearly also limn→∞Pr
(
|Z − ny| ≥ n 34
)
= 0.
I deﬁne
A =
{
|Z − ny| < n 34
}
,
and can thus rewrite R as
R = Ez [1A Pr (bn ≤ Z)] + Ez [1AC Pr (bn ≤ Z)] , (4.22)
CHAPTER 4. CONVERGENCE OF FINITE CLUSTERED MARKETS 104
where 1A is the indicator function of the set A and 1AC is the indicator function of
its complement. Next it is clear that R converges when n grows without limit as
the distance between the following upper bound and the lower bound goes to zero
R ≤ Pr
(
bn ≤ ny + n 34
)
+ Pr(AC)
R ≥ Pr
(
bn ≤ ny − n 34
)
− Pr(AC).
Now Pr
(
bn ≤ ny + n 34
)
converges to zero when n tends to inﬁnity if b > y and
to one otherwise. To see this, notice that given b the number of buyers is by
construction bn = bn + 1. Since bn ≥ bn ≥ bn − 1, as n grows without limit
bn+ 1 > ny + n 34 if and only if b > y. Consequently, in this case
lim
n→∞
Pr
(∣∣∣∣bnn − y
∣∣∣∣ ≤ n− 14) = 0.
Thus limn→∞Pr
(
bn
n
− y ≤ n− 14
)
= 0 whenever b > y. Likewise Pr(bn ≤ ny−n 34 )
converges to one if b < y and to zero otherwise. This means that limn→∞R = H(y).
As I deﬁned y = Fn(z) this can be written as
lim
n→∞
R = H(Fn(z)), (4.23)
which means that g(Fn(z)) converges to 1−H(Fn(z))
lim
n→∞
g(Fn(z)) = 1−H(F (z)).
Using expression (4.16) we thus have
lim
n→∞
g(Fn(z)) =
1−H(1)
z
= 1−H(F (z)),
which gives us
lim
n→∞
Fn(z) = H
−1
(
1− 1−H(1)
z
)
. (4.24)
Note that the RHS of the above expression, F (z) = H−1
(
1− 1−H(1)
z
)
the equilib-
rium distribution of prices in the model with continua of sellers and buyers. Thus
CHAPTER 4. CONVERGENCE OF FINITE CLUSTERED MARKETS 105
I have shown that the symmetric mixed strategy of the ﬁnite model converges to
the equilibrium distribution of prices of the continuum model.
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Chapter 5
Market Structure and Pricing
5.1 Introduction1
It is often observed that sellers of similar goods, say outdoor equipment, locate
close to each other and that several smaller retailers are found near a larger one.
Another frequently observed market structure is one with several small sellers in
the city centre and large retailers in the outskirts of the city. I analyze the eﬀect
that diﬀerent market structures have on expected prices and expected utilities and
proﬁts. This can be seen as investigating the eﬀects of price competition between
locations versus price competition within a location.
In my model aggregate supply is potentially much larger than aggregate de-
mand. If there were only one ﬁrm it could charge the monopoly price, whereas if
there were two ﬁrms (still with enough capacity to satisfy the whole market) they
would engage in Bertrand competition and drive the price down to zero. I model a
market with one large ﬁrm (without capacity restrictions) and a competitive fringe
of small capacity constrained ﬁrms and analyze the eﬀect these ﬁrms have on the
prices. Key assumptions are capacity constraints of the small ﬁrms and uncertain
demand,2 as they induce the small sellers to use a mixed pricing strategy whenever
1A version of this chapter has appeared in the HECER Discussion Paper series, No 338,
September 2011. It is joint work with Professor Klaus Kultti.
2Without theese assumptions the analysis would be uninteresting as ﬁrms would engage in
Bertrand competition and drive prices to zero whenever demand is smaller than supply at a
location. (The mirror case is just as uninterresting; when demand is at least as large as supply
all ﬁrms would sell, thus all ﬁrms would charge the highest possible price).
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they are together at a location3.
I deﬁne market structure as the locational distribution of ﬁrms and analyze
how market structure aﬀects the average prices, the expected utilities as well as
the proﬁts of the ﬁrms. The settings that I consider are
(A) All ﬁrms are in the same location, this setting can be interpreted as de-
scribing a city centre.
(B) The large ﬁrm is in one location and all the small ﬁrms are in a second
location. This setting can be seen as corresponding to a city center with small
ﬁrms and a large retailer at the outskirts of the city.
(C) All ﬁrms are at separate locations.
The ordering of the diﬀerent market structures by average price and by ex-
pected price paid is often very diﬀerent. There are several reasons for this. Firstly,
when the small sellers are together in a location (as in market structures (A) and
(B) they use mixed pricing strategies4. The cheapest goods are then bought ﬁrst,
leading to diﬀerences in the average and paid prices when demand is less than the
small ﬁrms’ capacity. The large ﬁrm’s expected price is higher than that of the
small ﬁrms in both market structures (A) and (B).5 Thus, the average prices and
the expected prices paid are diﬀerent also for high demand realizations. Secondly,
when there are several locations as in market structures (B) and (C) the locations
compete for customers aﬀecting the prices. These market structures induce extra
frictions as now some buyers visiting the small sellers are left without the good
and not all small sellers are able to sell even when demand is relatively high. The
small ﬁrms’ prices reﬂect the need to compensate the buyers for the possibility of
being left without the good. It is clear that these frictions aﬀect market structures
(B) and (C) diﬀerently as the number of locations and goods per location are
diﬀerent. For the reasons above the eﬀect of market structure on prices, expected
proﬁts and expected utilities is highly nontrivial.
The diﬀerent market structures lead to diﬀerent pricing strategies for both the
3This was ﬁrst demonstrated by Prescott (1975).
4The large ﬁrm might price using a mixed strategy as well when it is in the same location as
the small ﬁrms.
5In market structure (A) no small ﬁrm with a price higher than the large ﬁrm’s price sells
ever sells. In market structure (B) the small ﬁrms compenste the buyers for the possibility that
they are left without a good.
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large and the small ﬁrms. An implication is that a sample of posted prices and a
simple index based on these is not enough for comparing the market structures in
terms of expected proﬁts and expected utility of the buyers Knowledge of the mar-
ket structure and potential demand, or alternatively expected demand, is needed
as well.
Even when the market structure is known the distribution of the demand can
have large and surprising eﬀects on the pricing behavior of ﬁrms. As an example
of this consider market structure (A), where all sellers are together in a single
location. In this setting the large seller has a pure pricing strategy when demand
is exponentially distributed whereas it has a mixed pricing strategy with an atom
at the highest price the buyers are willing to pay when demand is uniform.
The rest of the paper is structured the following way. In section two I describe
the model and derive the pricing strategies of the ﬁrms under the three market
structures. In section 3 I compare the average prices, the expected proﬁts and
the expected utilities under the diﬀerent settings when demand is uniformly dis-
tributed. In section 4 I show that the ranking of the market structures under the
exponential distribution are diﬀerent still. Section 5 concludes.
5.1.1 Related models
The study of ﬁrms’ choice of location has a long tradition in economics going
back at least to Chamberlin (1933). More recently ﬁrms’ location choice has been
analyzed by e.g. Kultti (2008). He considers the location choice of small capacity
constrained ﬁrms that have the option of locating close together or separately. The
paper derives the equilibrium prices in both markets and shows that both markets
cannot coexist and that when sellers are allowed to choose markets they choose
the clustered market.
Whenever the small ﬁrms are together in a location as in market structures (A)
and (B) uncertain demand and capacity constraints induce them to use a mixed
pricing strategy. This was ﬁrst demonstrated by Prescott (1975) in his example
of hotel competition. Later the eﬀect of demand uncertainty on pricing has been
modelled e.g. by Eden (1990) and Dana (1999). For a dynamic model of price
posting with random demand see Deneckere and Peck (2010).
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Whenever there are several locations as in market structures (B) and (C)
I model the search behavior by the buyers similarly as in the directed search
literature (see e.g. Moen (1997), Shimer (1996), Burdet Shi and Wright (2001),
Watanabe (2010), or Godenhielm and Kultti (2011), where the last three papers
allow for diﬀerent capacities of sellers).
5.2 The model
There is a unit interval of small sellers who all have one good for sale. In addition
there is a large seller with enough capacity to serve the whole market. There
is a continuum m > 1 of potential buyers. The sellers value the good at zero.
The number of actual buyers in the market is a random variable Θ and follows
distribution H. I assume that the support of H(θ) is [0,m]. The buyers value
the good at unity. The sellers post prices and based on these, as well as on the
quantities on oﬀer at the diﬀerent locations the buyers decide which location to
visit.
Next I analyze the three market structures in detail.
5.2.1 Market structure (A); All ﬁrms in the same location
I assume that all sellers’ are in the same location. A buyer visiting the location
will then choose to buy the cheapest good (as long as the price is at most unity).
If a small ﬁrm charges the same price as the large ﬁrm I assume that the buyer
prefers the small ﬁrm. To ﬁnd the equilibrium prices I ﬁrst assume that the large
ﬁrm uses a pure strategy when all small ﬁrms are in the same location with it.
The large ﬁrm asks price q. Now in a prospective equilibrium q has to be the
highest price. If the large ﬁrm quotes price q = 1 it will trade only when there are
more buyers than small ﬁrms. As there is a unit interval of small ﬁrms this means
that the large ﬁrm will trade only when realized demand θ > 1. In that case it
will sell to all the buyers who have not been able to buy from the small ﬁrms, i.e.,
to measure measure θ − 1 of the buyers. Thus it expects to sell ∫ m
1
(θ − 1)h(θ)dθ
units. More formally, by quoting price q = 1 the large ﬁrm expects
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∫ m
1
(θ − 1)h(θ)dθ =
∫ m
1
θh(θ)dθ − [1−H(1)] = m−H(1)−
∫ m
1
H(θ)dθ − [1−H(1)]
= m− 1−
∫ m
1
H(θ)dθ, (5.1)
where I have partially integrated to get the second equality. It is easy to show
that the derivative of equation (5.1) is positive with respect to the price. Thus no
inﬁnitesimal deviations to a lower price exist. Next I look for larger deviations. A
natural place to start is to look at deviations to 1−H(1), the lower bound of the
support of the prices of the small ﬁrms.
If the large ﬁrm quotes price 1−H(1) it can expect the following proﬁt
[1−H(1)]
∫ m
0
θh(θ)dθ = m [1−H(1)]−
∫ m
0
H(θ)dθ [1−H(1)] . (5.2)
Note that the large ﬁrm now sells to all buyers at price 1 − H(1), the expected
measure of trades is thus the whole realized demand or
∫ m
0
θh(θ)dθ. To get the
RHS of Eq. (5.2) I have, again, partially integrated.
A deviation from q = 1 to q = 1−H(1) proﬁtable if
−mH(1)−
∫ 1
0
H(θ)dθ [1−H(1)]−
∫ m
1
H(θ)dθ [1−H(1)] > −1 +
∫ m
1
H(θ)dθ,
(5.3)
which is equivalent to
1 +H(1) > mH(1) +
∫ 1
0
H(θ)dθ. (5.4)
Claim 5.1 Whenever 1 >
∫ 1
0
H(θ)dθ+mH(1) − H(1) the large ﬁrm has a prof-
itable deviation from price unity.
Proof. The proof is sketched above.
An example of a demand distribution H for which expression (5.4) does not
hold is the exponential distribution. I show (in the appendix) that in this case
the large ﬁrm prices at unity. An example of a distribution of H for which the
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expression holds is the uniform distribution. Next I derive the mixed strategy
equilibrium in price when (5.4) holds.
Let us next derive the mixed strategies of the ﬁrms. Denote the small ﬁrms’
mixed strategy on [a,A] by F and the large ﬁrm’s mixed strategy on [b, B] by G.
Note ﬁrst that as long as there are no atoms B = 1 since otherwise there would be
a proﬁtable deviation upwards from B. Notice that A = 1 since otherwise there
would be a gap between A and B; in this case the large ﬁrm could deviate by
choosing a mass point at B = 1 and choosing prices between A and unity with
probability zero. Then, again the small ﬁrms could proﬁtably deviate upwards from
A.6A small ﬁrm would trade with probability zero if it chose price A = 1 unless
the large ﬁrm had a mass point at B = 1. This is the equilibrium I construct
denoting the mass at unity by γ Finally, let us note that it is quite possible that
b > a.
Consider a small ﬁrm that chooses price p ∈ [a, 1]. Its expected proﬁt is given
by
p [1−G(p)]
∫ m
F (p)
h(θ)dθ = p [1−G(p)] [1−H(F (p))] , (5.5)
when p > b. To understand the expression not that the LHS is just the price p
of the small ﬁrm multiplied by the probability that the large ﬁrm prices above p
multiplied with the probability that demand is above F (p), the measure of small
ﬁrms pricing below it.
When p ≤ b the probability that the small ﬁrm’s price is below that of the
large ﬁrm is unity and the small ﬁrm expects
p
∫ m
F (p)
h(θ)dθ = p [1−H(F (p))] . (5.6)
Consider next a large ﬁrm that chooses price q ∈ [b, 1]. Its expected proﬁt is
given by
q
∫ m
F (q)
(θ − F (q))h(θ)dθ = q
{
m− F (q)−
∫ m
F (q)
H(θ)dθ
}
, (5.7)
6Of course B cannot be less than A since small ﬁrms choosing a price above B would never
sell.
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where the LHS is analogous to the LHS of Eq. (5.1). By quoting price q the large
ﬁrm will trade only when realized demand is higher than F (q),the measure of small
ﬁrms with a lower price than it has. It will then sell to all the buyers who have
not been able to buy from the small ﬁrms, i.e., to measure measure θ−F (q) of the
buyers whenever θ > F (q). As the large ﬁrm doesn’t know the realized demand
θ integrate over m to ﬁnd that it expects to sell
∫ m
F (q)
(θ − F (q))h(θ)dθ units at
price q. To get the RHS I have again partially integrated.
Price 1 yields a small ﬁrm proﬁt [1−H(1)] γ. As a small ﬁrm has to make the
same proﬁt, i.e., [1−H(1)] γ by any price in its support. Thus the lower bound of
its support, where it sells with probability one, is a = [1−H(1)] γ. Equating the
small ﬁrms’ proﬁt with [1−H(1)] γ allows me to use Eq. (5.5) to solve for G(p).
Thus
G(p) =
p [1−H(F (p))]− [1−H(1)] γ
p [1−H(F (p))] . (5.8)
Now b is determined by G(b) = 0 which is equivalent to
b [1−H(F (b))]− [1−H(1)] γ = 0. (5.9)
From this I immediately see that b = a or equivalently b = [1−H(1)] when
H(F (b)) = 0.
I know from Eq. (5.1) that the large ﬁrm expects
∫ m
1
(θ − 1)h(θ)dθ when its
price is unity. As the large ﬁrm makes the same proﬁt anywhere in its support I
could use Eq. (5.7) to solve for F (q).
q
{
m− F (q)−
∫ m
F (q)
H(θ)dθ
}
=
∫ m
1
(θ − 1)h(θ)dθ (5.10)
One would like to show that in Eq. (5.9) the LHS becomes zero at some value
b > [1−H(1)] γ, and to solve F from Eq. (5.10). This is, however, not possible
unless one considers an explicit distribution H. To that end I focus on a uniform
distribution7. Now Eq. (5.9) becomes
b
[
1− F (b)
m
]
− [1−H(1)] γ = 0, (5.11)
7I derive the explicit pricing strategies under the exponential distribution in the appendix.
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and Eq. (5.10) becomes
q
{
m− F (q)− 1
2
m2 − F (q)2
m
}
=
1
2
m2 − 1
m
− m− 1
m
, (5.12)
which is equivalent to
qF (q)2 − 2mqF (q) +m2q − (m− 1)2 = 0. (5.13)
This expression has two roots F (q) = mq−(m−1)
√
q
q
and F (q) = mq+(m−1)
√
q
q
. As the
measure of small ﬁrms is unity and the second root would imply that more than
measure unity small ﬁrms would quote even at b I disqualify it as a solution for
F (q). Thus the mixed strategy of the small ﬁrms is
F (q) =
mq − (m− 1)√q
q
. (5.14)
Claim 5.2 The unique mixed strategy of the small ﬁrms is F (q) = mq−(m−1)
√
q
q
.
The support is
[(
m−1
m
)2
, 1
]
Proof. The proof is by construction above.
Inserting the condition F ([1−H(1)] γ) = F (m−1
m
γ
)
= 0 and solving yields
γ = m−1
m
.
Now I can solve for
G(p) = 1− m− 1
m
√
p
. (5.15)
Claim 5.3 The large ﬁrm uses a unique mixed strategy G(p) = 1 − m−1
m
√
p
with
probability 1− γ, with probability γ the large ﬁrm uses prices at unity.
Proof. The proof is by construction above.
Thus, in equilibrium the small ﬁrms price using mixed strategy F with sup-
port [a, 1] , and earn expected proﬁts of [1−H(1)] γ = (m−1
m
)2
. The large ﬁrm
uses mixed strategy G(p) with support [a, 1), it has an atom at price unity. The
probability that the large ﬁrm has price one is proﬁt is γ = m−1
m
. The expected
proﬁt of the large ﬁrm is m− 1− ∫ m
1
H(θ)dθ.
CHAPTER 5. MARKET STRUCTURE AND PRICING 117
Expected utility under market structure A
The expected price is given by the small ﬁrms’ share of the market multiplied by
their expected price plus the large ﬁrm’s market share multiplied by its expected
price. As the large ﬁrm has measure m units and the small ﬁrms have measure
unity the market shares are 1
m+1
and m
m+1
respectively the expected price is given
by
1
m+ 1
∫ 1
a
qf(q)dq +
m
m+ 1
(∫ 1
a
pg(p)dp+ γ · 1
)
(5.16)
=
1
m (m+ 1)
(
m2 +m− 2) .
To get the RHS I have used the fact that H is uniform and that the large ﬁrm
then prices at unity with probability γ = m−1
m
.
Next I ﬁnd the average price actually paid in the market. I begin by assuming
that the large ﬁrm asks price q. Then as long as θ ≤ F (q) only the small ﬁrms sell
and when θ > F (q) both types of ﬁrms sell. The expected price paid given that
the large ﬁrm quotes price q is thus
Ω (q) =
∫ F (q)
0
∫ F−1(θ)
a
qf(q)dqh(θ)dθ +
∫ m
F (q)
∫ q
a
qF (q)
θ
f(q)dqh(θ)dθ
+
∫ m
F (q)
q
θ
(θ − F (q))h(θ)dθ +
∫ m
F (q)
q
θ
(θ − F (q))h(θ)dθ, (5.17)
where the ﬁrst term is the expected price of the small ﬁrms when demand is
θ ≤ F (q) multiplied by the probability that demand is at this level. When demand
is higher than F (q), the amount F (q) of the buyers buy the good from the small
sellers and the rest buy the good from the large seller. The second and third
terms capture this. The second term is the price of the large ﬁrm multiplied by
the probability that a buyer buys from the large ﬁrm times the probability that
demand is higher than F (q). The third term is the expected price when buying
from a small ﬁrm when demand is high θ > F (q) multiplied by the probability
that a buyer gets to acquire the good from a small ﬁrm times the probability that
demand is high.
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To get the expected price paid under market structure (A) (EPPA) I need
to integrate over the possible prices of the large ﬁrm. The following expression
captures the idea8:
EPPA =
∫ 1
a
Ω (q) g (q) dq + γΩ (1) . (5.18)
The ﬁrst term in EPPA is just Ω (q) integrated over the prices in the support of
the large ﬁrm. The large ﬁrm has an atom at price unity. The second term is the
probability γ that the large ﬁrm prices at unity multiplied by Ω (1) , the price a
buyer then expects to pay.
In market structure A all buyers trade. Thus the expected utility is
EUA = 1− EPPA.
I derive the expression for the expected price paid when H is uniform in the
appendix. In section 3 I depict the expected price paid as well as the expected
utilities and the proﬁts under as a function of potential demand m.
5.2.2 Market structure (B); Large ﬁrm and small ﬁrms in
two separate locations
I next consider price and expected utilities when the small ﬁrms are located to-
gether in one location but separately from the large ﬁrm. I proceed to ﬁnd equi-
librium prices and expected utilities in this case.
Assume that fraction z of buyers go to small ﬁrms and fraction 1 − z go to
the large ﬁrm. Then the small ﬁrms set their price using a mixed strategy with
support9 [a,A], and the large ﬁrm quotes price PB. As before, it is clear that
F (A) = F (1) = 1.
A small ﬁrm quoting price 1 can then expect to get (1−H(1
z
)). As the expected
proﬁt must be the same over the support one easily sees that the lower bound of
8I derive the expression for the expected price paid under market structure (A) or (EPPA)
in the appandix.
9It is clear that A=1 as a small ﬁrm pricing A would otherwise have a deviation to 1.
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the support is a =
(
1−H(1
z
)
), as a seller quoting this price trades with certainty.
Any price ρ ∈ [a, 1] in the support of the small ﬁrms yields the same proﬁt
1−H (1
z
)
or more formally
ρ
(
1−H
(
F (ρ)
z
))
= 1−H
(
1
z
)
. (5.19)
From Eq. (5.19) I solve the mixed strategy of the small ﬁrms.
F (ρ) = zH−1
(
ρ− (1−H (1
z
))
ρ
)
. (5.20)
The expected proﬁt of the large ﬁrm is simply its price multiplied by the
expected number of trades it makes. This can be expressed as
PB
∫ m
0
(1− z)θh(θ)dθ = Π(PB). (5.21)
To continue I ﬁrst look at the expected utilities of buyers that go to the small
ﬁrms. The small ﬁrms set their prices using a mixed strategy. To make calculations
easier I follow Kultti (2008) and assume that all sellers charge the virtual price r
described below. I denote the expected utility of buyers visiting the small ﬁrms
by u(z, F ). A buyer going to a large seller knows that he can expect to get 1−PB.
In equilibrium the following must hold:
u(z, F ) = 1− PB (5.22)
and
Π′(PB) = 0. (5.23)
To solve this set of equations I begin by looking at the small ﬁrms’ pricing
decision. To simplify I let every small ﬁrm asks the same price r, where r can be
thought of as the virtual price that gives the sellers the same expected proﬁt as
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the sellers would get using the mixed strategy F derived above. I get
r
∫ 1
z
0
θz
1
h(θ)dθ +
(
1−H
(
1
z
))
r = 1−H
(
1
z
)
. (5.24)
In the ﬁrst term on the LHS I integrate over levels of demand when there are fewer
buyers than small sellers. The term is the expected proﬁt of the small ﬁrm when
there are less buyers than small ﬁrms. The second term is the expected proﬁt of a
small ﬁrm when demand is higher than the number of small ﬁrms, in which case
all sellers trade. Forcing the LHS to equal the expected proﬁt from the mixed
strategy, i.e., the RHS of Eq. (5.24) I solve for the small seller’s virtual price
r =
(
1−H (1
z
))
1−H (1
z
)
+
∫ 1
z
0
θz
1
h(θ)dθ
. (5.25)
Thus the buyers’ expected utility from visiting the small sellers is given by
u(z, F ) = (1− r)
[∫ 1
z
0
g (θ) dθ +
∫ m
1
z
1
zθ
g (θ) dθ
]
,
where g(θ) = θh(θ)
E(Θ)
is a buyer’s expectation of the overall demand given that he
exists and E(Θ) =
∫ m
0
θh(θ)dθ. If the buyer acquires the good he expects to
get 1 − r. Whenever less than 1
z
other buyers visit the small ﬁrms the buyer is
certain to acquire the good. The probability that demand is small in this sense is∫ 1
z
0
g (θ) dθ. When demand is high and more than 1
z
buyers visit the small sellers
then only some of the buyers get served, this probability is simply the measure
of goods divided by the measure of buyers visiting the small sellers, i.e., 1
zθ
. The
probability of acquiring a good is thus
∫ m
1
z
1
zθ
g (θ) dθ.
The buyers’ indiﬀerence condition can be stated as
(1− r)
[∫ 1
z
0
g (θ) dθ +
∫ m
1
z
1
zθ
g (θ) dθ
]
= 1− PB. (5.26)
The LHS is the buyers’ expected utility from visiting the small ﬁrms’ location, the
RHS is the buyers expected utility from visiting the large ﬁrm. It is clear that
PB ≤ 1 as no buyer would otherwise visit the large ﬁrm. Before solving the large
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ﬁrm’s optimization problem I rewrite the buyers indiﬀerence condition. Using Eq.
(5.25) I write 1− r as
1− r = 1−H
(
1
z
)
+
∫ 1
z
0
θzh(θ)dθ − (1−H (1
z
))
1−H (1
z
)
+
∫ 1
z
0
θzh(θ)dθ
=
∫ 1
z
0
θzh(θ)dθ
1−H (1
z
)
+
∫ 1
z
0
θzh(θ)dθ
(5.27)
Now I look at the rest of the LHS of Eq. (5.26). Remembering that g(θ) = θh(θ)
E(Θ)
I
get ∫ 1
z
0
g (θ) dθ +
∫ m
1
z
1
zθ
g (θ) dθ
=
∫ 1
z
0
θh(θ)
E(Θ)
dθ +
∫ m
1
z
1
zθ
θh(θ)
E(Θ)
dθ
=
1
E(Θ)
[∫ 1
z
0
θh(θ)dθ +
1
z
∫ m
1
z
h(θ)dθ
]
. (5.28)
Partially integrating the ﬁrst term in brackets, the last equation the expression
becomes
1
E(Θ)
{
[θH(θ)]
1
z
0 −
∫ 1
z
0
H(θ)dθ +
1
z
(
1−H(1
z
)
)}
, (5.29)
which simpliﬁes to
1
E(Θ)
{
1
z
−
∫ 1
z
0
H(θ)dθ
}
. (5.30)
I can now rewrite the buyers indiﬀerence condition Eq. (5.26) as
1− PB =
∫ 1
z
0
θzh(θ)dθ
1−H (1
z
)
+
∫ 1
z
0
θzh(θ)dθ
· 1
E(Θ)
{
1
z
−
∫ 1
z
0
H(θ)dθ
}
(5.31)
Partially integrating
∫ 1
z
0
H(θ)dθ and simplifying the buyers indiﬀerence condition
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becomes
1− PB =
∫ 1
z
0
θzh(θ)dθ
zE(Θ)
. (5.32)
Then
PB =
zE(Θ)− ∫ 1z
0
θzh(θ)dθ
zE(Θ)
. (5.33)
The large ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize its revenue, which is just its price multi-
plied with its share of the expected demand or more formally
max
PB
∫ m
0
(1− z) θh(θ)dθ · PB,
where
∫ m
0
(1− z) θh(θ)dθ is simply (1− z) E(Θ). The ﬁrst order condition is:∫ m
0
(1− z) θh(θ)dθ −
∫ m
0
dz
dPB
θh(θ)dθ · PB = 0. (5.34)
I get dz
dPB
by totally diﬀerentiating the buyers indiﬀerence condition Eq. (5.32) or
zE(Θ)(1− PB)−
∫ 1
z
0
θzh(θ)dθ = 0. (5.35)
I get
dPB {−zE(Θ)}+
dz
{
E(Θ)(1− PB)−
∫ 1
z
0
θh (θ) dθ + h
(
1
z
)(
1
z2
)}
(5.36)
= 0,
from which I solve
dz
dPB
=
zE (θ)
E(Θ)(1− PB)−
∫ 1
z
0
θh (θ) dθ + h
(
1
z
) (
1
z2
) . (5.37)
Substituting Eq. (5.37) into the Eq. (5.34) the FOC can be expressed as∫ m
0
(1− z) θh(θ)dθ− zE (θ)
E(Θ)(1− PB)−
∫ 1
z
0
θh (θ) dθ + h
(
1
z
) (
1
z2
) ∫ m
0
θh(θ)dθ·PB = 0,
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and simpliﬁed to
E(Θ)
∫ m
0
(1− z) θh(θ)dθ − E(Θ)PB
∫ m
0
(1− z) θh(θ)dθ−
∫ m
0
(1− z) θh(θ)dθ
∫ 1
z
0
θh (θ) dθ
(5.38)
+
∫ m
0
(1− z) θh(θ)dθ · h
(
1
z
)(
1
z2
)
−zE(Θ)
∫ m
0
θh(θ)dθ · PB
= 0.
I use the simpliﬁed FOC to solve for the large ﬁrm’s price
PB=
E(Θ)
∫ m
0
(1− z) θh(θ)dθ − ∫ m
0
(1− z) θh(θ)dθ · ∫ 1z
0
θh (θ) dθ +
∫ m
0
(1− z) θh(θ)dθ · h(1
z
) 1
z2
E(Θ)
∫ m
0
θh(θ)dθ
,
(5.39)
which simpliﬁes to
PB =
(1− z)
[
E(Θ)− ∫ 1z
0
θh (θ) dθ + h(1
z
) 1
z2
]
E(Θ)
, (5.40)
as
∫ m
0
θh(θ)dθ = E(Θ).
Determining the sign of the second order condition is cumbersome for a general
distribution H. Therefore I again assume that H is uniformly distributed. The
key equations are then as follows.
The virtual price of the small ﬁrms is
r =
(
1−H (1
z
))
1−H (1
z
)
+
∫ 1
z
0
θz
1
h(θ)dθ
=
1− 1
zm
1− 1
zm
+ 1
2zm
=
2mz − 2
2mz − 1 . (5.41)
For the virtual price to be positive I need zm > 1 or zm < 1
2
. The buyers’
indiﬀerence condition under uniform H is
1− PB − 1
m2z2
= 0. (5.42)
The objective function of the large ﬁrm is
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max
PB
∫ m
0
(1− z) θh(θ)dθ · PB = max
PB
(1− z) m
2
· PB.
The ﬁrst order condition is
(1− z) m
2
− dz
dPB
m
2
PB = 0,
where I get dz
dPB
= m
2z3
m2z2−Pm2z2+1 by totally diﬀerentiating the buyers’ indiﬀerence
condition, which is given by Eq. (5.42) as H is uniform. The FOC thus simpliﬁes
to
(1− z) m
2
− m
2z3
m2z2 − PB ·m2z2 + 1
m
2
PB = 0,
which gives me
PB =
(1− z +m2z2 −m2z3)
m2z2
. (5.43)
As m > 1 this is deﬁned for all z ∈ (0, 1).
I next show uniqueness when H is uniform. To solve for z I substitute PB in
the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition and solve for z. The only real root is then given
by
z∗ = − 1
3m2Υ
+Υ, (5.44)
where Υ = 3
√√
1
m4
+ 1
27m6
+ 1
m2
. There exists a unique z∗(m) that is convex
and decreasing in the interval [0, 1] when m > 1.
It is clear from the expected proﬁt of the large ﬁrm E (πL) = (1−z) E(Θ) ·PB,
coupled with the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition (5.42) that PB = 0 and PB = 0 lead
to proﬁts of zero. Then as E (πL) is continuous and diﬀerentiable and the bordered
Hessian of the second order conditions is positive, as shown in the appendix, Eq.
(5.43) describes the maximizing price of the large ﬁrm.
Claim 5.4 When H is uniform the large ﬁrm has a unique price P ∗B which is a
function of z and m and is deﬁned in Eq. (5.43). The small ﬁrms have a unique
mixed strategy F (ρ) which is a function of z∗ and m and is deﬁned in Eq. (5.20).
Proof. The proof is by construction and can be found above. The second order
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condition is in the appendix.
The expected proﬁt E (πL) of the large ﬁrm is
E∗ (πL) = (1− z)E(Θ) · P ∗B
= (1− z)2
[
m
2
+
1
2
1
z2
1
m
]
, (5.45)
where z is deﬁned by Eq. (5.44).
Expected utility under market structure (B)
A buyer visiting the large ﬁrm trades with certainty and by the buyers’ indiﬀerence
condition a buyer is, in equilibrium, indiﬀerent between the small sellers and the
large seller. Thus the expression for the buyers’ expected utility is very simple, it
is just 1 minus the large ﬁrm’s prize or,
EUB = 1− P ∗B,
where z is given by Eq. (5.44).
5.2.3 Market structure (C); All ﬁrms in diﬀerent locations
Now assume that all ﬁrms are in diﬀerent locations. Assume that proportion z of
buyers visit the small ﬁrms and proportion 1−z visit the large seller. In equilibrium
the buyers are indiﬀerent between visiting the large ﬁrm or mixing over the small
ﬁrms.
I show in the appendix that the equilibrium price of the small sellers is
q =
∫ m
0
(
1− e−zθ − zθe−zθ)h(θ)dθ∫ m
0
(1− e−zθ)h(θ)dθ . (5.46)
The only diﬀerence to the price derived in a standard directed search model
with where ﬁrms have unit capacity and demand is stochastic capacity is that the
queue length of in the market of the small ﬁrms is zθ instead of θ I later derive
z, the proportion of buyers visiting the small sellers. Next I go on by deriving the
price of the large ﬁrm.
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By going to the small ﬁrms a buyer thus expects to get
(1− q)
∫ m
0
(
1− ze−zθ)
zθ
g(θ)dθ, (5.47)
where
∫ m
0
(1−ze−zθ)
zθ
g(θ)dθ is the probability of getting the good by when the buyer
visits a small ﬁrm. Again as g(θ) = θh(θ)
E(Θ)
I can rewrite the above as
1
E(Θ)
∫ m
0
θe−zθh(θ)dθ.
Thus I again proceed by writing the buyers indiﬀerence condition between
visiting a small seller or the large seller
1
E(Θ)
∫ m
0
θe−zθh(θ)dθ = 1− PC . (5.48)
The large ﬁrm’s price is found by maximizing the large ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt with
respect to PC ,
max
PC
(
PC · (1− z)
∫ m
0
θh(θ)dθ
)
. (5.49)
The FOC is
(1− z)
∫ m
0
θh(θ)dθ −
∫ m
0
dz
dPC
θh(θ)dθ · PC = 0, (5.50)
where I ﬁnd dz
dPC
= E(Θ)∫m
0 θ
2e−zθh(θ)dθ by totally diﬀerentiating the buyers’ indiﬀerence
condition. I can now solve for the large ﬁrm’s price
PC =
(1− z) ∫ m
0
θ2e−zθh(θ)dθ
E(Θ)
. (5.51)
To see that PC is unique I show that there is a unique z ∈ [0, 1] that solves the
buyers’ indiﬀerence condition 1
E(Θ)
∫ m
0
θe−zθh(θ)dθ = 1− PC . I get
E(Θ)−
∫ m
0
θe−zθh(θ)dθ = (1− z)
∫ m
0
θ2e−zθh(θ)dθ. (5.52)
I begin by renaming the LHS and RHS of Eq. (5.52) as f(z) and g(z) respec-
tively. As f(0) = 0 and g(0) = E(θ2); f(1) = E(Θ) − ∫ m
0
θe−θh(θ)dθ > 0 and
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g(1) = 0; and f ′(z) =
∫ m
0
θ2e−zθh(θ)dθ > 0 and g′(z) =
∫ m
0
θ2e−zθh(θ)dθ − (1 −
z)
∫ m
0
θ3e−zθh(θ)dθ < 0. Hence f(z) and g(z) cross once only and it is clear that
a unique z exists. I still need to show that PC maximizes the proﬁt of the large
ﬁrm. I again need to switch to a uniform distribution H. The key equations are
then as follows.
The equilibrium price of the small sellers is
q =
∫ m
0
(
1− e−zθ − zθe−zθ)h(θ)dθ∫ m
0
(1− e−zθ)h (θ) dθ =
2e−mz +mz +mze−mz − 2
e−mz +mz − 1 . (5.53)
The expected utility of a buyer going to a small ﬁrm is (1 − q) times the
probability of ending up with the good. This is
(1− q)
∫ m
0
(
1− e−zθ)
zθ
g(θ)dθ = −2
(
e−mz +mze−mz − 1
m2z2
)
.
as g(θ) = θh(θ)
E(Θ)
and H is uniform.
The buyers’ indiﬀerence condition is thus
−2
(
e−mz +mze−mz − 1
m2z2
)
= 1− PC . (5.54)
The large ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize its expected proﬁt
max
PC
PC · (1− z) m
2
. (5.55)
The FOC is
(1− z) m
2
− dz
dPC
m
2
· PC = 0, (5.56)
where I ﬁnd dz
dPC
= m
2z3
(4−4e−mz−2m2z2e−mz−4mze−mz)by totally diﬀerentiating the buyers’
indiﬀerence condition. I can thus rewrite the FOC as
m (1− z) (4− 4e−mz − 2m2z2e−mz − 4mze−mz)− PCm3z3 = 0,
allowing me to ﬁnd the large ﬁrm’s price
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PC =
(1− z) (4− 4e−mz − 2m2z2e−mz − 4mze−mz)
m2z3
(5.57)
To ﬁnd z I substitute PC into the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition. I get
−2z−4e−mz+2ze−mz−m2z3−2m2z2e−mz+2m2z3e−mz−4mze−mz+2mz2e−mz+4 = 0.
This expression allows me to solve for z as a function of m. I am, however, not
able to do so analytically but instead solve it numerically for speciﬁc values of m.
In these instances there is a unique z between zero and one. For instance, when
m = 3 I get z ≈ 0.3894 and PC ≈ 0.522 53. I show that the second order condition
holds in the appendix.
Claim 5.5 When all sellers are separate the small sellers have price q and the
large seller has price P ∗C deﬁned as in Eq. (5.57).
Proof. The proof can be found above. The second order condition is found in the
appendix.
5.2.4 Expected utility under market structure (C)
In equilibrium a buyer has to be indiﬀerent between visiting a small seller or the
large seller. When H is uniform the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition is given by Eq.
(5.54). As a buyer expects the same utility from both markets the expected utility
of a buyer under market structure (C) is simply
EUC = 1− PC = 21− e
−mz −mze−mz
m2z2
. (5.58)
5.3 Comparing the expected prices and proﬁts
In this section I compare the three market structures when demand H follows the
uniform distribution. In the picture below I show the expected prices as a function
of potential demand m. I begin by describing the market structure (A) where all
sellers are in the same location (denoted by red in the picture). For large values
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of m ( 3) the large ﬁrm prices at unity with a relatively high probability (> 2
3
).
In addition the lower bound of the supports of the mixed strategies of both the
large ﬁrm and the small ﬁrms is
(
m−1
m
)2
, which is increasing and approaches 1
in the limit as m approaches inﬁnity. For small values of demand, e.g. when m
approaches unity (from above) the probability γ = m−1
m
that the large ﬁrm prices
at unity approaches zero. Also the lower bound of the support of the pricing
strategies of both the large ﬁrm and the small ﬁrms tends towards zero when m
tends to unity. At values ofm at unity or below there will be Bertrand competition
and all ﬁrms will oﬀer prices of zero.
In market structure (B), with two locations, values of m at or below unity lead
to Bertrand competition and zero price just as in the one location case. For values
of potential demand m above unity the average price is, however, always lower in
market structure (B) than in market structure (A).
In market structure (C), where all sellers are separate, the sellers enjoy a
locational monopoly and thus there is no competition within a location that would
drive prices to zero even if m is below unity.
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Figure 1: Expected prices
Average prices: market structures A (red), B (blue), C (green)
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Expected proﬁts in the three market structures
In this subsection I analyze how the large seller and small sellers fare in the diﬀerent
market structures. I ﬁnd that the large ﬁrm always prefers market structure (A) to
market structure (B). When potential demand is low (m  1.9) the large ﬁrm is
even better oﬀ in market structure (C) where all ﬁrms are separate. The reason is
that both in market structure (A) and in market structure (B) competition within
the small sellers’ location drives the prices towards down zero when m approaches
one. In both of these market structures the large ﬁrm then has to respond by
lowering it’s expected price as well. When all sellers are separate there is no
within location competition to drive the prices to zero when m approaches one
as discussed in connection to the average prices. Market structure (C) becomes
relatively worse for the large seller compared to the other market structures when
m becomes larger. The reason for this is that the capacity constraints of the small
ﬁrms’ locations forces them to quote relatively low prices even for high values of
m. This in turn means that the large ﬁrm must quote a low price as well (A direct
consequence is e.g. that the large ﬁrm never quotes price unity) in order to entice
any buyers to visit its location.
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Figure 2: Large firm's profit
Large ﬁrm’s proﬁt; A (red), B (blue), C (green)
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Proposition 5.6 The large ﬁrm is better-oﬀ in market structure (A) than in mar-
ket structure (B)
Proof. The proof is by simple calculation of the expected proﬁts of the large ﬁrm.
Proposition 5.7 The small ﬁrms are better oﬀ in market structure (B) than in
market structure (A) when potential demand is low10, otherwise they are better of
together with the large ﬁrm.
The result is obtained by comparing the expected proﬁts of the small ﬁrms
under the diﬀerent market structures. First note that the small ﬁrms want to be
in a market structure where they are all separate only when m is very close to
one (m<1.065) for reasons discussed above. When all ﬁrms are located together
a small ﬁrm expects to get (1−H(1)) γ, with H uniform this is equal to (m−1
m
)2
.
When the large ﬁrm is located separately from the small ﬁrms the small ﬁrms
expect to receive 1−H(1
z
) with H uniform this is 1− 1
zm
. It is easy to verify that
the small ﬁrms are better-oﬀ in market structure (B) than in market structure (A)
when m  2.27 as shown in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: A small firm's profit
A small ﬁrm’s proﬁt; A (red), B (blue), C (green)
10When H is uniform low means m  2.27
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Expected utility of the buyers
The expected utility of the buyers in the three market structures is straightforward
to calculate. When all ﬁrms are together it is just unity minus the expected price
actually paid or
EUA = 1− EPPA,
as all buyers are always served. When the large ﬁrm and the small ﬁrms are
at two diﬀerent locations a buyer must be indiﬀerent between the two locations.
As the large ﬁrm has enough capacity to satisfy the whole market the expected
utility of a buyer is simply one minus the large ﬁrm’s price i.e.
EUB = 1− PB(z(m),m).
The expected utility when all sellers are separate is analogous to the two lo-
cations case. The expected utility of a buyer when all sellers are separate is thus
simply11
EUC = 1− PC(z(m),m).
Figure 4 shows the expected utilities as functions of potential demand m. One
immediately sees that the relative order depends on potential demand.
For relatively low m ( 5) the buyers are best oﬀ in market structure (A)
(the red curve). In this setting there are no frictions and competition within the
location keeps the prices low. As m grows the probability that the large ﬁrm
prices at unity increases. So does the lower bound of the support of the mixed
strategies of both the large and the small ﬁrms. These eﬀects are large enough to
overcome the costs of the frictions (some of the buyers visiting the small ﬁrms are
left without a good) inherent in the other two market structures so that for a high
m (15.5) market structure (A) actually becomes the worst for the buyers.
Market structure (B) (the blue curve) is worse for the buyers than market
structure (A) for values of m lower than 15.5 for the reasons just described. The
between locations competition, however, means that the large ﬁrm never prices
at unity in the two-locations setting. In fact, with high potential demand the
11Note that the z’s are diﬀerent for the two relevant market structures
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prices will still be low enough to compensate for the loss of the cost from frictions
compared to market structure (A). Market structure (B) is thus better then
market structure (A) for high vales of potential demand.
When all ﬁrms are separate (the green curve) the cost of frictions are at their
highest. There is competition between locations but no within location compe-
tition to drive prices to zero when potential demand is low. For small values of
potential demand (m  2) the last eﬀect dominates and market structure (C) is
actually the best for buyers.
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Figure 4: Expected utilities
Expected utilities; A (red), B (blue), C (green)
5.3.1 Exponential distribution
In this section I compare the market structures when demand follows the expo-
nential distribution. The reason I have chosen the exponential distribution is that
it leads to quite diﬀerent pricing strategies compared to when demand is uniform.
This is true especially for market structure A, where the large ﬁrm has a pure
strategy price of unity when demand is exponential.12 As the pricing equilibria
in all three market structures are unique also when demand is exponential the
comparison of the three market structures is informative.
12I derive the pricing strategies of the ﬁrms under exponential demand in the appendix
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Realized demand θ follows the exponential distribution Ĥ (θ) = 1− e−ηθ and
the support of Ĥ is [0.∞]. There is thus no upper bound for potential demand. In
order to compare the outcomes to those in the uniform demand case I use the fact
that the expected demand is 1
η
when Ĥ is exponential and m
2
when H is uniform.
Thus I let
η =
2
m
.
The fact that the support of Ĥ under the exponential demand is unbounded
from above has the immediate eﬀect that within-location competition will not drive
prices to zero when all ﬁrms are together even for values of m at or below unity.
When Ĥ is exponential the large ﬁrm will interestingly have a pure pricing strategy
at unity when all sellers are in the same location (market structure (A)). The
expected price of the large ﬁrm is thus higher than under the uniform distribution.
The expected prices paid are driven down toward zero by competition between the
small ﬁrms for low values of m, just as when demand is uniform. (The eﬀect of
the large ﬁrm’s price unity is that the expected prices under market structure (A)
remain above zero even for very small levels of demand). Under market structure
(C) all ﬁrms have a locational monopoly thus protecting them from within-location
competition that would drive the expected prices paid to zero for low levels of
expected demand.
The three pictures below compare the market structures under the exponential
distribution. Given m the relative ordering of the expected price, expected price
paid and the expected utilities diﬀer quite a lot compared to when H is uniform
as can be seen by comparing ﬁgures 5 and 6 with ﬁgures 1 and 2. Except for the
eﬀect of the changes in the large ﬁrm’s pricing strategy when all ﬁrms are together
the intuitions from the uniform H cases are valid.
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Figure 5: Expected prices (exponential demand)
Market structures A (red), B (blue), C (green)
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Figure 6: Expected utilities (exponential demand)
Expected utilities, A (red), B (blue), C (green)
5.4 Conclusion
I derive the equilibrium pricing strategies under three often observed market struc-
tures in a model with one large ﬁrm and a competitive fringe of small ﬁrms. These
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pricing strategies are nontrivial and interesting in themselves as they reﬂect the
varying levels of frictions and within-location competition induced by the market
structures at diﬀerent levels of expected demand. An implication of the complexity
of the pricing strategies is that a sample of posted prices and a simple index based
on these is not enough for comparing the market structures in terms of expected
prices, expected revenues or expected utilities.
In addition to knowledge of the market structure also the speciﬁc distribution of
realized demand is needed to describe the sellers’ pricing strategies. This becomes
most apparent in market structure (A), where all sellers are in the same location;
I show that the large ﬁrm has a unique pure price at unity when demand is
exponential and a mixed pricing strategy with an atom at unity when demand
is uniformly distributed.
The logical next step would be to endogenize the market structure. This,
however, leads to surprising technical diﬃculties even with the simple demand
distributions considered in this article and will be left for future work.
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Appendix 5.A Proofs
Deriving the price paid in market structure (A)
In order to be able to compare the diﬀerent market structures with each other I
solve for the expected price actually paid when H is uniform. I begin with market
structure (A), where all ﬁrms are in the same location. From Eq. (5.18) we know
that
EPPA =
∫ 1
a
Ω (q) g (q) dq + γ · Ω(1),
with Ω (q) deﬁned as
Ω (q) =
∫ F (q)
0
∫ F−1(θ)
a
qf(q)dqh(θ)dθ+
∫ m
F (q)
∫ q
a
qF (q)
θ
f(q)dqh(θ)dθ+
∫ m
F (q)
q
θ
(θ−F (q))h(θ)dθ.
As EPPA is rather complex I split it up and begin by solving the expression for
γ · Ω(1) when H is uniform. I get
γ · Ω(1) = γ
(∫ 1
0
∫ F (θ)−1
a
qf(q)dqh(θ)dθ +
∫ m
1
1
(θ − 1)
θ
· 1h(θ)dθ +
∫ m
1
∫ 1
a
1
θ
f(q)dqh(θ)d(θ)
)
=
(
m− 1
m
)2(
(m− 1)2
m
(
ln
(
m
m− 1
)
− 1
m
)
+ 1− lnm
m
− 1
m
+
1
m2
(lnm) (m− 1)
)
.
Next I look at
∫ 1
a
Ω (q) g (q) dq. The ﬁrst term in the integrand can be written as
∫ F (q)
0
∫ F−1(θ)
a
qf(q)dqh(θ)dθ =
(m− 1)2
m
(
ln
(
m
m− F (q)
)
− F (q)
m
)
.
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The second term in the integrand simpliﬁes to∫ m
F (q)
q
θ
(θ − F (q)) 1
m
dθ
=
[
− 1
m
√
q (ln θ −m ln θ −√qθ +m√q ln θ)
]m
F (q)
=
1
m
√
q
(
m+ ln 1√
q
(
m
√
q −m+ 1)− lnm−m ln 1√
q
(
m
√
q −m+ 1)
+m lnm+m
√
q ln 1√
q
(
m
√
q −m+ 1)−m√q lnm− 1
)
.
The third term can be written as∫ m
F (q)
∫ q
a
q
θ
f(q)dqh(θ)dθF (q) = F (q)
∫ m
F (q)
1
θ
(√
q(m− 1)− (m− 1)
2
m
)
h(θ)dθ
= F (q)
m− 1
m2
(
ln
m
F (q)
)(
m
√
q −m+ 1
)
=
1
m2
√
q
(
ln
mq
mq − (m− 1)√q
)
(m− 1) (m√q −m+ 1)2 .
Now ∫ 1
a
Ω (q) g (q) dq =
∫ 1
a
Ω (q)
(
m− 1
2m
)
q−
3
2dq
=
1
2m
(m− 1)
(
m+m
(
ln 1
m2
(m− 1)2) (m−1
m
)
+m
(
ln m
2
(m−1)2
) (
m−1
m
)− 1
)
− 1
2m3
(m− 1)3
(
m+m ln
m2
(m− 1)2 − 1
)
+
(
m− 1
2m
)
1
m
∫ 1
(m−1m )
2
⎛⎜⎜⎝
m+ ln 1√
q
(
m
√
q −m+ 1)− lnm
−m ln 1√
q
(
m
√
q −m+ 1)+m lnm
+m
√
q ln 1√
q
(
m
√
q −m+ 1)−m√q lnm− 1
⎞⎟⎟⎠ q−1dq
+
∫ 1
(m−1m )
2
1
m2
(
ln
mq
mq − (m− 1)√q
)
(m− 1) (m√q −m+ 1)2
(
m− 1
2m
)
q−2dq.
Below I plot the expected price paid as a function of m.
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The expected price actually paid as a function of m
Proof that the large ﬁrm’s price PB is unique inmarket struc-
ture (B)
I analyze market structure (B), where the large ﬁrm is in one location and all
small ﬁrms are in another location. The large ﬁrm’s maximization problem is
max
PB
(1− z) m
2
· PB s.t. (1− PB)− 1
m2z2
= 0.
The Lagrangian is thus
Z = (1− z) m
2
· PB + λ
(
(1− PB)− 1
m2z2
)
.
The ﬁrst order conditions are:
∂
∂z
(
(1− z) m
2
PB + λ
(
(1− PB)− 1
m2z2
))
=
1
2m2z3
(
4λ− PBm3z3
)
= 0,
∂
∂PB
(
(1− z) m
2
PB + λ
(
(1− PB)− 1
m2z2
))
=
1
2
m− λ− 1
2
mz = 0,
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and
∂
∂λ
(
(1− z) m
2
PB + λ
(
(1− PB)− 1
m2z2
))
= − 1
m2z2
(
PBm
2z2 −m2z2 + 1) = 0.
This system of equations has one real solution. It is
z = − 1
3m2 3
√√
1
m4
+ 1
27m6
+ 1
m2
+
3
√√
1
m4
+
1
27m6
+
1
m2
,
PB =
(
−18m2 3
√√
1
m4
+ 1
27m6
+ 1
m2
2
)(
−3m2 3
√√
1
m4
+ 1
27m6
+ 1
m2
+ 3m2 3
√√
1
m4
+ 1
27m6
+ 1
m2
2
− 1
)
(
3m2 3
√√
1
m4
+ 1
27m6
+ 1
m2
2
− 1
)3 ,
and
λ = −
−3m2 3
√√
1
m4
+ 1
27m6
+ 1
m2
+ 3m2 3
√√
1
m4
+ 1
27m6
+ 1
m2
2
− 1
6m 3
√√
1
m4
+ 1
27m6
+ 1
m2
.
It is easy to see that PB and z are between zero and one for m > 1. In addition
it is clear that the corner solutions PB = 0 and PB = 1 give the large ﬁrm zero
proﬁts.
I next show that the second order conditions are satisﬁed. The bordered
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Hessian is
∣∣H∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 gPB gz
gPB ZPP ZPz
gz ZzP Zzz
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 2ZPz · gP · gz − ZPP · (gz)2 − Zzz (gP )2
=
2m
m2z3
+ 6
λ
m2z4
,
where gP = −1, gz = 2m2z3 , gPz = 0, gPP = 0, gzz = − 6m2z4 , gzP = 0. Inserting the
critical points we get
∣∣H∣∣ = 2m
m2z3
+ 6
λ
m2z4
> 0,
Thus the critical values describe a local maximum. As there is only one set of
real valued critical points the maximum is unique.
Deriving the small ﬁrms’ price under market structure (C)
In market structure (C) all ﬁrms are in diﬀerent locations. The derivation of
the small ﬁrms’ price when they are dispersed and there is demand uncertainty
is quite standard and can be found e.g. in Kultti (2008). For completeness I,
however, include the outline of the proof below. The only diﬀerence with Kultti is
that in the current setting only proportion z (which is determined endogenously
in section 5.3) of the buyers contact the small ﬁrms. The market tightness in this
market is thus zθ = φ.
Outline of proof
When all sellers quote the same price the queue length, or the number of buyers
that a seller expects, is Poisson-distributed with parameter φ. As in chapter 1 of
this thesis I denote the equilibrium price with q, and look for deviations to price
q˜ by measure  of the sellers. Then I ﬁnd the ﬁrst order condition for the optimal
deviation q˜ and impose the equilibrium requirement q˜ = q. Then letting  approach
zero I ﬁnd the equilibrium price.
The buyers need to be indiﬀerent between visiting the deviators and the non-
deviators. Assume that proportion y of the buyers visit the deviating sellers. The
queue length facing the non-deviators is then α = 1−y
1−	φ and the queue length
facing the deviators is β = y
	
φ. The buyers’ indiﬀerence condition is thus
CHAPTER 5. MARKET STRUCTURE AND PRICING 142
(1− q)
m∫
0
[
1− e−α
α
]
g(θ)dθ = (1− q˜)
m∫
0
[
1− e−β
β
]
g(θ)dθ.
By totally diﬀerentiating the indiﬀerence condition I get
dy
dq˜
= −
m∫
0
1−e−β
β
g(θ)dθ.
∫ m
0
(1− q) (1−e−α−αe−α
α2
) (
φ
1−	
)
g (θ) dθ + (1− q)
(
1−e−β−βe−β
β2
) (
φ
	
)
g (θ) dθ
,
(5.59)
where g (θ) = θh(θ)
E(Θ)
.
A deviating ﬁrm maximizes his proﬁt, i.e., price times probability of trade
max
q˜
∫ m
0
q˜
[
1− e−β]h (θ) dθ. (5.60)
The ﬁrst order condition is∫ m
0
(
1− e−β + q˜e−β φ

dy
dq˜
)
h (θ) dθ = 0. (5.61)
In a symmetric equilibrium q˜ = q and α = β = φ. Inserting these into (5.59) and
(5.61) and letting  approach zero gives us the equilibrium price
q =
∫ m
0
(
1− e−zθ − zθe−zθ) dθ∫ m
0
(1− e−zθ) dθ .
The second order condition and equilibrium conditions are satisﬁed and can be
found in Kultti (2012). I do not derive them here as the derivation is done similarly
as in the proof for Proposition 2 in chapter two of this theses.
Second order condition for large ﬁrm in market structure (C)
The large ﬁrm’s objective is to maximize its expected proﬁt subject to the
indiﬀerence condition.
max
P
(1− z) m
2
· P s.t.1− P + 2
(
e−mz +mze−mz − 1
m2z2
)
= 0
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The Lagrangian is thus
Z = (1− z) m
2
· P + λ
(
1− P + 2
(
e−mz +mze−mz − 1
m2z2
))
.
The ﬁrst order conditions are:
∂
∂P
(1− z) m
2
· P + λ
(
1− P + 2
(
e−mz +mze−mz − 1
m2z2
))
=
1
2
m− λ− 1
2
mz = 0,
∂
∂λ
(
(1− z) m
2
· P + λ
(
1− P + 2
(
e−mz +mze−mz − 1
m2z2
)))
= 1− P + 2
(
e−mz +mze−mz − 1
m2z2
)
= 0,
and
∂
∂z
(
(1− z) m
2
· P + λ
(
1− P + 2
(
e−mz +mze−mz − 1
m2z2
)))
= − 1
2m2z3
(
8λe−mz − 8λ+ Pm3z3 + 4m2z2λe−mz + 8mzλe−mz) = 0.
Now it is next to impossible to solve this system of equations analytically. The
easiest way to see this is by solving P = 1+2
(
e−mz+mze−mz−1
m2z2
)
and λ = 1
2
m(1−z)
from the ﬁrst two FOCs and substituting in the third to get
2z+4e−mz−2ze−mz+m2z3+2m2z2e−mz−2m2z3e−mz+4mze−mz−2mz2e−mz−4 = 0,
an expression from which a closed form solution for z very hard to ﬁnd indeed.
For speciﬁc values of m > 1 it is however possible to solve for z. Solving for z
numerically with Maple I plot it below
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Note that when z is as above the system of FOCs has a unique solution. I can
show numerically for diﬀerent values for potential demand m, that the solution to
the FOCs describes a maximum. The bordered Hessian is
∣∣H∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
0 gP gz
gPB ZPP ZPz
gz ZzP Zzz
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣ = 2ZPz · gP · gz − ZPP · (gz)2 − Zzz (gP )2
= − 1
mz3
(
4e−mz + 2m2z2e−mz + 4mze−mz − 4)−
1
m2z4
(
12λe−mz − 12λ+ 6m2z2λe−mz + 2m3z3λe−mz + 12mzλe−mz)
= −2
−6λ+ 6λe−mz − 2mz + 2m2z2e−mz +m3z3e−mz
+2mze−mz + 3m2z2λe−mz +m3z3λe−mz + 6mzλe−mz
m2z4
,
where gP = −1, gz = − 1m2z3 (4e−mz + 2m2z2e−mz + 4mze−mz − 4), ZPP = 0,
ZPz = −12m = ZzP , gP = −1, gz = 2m2z3 , ZPP = 0 and
Zzz =
1
m2z4
(12λe−mz − 12λ+ 6m2z2λe−mz + 2m3z3λe−mz + 12mzλe−mz). For val-
ues of m > 1 the Hessian is positive. For example, letting m = 3 and inserting the
critical values for λ and PC I get
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∣∣H∣∣ ≈ 4.22 > 0.
Thus the critical values describe a local maximum. As there seems to be only one
set of real valued critical points the maximum is unique.
Deriving the expected prices when Ĥ is exponen-
tial
Market structure (A)
I assume that all sellers’ are in the same location. A buyer visiting the location
will then choose to buy the cheapest good (as long as the price is at most 1).
If a small ﬁrm charges the same price as the large ﬁrm I assume that the buyer
prefers the small ﬁrm. To ﬁnd the equilibrium prices I ﬁrst assume that the large
operator uses pure strategy when all small operators are in the same location with
it. The large operator asks price q. Now in a prospective equilibrium q has to be
the highest price. The large operator is assumed to have unlimited capacity. If the
large ﬁrm quotes price q = 1 it will trade only assuming that there are more buyers
than small ﬁrms. Ĥ follows the exponential distribution with support [0,∞).
I next determine whether there is a proﬁtable deviation for the large ﬁrm to
price 1− Ĥ(1) from the prospective equilibrium where the large ﬁrm asks price 1.
In the candidate equilibrium the large ﬁrm earns∫ ∞
1
(θ − 1)ĥ(θ)dθ =
∫ ∞
1
θĥ(θ)dθ −
[
1− Ĥ(1)
]
=
∫ ∞
1
θηe−ηθdθ − e−η = 1
η
e−η.
(5.62)
A small player with price 1 makes∫ ∞
1
ηe−ηθdθ = e−η.
It is, again, easy to see that the small players use mixed strategy F with support
[e−η, 1] Consider a small ﬁrm that chooses price p ∈ [e−η, 1]. Its expected proﬁt is
given by
p
∫ ∞
F (p)
ĥηe−ηθdθ = pe−F (p)η = e−η, (5.63)
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as ln p− ηF (p) = −η and F (p) = ln p+η
η
. The large ﬁrm doesn’t have a proﬁtable
deviation as asking price y ∈ (e−η, 1) yields
y
∫ ∞
F (y)
ηe−ηθ (θ − F (y)) dθ
= y
(
− [θe−ηθ]∞
F (y)
+
∫ ∞
F (y)
e−ηθdθ + F (y)
[
θe−ηθ
]∞
F (y)
)
=
y
η
e−ηF (y) =
y
η
e−η−ln y =
1
η
e−η. (5.64)
The large ﬁrm asks price 1, the small ﬁrms use mixed strategy
F (p) =
ln p+ η
η
, (5.65)
with support p ∈ [e−η, 1] .
f(p) =
∂
∂p
η + ln p
η
=
1
pη
=
1
pη
(5.66)
Note that the equilibrium where the large ﬁrm asks price unity and the small
ﬁrms mix using F (p) = ln p+η
η
is unique. Below I sketch the proof. Assume ﬁrst
that both ﬁrms have mixed strategies. Denote the small ﬁrms’ mixed strategy on[
a˜, A˜
]
by F˜ and the large ﬁrm’s mixed strategy on
[
b˜, B˜
]
by G˜. Note ﬁrst that
as long as there are no atoms B˜ = 1 since otherwise there would be a proﬁtable
deviation upwards from B˜ for the large ﬁrm. Notice that A˜ = 1 since otherwise
there would be a gap between A˜ and B˜; in this case the large ﬁrm could deviate
by choosing a mass point at B˜ = 1 and choosing prices between A˜ and unity with
probability zero.13 A small ﬁrm would trade with probability zero if it chose price
A˜ = 1 unless the large ﬁrm had a mass point at B˜ = 1. Next I consider this
equilibrium denoting the mass at unity by γ˜.
Now a small ﬁrm pricing at unity makes γ˜
∫∞
1
ηe−ηθdθ = γ˜e−η. It is clear that
b˜ cannot be smaller than a˜ or the large ﬁrm would have a proﬁtable deviation from
price b˜ to price a˜. Thus b˜ ≥ a˜ and a˜ = γ˜e−η.as it is in the support of the small
13Of course B cannot be less than A since small ﬁrms choosing a price above B would never
sell.
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ﬁrms. Now it is clear that b˜ > a˜ as otherwise the large ﬁrm would have a deviation
to unity where it makes 1
η
e−η (at b˜ = a˜ it would get the whole demand but still
make only
∫∞
1
θĥ(θ)dθ = γ˜
η
e−η). In the case where b˜ > a˜ it must be that the small
ﬁrms mixed strategy F˜ (p) = F (p) = ln p+η
η
as for F˜ (y) > F (y) the large ﬁrm
would again have a deviation to unity (as can be seen from Eq. (5.70)). But as
b˜ > a˜ F˜ (p) = F (p) at b˜ is impossible. Thus there cannot exist a mixed strategy
for the large ﬁrm.
To scale assume that η = 2
m
. The expected price is
m
m+ 1
+
∫ 1
0
(
1
η
− e−η
η
)
ηe−ηθdθ
m+ 1
=
m
m+ 1
−
∫ 1
0
e−
2
m
θ dθ
e−
2
m − 1
m+ 1
. (5.67)
The expected price actually paid is
∫ 1
0
∫ F−1(θ)
a
pf(p)dpĥ(θ)dθ +
∫ ∞
1
1
(θ − 1)
θ
· 1ĥ(θ)dθ +
∫ ∞
1
∫ 1
a
p
θ
f(p)dpĥ(θ)d(θ).
The ﬁrst term is
∫ 1
0
∫ F−1(θ)
e−η
pf(p)dpĥ(θ)dθ =
∫ 1
0
∫ F−1(θ)
e−η
1
η
dpĥ(θ)dθ =
∫ 1
0
(
F−1(θ)
η
− e
−η
η
)
ηe−ηθdθ
=
∫ 1
0
(
e−η+θη
η
− e
−η
η
)
ηe−ηθdθ
=
1
η
e−η
(
η + e−η − 1) .
The second term is
∫ ∞
0
(θ − 1)
θ
ηe−ηθdθ = η
∫ ∞
0
1
θ
e−θη (θ − 1) dθ
= η Ei (∞η)− η Ei (η) + e−η.
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The third term is
∫ ∞
1
∫ 1
a
p
θ
f(p)dpĥ(θ)d(θ) =
∫ ∞
1
∫ 1
a
1
θη
dpηe−ηθdθ
=
∫ ∞
1
(
1
θη
− e
−η
θη
)
ηe−ηθdθ =
[
Ei (θη)
(
e−η − 1)]∞
1
= Ei (η∞) (e−η − 1)− Ei (η) (e−η − 1) .
Plotting the expected price paid as a function of η = 2
m
I get the following.
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Equivalently I can plot the expected price paid as a function of m.
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Expected price (red) and expected actually paid price (green) as functions of m
Market structure (B)
I next consider price and expected utilities in market structure (B), where the
small ﬁrms are located together in one location but separately from the large ﬁrm.
Kultti (2008) considered a model with small sellers and should that they prefer to
locate close together to locating separately. I proceed to ﬁnd equilibrium prices
and expected utilities in this case.
Assume that fraction z of buyers go to small ﬁrms and fraction 1 − z go to
the large ﬁrm. The small ﬁrms will in this case price using a mixed strategy
with support [a, 1], and the large ﬁrm quotes price PB. As before, it is clear that
F (1) = 1.
A ﬁrm quoting price A can then expect to get A · (1− Ĥ(1
z
)). As the expected
proﬁt must be the same over the support I easily ﬁnd that
a = 1− Ĥ(1
z
) = 1− (1− e− ηz ) = e− ηz .
A small ﬁrm asking price ρ ∈ [e− ηz , 1] can thus expect
ρ
(
1− Ĥ
(
F (ρ)
z
))
= e−
η
z . (5.68)
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From this I solve
1− e
− η
z
ρ
= 1− e− ηF (ρ)z
⇔ −ηF (ρ)
z
= −η
z
− log(ρ).
Thus
F (ρ) =
z
η
(η
z
+ log(ρ)
)
= 1 +
z
η
log(ρ). (5.69)
A large ﬁrm can expect the following proﬁt
PB
∫ ∞
0
(1− z)θηe−ηθdθ = Π(PB). (5.70)
To continue I ﬁrst look at the expected utilities of buyers that go to the small
ﬁrms. The small ﬁrms price using mixed strategies. To make calculations easier I
follow Kultti (2008) and assume that all sellers charge the expected price. I denote
the expected utility of buyers visiting the small ﬁrms by u(z, F ). A buyer going to
a large seller knows that he can expect to get 1− PB.
In equilibrium the following must hold:
u(z, F ) = 1− PB, (5.71)
and
Π′(PB) = 0. (5.72)
Next I look at the small ﬁrms’ pricing decision. I pretend that every small ﬁrm
asks the same price r. I get
r
∫ 1
z
0
θz
1
ηe−ηθdθ +
(
e−
η
z
)
r = e−
η
z . (5.73)
From this I solve the small seller’s expected price
r =
e−
η
z(
e−
η
z
)
+
∫ 1
z
0
θz
1
ηe−ηθdθ
. (5.74)
Then the buyers’ expected utility conditional on being alive is
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(1− r)
[∫ 1
z
0
g (θ) dθ +
∫ ∞
1
z
1
zθ
g (θ) dθ
]
, (5.75)
where g(θ) = θh(θ)
E(Θ)
.
The buyer must be indiﬀerent between visiting the large ﬁrm and going to the
small ﬁrms.
(1− r)
[∫ 1
z
0
g (θ) dθ +
∫ ∞
1
z
1
zθ
g (θ) dθ
]
= 1− PB (5.76)
it is clear that PB ≤ 1. Using Eq. (5.74) I write 1− r as
1− r =
∫ 1
z
0
θz
1
ηe−ηθdθ
e−
η
z +
∫ 1
z
0
θz
1
ηe−ηθdθ
=
z
η
− z
η
e−
1
z
η
(
1
z
η + 1
)
e−
η
z + z
η
− z
η
e−
1
z
η
(
1
z
η + 1
)
= − 1
z − ze− 1z η
(
ze−
1
z
η − z + ηe− 1z η
)
. (5.77)
Now I look at the rest of the LHS of (5.76). Remembering that g(θ) = θh(θ)
E(Θ)
I get
∫ 1
z
0
g (θ) dθ +
∫ ∞
1
z
1
zθ
g (θ) dθ
=
∫ 1
z
0
θĥ(θ)
E(Θ)
dθ +
∫ ∞
1
z
1
zθ
θĥ(θ)
E(Θ)
dθ (5.78)
= η
(∫ 1
z
0
θηe−ηθdθ +
1
z
∫ ∞
1
z
ηe−ηθdθ
)
(5.79)
= −e− 1z η
(
1
z
η + 1
)
+ 1 + η
1
z
e−
1
z
η (5.80)
= 1− e− 1z η. (5.81)
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I can now rewrite the buyers indiﬀerence condition (5.76) as
1− PB = − 1
z − ze− 1z η
(
ze−
1
z
η − z + ηe− 1z η
)
·
(
1− e− 1z η
)
= −1
z
(
ze−
1
z
η − z + ηe− 1z η
)
. (5.82)
Thus
PB = 1 +
1
z
(
ze−
1
z
η − z + ηe− 1z η
)
. (5.83)
The large ﬁrm maximizes
max
PB
∫ ∞
0
(1− z) θηe−ηθdθ · PB
The ﬁrst order condition is:∫ ∞
0
(1− z) θηe−ηθdθ −
∫ ∞
0
dz
dPB
θηe−ηθdθ · PB = 0. (5.84)
I get dz
dPB
by totally diﬀerentiating the buyers indiﬀerence condition. Rewriting
the buyers indiﬀerence condition (5.82) I get
1− PB + 1
z
(
ze−
1
z
η − z + ηe− 1z η
)
= 0. (5.85)
Totally diﬀerentiating the expression I get
dPB {−1}+ dz
{
1
z3
η2e−
1
z
η
}
= 0.
From which I solve
dz
dPB
=
1
1
z3
η2e−
1
z
η
=
z3
η2e−
1
z
η
. (5.86)
Therefore the ﬁrst order condition becomes∫ ∞
0
(1− z) θηe−ηθdθ −
∫ ∞
0
z3
η2e−
1
z
η
θηe−ηθdθ · PB = 0. (5.87)
Solving for PB I get
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PB =
(1− z)
(
η2e−
1
z
η
)
z3
. (5.88)
I solve for z by inserting (5.88) into the buyers’ indiﬀerence condition (5.87). The
only real root between zero and one is
z =
3
√
1
2
η2 +
7
54
η3 +
√
1
36
η6 +
7
54
η5 +
1
4
η4−2
9
η2
3
√
1
2
η2 + 7
54
η3 +
√
1
36
η6 + 7
54
η5 + 1
4
η4
−1
3
η,
(5.89)
When η is between zero and two, i.e., when m > 1, one notices that there is a
unique z between zero and one.
Market structure (C)
Now assume that all ﬁrms are in diﬀerent locations. Assume that proportion
z of buyers visit the small ﬁrms and proportion 1 − z visit the large seller. In
equilibrium the buyers are indiﬀerent between visiting the large ﬁrm or mixing
over the small ﬁrms.
In equilibrium the price of the small sellers is
q =
∫∞
0
(
1− e−zθ − zθe−zθ) ηe−ηθh(θ)dθ∫∞
0
(1− e−zθ) ηe−ηθh(θ)dθ =
z
z + η
. (5.90)
By going to the small ﬁrms a buyer thus expects to get
(1− q)
∫ ∞
0
(
1− e−zθ)
zθ
g(θ)dθ =
1
E(Θ)
∫ ∞
0
θe−zθĥ(θ)dθ
= η2
∫ ∞
0
θe−(z+η)θdθ
=
η2
(z + η)2
, (5.91)
where the ﬁrst equality follows from g(θ) = θh(θ)
E(Θ)
. In equilibrium a buyer has to be
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indiﬀerent between visiting a small seller or the large seller. Thus
1− PC = η
2
(z + η)2
.
Thus the large ﬁrms price is
PC = 1− η
2
(z + η)2
.
The large ﬁrm’s price is found by maximizing the large ﬁrm’s expected proﬁt with
respect to z.
max
z
(
PC · (1− z) 1
η
)
s.t. PC +
η2
(z + η)2
= 1. (5.92)
By solving the large ﬁrm’s problem I get a unique critical point,
z =
3
√
η2 + η3 +
√
28
27
η6 + 2η5 + η4− η− 1
3
η2
3
√
η2 + η3 +
√
28
27
η6 + 2η5 + η4
(5.93)
and
PC = 1− η
2(
3
√
η2 + η3 +
√
28
27
η6 + 2η5 + η4 − 1
3
η2
3
√
η2+η3+
√
28
27
η6+2η5+η4
)2 .
By the SOC, e.g. by showing that the bordered Hessian is positive at the critical
point, I can show that z and PC describe a unique maximum.
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